

The Architecture of Genocidal Starvation in Gaza, March – August 2025

18 March – 1 August 2025

This report was prepared by Forensic Architecture (FA) with the World Peace Foundation. It is published as part of FA's independent and ongoing research into the Israeli military's conduct in Gaza since October. As part of FA's mandate, this report is made available for public dissemination and legal forums.

This report is also made available in support of the Republic of South Africa's (SA) request to the United Nations General Assembly and Economic and Social Council to take immediate action in relation to the genocidal starvation being inflicted on the Palestinian population in Gaza, in terms of Article VIII of the Genocide Convention. This report considers starvation in Gaza and includes references to a publicly available version of Professor Alex de Waal's Expert Report, 'The Sociology of Genocidal Starvation' as well as references to the publicly available version of the affidavit and sworn testimony of Dr Nick Maynard, filed in support of SA's request under Article VIII.

8 August 2025

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A GLOSSARY

- ¹ **Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF)** — The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation or GHF was founded in February 2025 in the US. Officially independent, it has been backed by the US and Israel to distribute humanitarian aid in Gaza.¹ The GHF is viewed by some observers as part of a broader strategy to weaken existing governance structures in Gaza and to channel aid through alternative systems which are under the overall coordination of Israel. International NGOs and local civil society actors, have raised concerns over transparency, accountability, and the politicisation of aid under the GHF's control.²
- ² **Civilians** — Under international humanitarian law (IHL), a civilian is defined as anyone who is not a combatant.³ In cases in which there is doubt whether a person is a civilian, they are considered to be a civilian. The burden is on the party initiating the attack to provide evidence that they had reasonable belief the individual was a combatant.
- ³ **Clans** — Clans are extended family networks that form an important part of Palestinian society. They often comprise hundreds or even thousands of members connected through extended familial relations. Historically, clans have served as informal mechanisms for dispute resolution and have provided economic safety nets to their members during times of crisis. They can also be powerful political actors, often have access to arms, and/or are affiliated with, or asked to support, one of the political factions in Gaza.⁴ Their affiliation, resources, role and influence of vary. For example, some clans are associated with Hamas, others are against Hamas or more aligned with Fatah and the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority. Israel has historically sought to exploit the clan structure to undermine urban and nationalist Palestinian movements, most notably by creating and arming elements of the rural clan leadership through the establishment of the so-called Village Leagues.⁵ Since October 2023, similar strategies have re-emerged, with Israel attempting to mobilise certain clans to bypass civil institutions, and establish parallel mechanisms for aid distribution.⁶ When Palestinian police have been attacked, the clans have also protected aid deliveries and taken charge of maintaining some areas of public order.
- ⁴ **Aid organisations** — Humanitarian organisations active in Gaza during the period of analysis of this report, whether through international staff that manage to enter Gaza, or their local staff in Gaza. They include the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the World Food

¹ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/08/un-experts-call-immediate-dismantling-gaza-humanitarian-foundation>

² <https://web.archive.org/web/20250612022025/https://www.middleeasteye.net/live-blog/live-blog-update/us-legal-advocacy-organisation-puts-gaza-humanitarian-foundation-legal>

³ <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v2/rule5>

⁴ https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/tribes-and-clans/

⁵ <https://www.newarab.com/news/gaza-are-village-leagues-planned-replace-hamas-rule>

⁶ <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/08/03/israel-gaza-clans-abu-shabab/>

Programme (WFP), the Red Crescent Society, World Central Kitchen (WCK), Oxfam, and American Near East Refugee Aid (Anera).

- 5 **Merchants** — Merchants sell goods and services, such as food and other essential goods. In Gaza, merchants play vital roles in the distribution of aid and currency, keeping the economy and everyday life running despite Israeli blockade and goods shortage. Some merchants in Gaza have been accused of selling stolen aid or hoarding commodities to sell at heavily inflated prices during times of scarcity. Some merchants coordinate with the Israeli military to allow commodities to reach their warehouses.
- 6 **Palestinian Police and the Sahm Unit** — A Palestinian-run police force is still operating in Gaza, under Gaza's Interior Ministry.⁷ The Sahm Unit is a unit of that police force tasked with, amongst other things, preventing aid diversion, and cracking down on merchants who sell stolen aid. The Sahm Unit includes members affiliated with Hamas as well as members of other Palestinian political factions. Both Palestinian police and the Sahm Unit are distinct bodies to Hamas's combatants operating under Al-Qassam Brigades.
- 7 **Gangs** — Since October 2023, criminal organisations have looted aid trucks to sell commodities in the market for inflated prices.⁸ Hundreds of convicted criminals serving sentences in Palestinian prisons escaped early in the conflict after prisons were bombed by Israel or police fled.⁹ The Israeli military has not taken meaningful action against gangs who divert aid.¹⁰
- 8 **Local collaborators** — Members of gangs and individuals operating in coordination with the Israeli military or in Israeli-controlled areas, the most prominent example being Abu Shabab's group.
- 9 **Abu Shabab's group** — An armed faction operating primarily in Israeli-controlled Rafah, that refers to itself as the 'Popular Forces' and sometimes the 'Counter Terrorism Service'. It is led by Yasser Abu Shabab, who had previously been imprisoned on drug-related charges and escaped during the Israeli bombardment in October 2023.¹¹ The group is estimated to be composed of around three hundred armed fighters and have been observed working along the Morag corridor.¹² In June 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly acknowledged that Israel had provided weapons to anti-Hamas groups in Gaza, including the so-called Popular Forces.¹³ While the group claims to protect civilians and secure aid

⁷ <https://www.euronews.com/2025/06/27/at-least-18-dead-in-gaza-after-israeli-strike-hits-street-during-food-collection-hospitals>

⁸ <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/22/gaza-aid-deliveries-looting-police-hamas/>

⁹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/29/aid-officials-recount-violent-looting-in-gaza-as-criminal-gangs-thrive-amid-israeli-bombardment>

¹⁰ <https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-un-officials-israel-failing-to-crack-down-on-humanitarian-aid-looting-in-gaza>

¹¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/10/abu-shabab-the-israeli-agent-gaza-war>

¹² <https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/bk00gpxqble>; <https://x.com/DropSiteNews/status/1940570813553385759>

¹³ <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/06/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-palestinian-militia-hamas-abu-shabab.html>

convoys—particularly around key distribution routes near the Kerem Shalom (Karm Abu Salem) crossing—it has been accused by UN officials and humanitarian organisations of diverting aid and exploiting the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

- 10 **Humanitarian aid** — Assistance aimed at saving lives, alleviating suffering, and maintaining human dignity in accordance with the core principle of the International Committee of the Red Cross, namely humanity.¹⁴ It focuses on providing immediate relief to vulnerable populations affected by emergencies, including food, water, shelter, medical care, and protection.¹⁵ In this report, the GHF is not referred to as a ‘humanitarian’ organisation, because its operations are odds with the core principle of humanity.
- 11 **Rations** — Food packages measured in calories and nutrients. A ‘ration’ is designed to meet the minimum nutritional requirements of displaced populations.¹⁶ They represent one component of humanitarian aid, and do not include other services like shelter, water, sanitation or electricity.
- 12 **Ration stations** — Locations operated by the GHF at which dry rations are distributed to individual beneficiaries. They do not offer other essential assistance or services, such as shelter, water, sanitation, electricity, or specialised care for children. The recipients must travel to the stations and go through their processing procedures to obtain the allocated rations. There are four ration stations in Gaza, three in the Rafah area in the south, and one in the centre between Netzarim corridor and Wadi Gaza..
- 13 **Starvation rationing** — Provision of rations that do not meet the minimum nutritional threshold for human health and/or are delivered in an inhumane manner.
- 14 **Community kitchens** — Community kitchens, sometimes referred to as *Takiyya* (تكية) in Arabic, are civilian institutions supporting the vulnerable. They are rooted in the Islamic practice of feeding the poor and originated in Ottoman-era Palestine.
- 15 **Military corridor** — Israeli military corridors are partly-appropriated and newly-constructed roads, typically surrounded by berms, secondary roads, military bases, or strips of land cleared and replaced with military infrastructure. There are currently four main corridors in Gaza: the Netzarim corridor, which divides Gaza in half; the Philadelphi corridor, located between Palestine and Egypt; the Morag corridor, separating Rafah from Khan Younis; and the Magen Oz corridor, dividing eastern and western Khan Younis. Since November 2023,

¹⁴ <https://unterm.un.org/unterm2/en/view/7b3d5405-fc2a-44f9-953c-a6ec8a0d82b0>

¹⁵ <https://www.unescwa.org/sd-glossary/humanitarian-aid>

¹⁶ <https://emergency.unhcr.org/emergency-assistance/food-security/emergency-food-assistance-standard>

Israel has begun constructing military corridors dividing Gaza.¹⁷ Since March 2025, some of these corridors were expanded and fortified, and new corridors were established.

- ¹⁶ **Airdropped aid** — Airdropped aid is a last resort to deliver life-saving food and supplies from the air, usually to people in areas that are inaccessible.¹⁸ It has been used by a number of countries, including Israel, the US, France, Egypt, Jordan, and the UK, to deliver aid to Gaza at various points since October 2023.¹⁹

¹⁷ https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FA_A-Spatial-Analysis-of-the-Israeli-militarys-conduct-in-Gaza-since-October-2023.pdf

¹⁸ <https://www.wfp.org/stories/airdrops-humanitarian-emergency-un-world-food-programme-sudan-syria>

¹⁹ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68457937>

B EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- 17 In its 28 March 2024 order in the case of South Africa v. Israel, making explicit reference to the ‘catastrophic humanitarian situation’ in Gaza, the International Court of Justice instructed the State of Israel to:
- 18 ‘Take all necessary and effective measures to ensure, without delay, in full co-operation with the United Nations, the unhindered provision at scale by all concerned of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance, including food, water, electricity, fuel, shelter, clothing, hygiene and sanitation requirements, as well as medical supplies and medical care to Palestinians throughout Gaza, including by increasing the capacity and number of land crossing points and maintaining them open for as long as necessary.’
- 19 The Court indicated that Israel was required to take these measures to comply with its obligations under the Genocide Convention and raised particular concern regarding ‘the spread of famine and starvation’.
- 20 In the sixteen months since the Court issued this order, Israel has continued to pursue policies which have the foreseeable outcome of the destruction of the Palestinian people of Gaza.
- 21 This report focuses on an Israeli system of aid distribution that ostensibly feeds Palestinians in Gaza, while in fact, according to our analysis, constituting a programme of intentional mass starvation on two levels: first, the starvation of individuals through the provision of starvation rations or no rations at all, and second, the use of mass starvation as a means of destroying the social order among the population of Gaza as a whole, towards the dismantling of the foundations of a functioning society in the region, and the separation of that population from its land.
- 22 Our findings show how Israel has systematically dismantled the long-standing and effective ‘civilian model’ of aid distribution through aid organisations and the local community. In its place, Israel has established a ‘military model’ of aid distribution which carries out starvation rationing. Through the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) and airdropped aid, Israel has created dependency upon a system which is, we conclude, deadly by design.
- 23 Previous analysis conducted by Forensic Architecture (FA) shows that the Israeli military repeatedly targeted aid distribution across Gaza, since the Israeli military campaign began in October 2023.²⁰ The updated analysis in this report finds these attacks have continued.

²⁰ https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FA_A-Spatial-Analysis-of-the-Israeli-militarys-conduct-in-Gaza-since-October-2023.pdf p.722

24 This report covers the period from 18 March 2025 to 1 August 2025. In this period, a number of key events occurred:

- 1) 18 March 2025: Israel breaks the ceasefire which began on 19 January.²¹
- 2) 26 May 2025: Following international pressure, Israel partially lifts the blockade on aid which had been in place since 2 March 2025, however the quantities of aid permitted to enter Gaza are still far below the minimum need, and the activities of humanitarian agencies continue to be severely limited.²²
- 3) 29 May 2025: The GHF begins operating in Gaza — a model of aid distribution that distributes rations from four locations, primarily in southern Gaza.

25 This report is in three sections:

- 1) **Two models of aid distribution:** Describes what the civilian and military models are, their structural organisation, and how they compare.
- 2) **The Israeli aid system: starvation rationing in practice:** Analyses how these two models are being weaponised by Israel into an inhumane aid distribution system operating through starvation rationing. By crippling the civilian model and replacing it with a military approach, Israel is starving by design, and using aid instrumentally to further its strategic military and political goals.
- 3) **Patterns:** Within this system, we observe three key dimensions to Israel's weaponisation of starvation. Namely, forced displacement and re-concentration of the Palestinian people, reaching aid being dangerous and deadly, and the undermining of civil order and dismantling of the social fabric.

26 Our findings contradict claims made by Israeli authorities and political figures that Hamas is systematically diverting aid in Gaza,²³ instead revealing how Israel creates the conditions for, directly enables, and fails to prevent aid diversion, in order to dismantle the civilian system (see p.46). We define aid diversion as the process by which aid (such as food, medicine, fuel, or other relief supplies) is intercepted, misappropriated, or redirected away from its intended civilian beneficiaries. Contrary to Israel's stated aim, we find that the Israeli 'military model' makes little attempt to protect against potential diversion by Hamas or other actors. It is in fact designed in a way which leaves aid *more* exposed to diversion, not less, undermining a key rationale behind Israel's ineffective and inhumane approach.

27 This manmade crisis has continued — and will continue, if Israel controls aid entry and distribution — even during a ceasefire. Under the current system, a ceasefire will not prevent

²¹ <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israel-gaza-ceasefire-palestine-hamas-netanyahu-what-know-rcna197012>

²² <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/czxy33z7p2lo>

²³ <https://www.timesofisrael.com/usaid-finds-no-proof-hamas-systematically-loots-aid-state-department-idf-push-back/>

the continued destruction of Palestinians in Gaza as a group: they will continue to die of starvation, and Palestinian society will continue to be dismantled.

- 28 This report, consistent with the reports of multiple UN bodies, eyewitness accounts, human rights organisations and NGOs, finds evidence that Israel is weaponizing aid distribution for its own strategic and political goals, carrying out starvation by design in Gaza.²⁴

²⁴ <https://www.msf.org/not-aid-orchestrated-killing>; <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/08/01/gaza-israeli-killings-of-palestinians-seeking-food-are-war-crimes>; <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/07/gaza-evidence-points-to-israels-continued-use-of-starvation-to-inflict-genocide-against-palestinians/>; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/04/gaza-starvation-un-expert-michael-fakhri>

1 Quantitative Findings

29 We have verified numerous incidents during the period of this report, 18 March to 1 August 2025:

- 1) At least 64 incidents of civilians being attacked while seeking aid, including:
 - i) 25 incidents around the GHF ration stations.
 - ii) 19 incidents in proximity to aid routes.
 - iii) 7 incidents during aid diversion.
- 2) 9 incidents of police and aid workers being attacked.
- 3) 23 incidents of aid infrastructure being attacked (including warehouses, distribution points, communal kitchens, restaurants, cafeterias, bakeries and water points).
- 4) 37 incidents of aid diversion by desperate civilians, gangs and Israeli-backed groups.
- 5) Palestinians in Gaza have been subject to 58 evacuation orders.
- 6) 6 kilometres is the average distance that Palestinians have to walk to arrive at a GHF ration station.
- 7) Between 29 May and 4 July 2025:
 - i) The GHF ration stations were open for an average of 23 minutes at a time. After 19 June, this fell to 10 minutes.
 - ii) 60% of the announcements on the GHF's Facebook page were published less than one hour before the stations opened.
 - iii) In 23% of cases we examined, the closure of a ration station was announced before the previously communicated opening time.

C TIMELINE

- 09-10-2023 Israel institutes a full blockade on aid entering Gaza.
- 21-10-2023 Small number of aid trucks enter Gaza via Egypt.
- 24-11-2023 Start of a temporary ceasefire.
- 01-12-2023 End of the temporary ceasefire.
- 23-02-2024 UNRWA reported to be no longer operational in northern Gaza.
- 29-02-2024 Flour Massacre: 112 civilians killed seeking aid.
- 01-03-2024 Start of US aid airdrops.
- 25-03-2024 Israel announces it will no longer work with UNRWA in Gaza.
- 28-03-2024 Order in the ICJ case of South Africa v. Israel.
- 06-05-2024 Rafah crossing closes.
- 17-05-2024 US pier opens.
- 17-07-2024 US pier closes.
- 06-10-2024 Siege of northern Gaza — Israel declares it a combat zone.
- 19-01-2025 Ceasefire begins. Humanitarian aid is entering.
- 26-01-2025 Israel bans UNRWA.
- 12-02-2025 Gaza Humanitarian Foundation registered in February 2025 (in Delaware, US).
- 02-03-2025 Israel halts entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza.

Period covered by this report:

- 18-03-2025 Israel breaks the ceasefire, with widespread bombing.
- 02-04-2025 Announcement of the new Morag corridor dividing Rafah from Gaza.
- 16-04-2025 Israel Katz, Minister of Defence of Israel, says the country does not plan to allow humanitarian aid to enter Gaza.
- 05-05-2025 'Gideon's Chariots', a major new Israeli military offensive, is announced.
- 19-05-2025 Israel announces it will temporarily allow a limited amount of aid into Gaza.
- 22-05-2025 End to the eleven-week aid blockade.
- 26-05-2025 Blockade of aid is partially lifted after to international pressure.

- 27-05-2025 Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) begins operating, opening the Swedish Village site.
- 07-07-2025 First public mention of a 'humanitarian city'.
- 16-07-2025 Israeli army claims it completed a new corridor called 'Magen Oz' that separates east and west of Khan Younis.
- 26-07-2025 First in a renewed round of air-dropped aid is scheduled to arrive.

D SCOPE

- 30 This report assesses Israel's conduct as it relates to the provision of aid distribution in Gaza between 18 March and 1 August 2025. It focuses on incidents and events from 18 March 2025, when Israel broke the ceasefire. The period of analysis is up to 1 August, the furthest extent of our dataset at the time of analysis.
- 31 It outlines two models of aid distribution: the 'civilian model', which existed before 18 March 2025, and a new 'military model', which was fully established with the opening of the GHF ration stations on 27 May. The report analyses how Israeli military operations throughout this period dismantle one model — the civilian model — and replace it with the other — the military model — to further Israeli military and political goals.
- 32 Our assessment of Israel's conduct with regard to the provision of aid is based on seven elements we have observed:
- 1) Destruction of Palestinian food sovereignty, manifesting in near-total destruction of the agricultural and fishing sectors.
 - 2) Siege and blockade, which has alternated between a total and partial blockade.
 - 3) Concealing or suppressing information about the nature and scale of the suffering.
 - 4) Destruction of essential infrastructure, and objects indispensable to survival.
 - 5) Forced displacement and re-concentration of the civilian population.
 - 6) Making reaching aid dangerous or deadly.
 - 7) Undermining civil order and dismantling the social fabric.
- 33 Combinations of these seven elements can be read in each of the findings identified in this report. They are mentioned in the background to understand aid distribution in Gaza before 12 March (see [p.18](#) and [p.22](#)), are used as a tool for evaluating different models of aid distribution which have been active in Gaza in the first half of 2025 ([p.32](#)), and three of the elements are unpacked in the patterns identified in our findings (see [p.95](#)).
- 34 The report is a collaboration, and has three main components:
- a) Forensic Architecture's independent research, which relies on spatial analysis and open-source materials to assess the Israeli military's conduct with respect to the provision of aid in Gaza. In its assessment, FA's research inspects incidents and patterns according to the methodology outlined in the report. All figures and incidents referenced in the report are based on FA's research.
 - b) Expert opinion provided by Alex de Waal, the executive director of the World Peace Foundation (WPF). De Waal has studied starvation and famine for more than forty years.

His contribution to the report consists of a detailed commentary and anthropological analysis of Forensic Architecture's findings in relation to an extensive literature review on the ongoing starvation in Gaza. His analysis of starvation and its relationship to genocide — both conceptually and in the specific case of Gaza — appears throughout the report, alongside the spatial evidence and patterns presented by Forensic Architecture.

- c) Reporting from third party sources such as the UN, news outlets, and statements from Israeli government officials. These have been incorporated to situate Forensic Architecture's research and De Waal's analysis within the broader context of Israeli military conduct and aid distribution in Gaza.
- 35 It also includes the witness statement of Dr Nick Maynard, a Consultant in General and Colorectal Surgery based in the United Kingdom. Dr Maynard was in Gaza between 24 June and 22 July 2025, as part of a medical delegation with Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP). His witness statement was collected by the International Centre of Justice for Palestinians (ICJP) on 4 August 2025.

E METHODOLOGY

- 36 FA's research relies on our methodological framework, based primarily on open-source data and spatial analysis. Our workflow has five stages: data collection, verification, interpretation, mapping, and analysis.²⁵
- 37 The extended methodology of FA's research in Gaza can be found in our October 2024 report 'A Spatial Analysis of the Israeli Military's Conduct in Gaza since October 2023.'²⁶ For the purposes of this report, we have highlighted the key steps of our workflow as well as any methods specific to this report.
- 38 Our data verification follows a rigorous framework which accounts for source credibility, geolocation, and authenticity. The result of the process of verification and interpretation is that an incident is classified as confirmed, most likely, or unknown. Only incidents which we have the 'confirmed' or 'most likely' classification are entered into our mapping database.²⁷ All incidents which FA has verified and input into its database are referred to throughout this report using an incident ID. Incident IDs referred to in this report are indexed at the end of the report (see p.153).
- 39 Each recorded incident is collected, verified, geolocated, timed, and tagged. This allows us to study multiple incidents in relation to each other in time and space, and to observe patterns.²⁸ In our analysis, we understand patterns to mean the repetition of same, similar or related incidents, at different times and places. Such patterns may indicate that these attacks are designed, formally or informally, rather than occurring at random. We consider attacks on civilians to be any act of violence against the civilian population and civilian objects, whether in offence or in defence, even if the attack does not lead to the death or injury of civilians.
- 40 The materials we reviewed include open-source footage of incidents, satellite imagery, news reporting, statements and media published by the Israeli military and government, reports by the UN and other NGOs, quantitative data from 18 March until 1 August 2025, and publicly available testimonies of Palestinians.
- 41 The World Peace Foundation based its analysis on a review of those same materials alongside an extensive literature review.

²⁵ ibid 25.

²⁶ https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FA_A-Spatial-Analysis-of-the-Israeli-militarys-conduct-in-Gaza-since-October-2023.pdf

²⁷ ibid 30.

²⁸ ibid 31.

F BACKGROUND

1 *Starvation Rationing as a Genocidal Practice*

- 42 Starvation rationing is the provision of rations that do not meet the minimum nutritional threshold for human health and/or are delivered in an inhumane manner.
- 43 Starvation rationing attacks the individual on a biological level and the group as a whole and can be a genocidal practice.
- 44 The Genocide Convention defines the crime of genocide as the intentional destruction of a group, as such, in whole or in part.²⁹ In popular understanding, this consists of mass killing, however such destruction of a group can occur through other means.
- 45 Raphael Lemkin, the Polish-Jewish jurist who established the theoretical underpinning of the concept of genocide, and who campaigned for its recognition as a crime, is instructive on this point. In his 1944 book, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, Lemkin described historical genocides as consisting of two phases, namely the 'destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group', after which the oppressor imposed its own chosen 'national pattern'. As an example of this, he devoted much attention to the rations permitted by the Nazis to oppressed groups. When we combine these observations with an understanding of how mass starvation unfolds as a social phenomenon, the implications of Israel's conduct regarding humanitarian and food aid since October 2023 — and especially since March 2025, when a new phase of its starvation policy was implemented — become clear.
- 46 Mass starvation is not only individual starvation multiplied by the number of hungry people. It is also a process of sundering social bonds among people, of systematic humiliation, and destruction of everything that makes society, community and family function in a meaningful way. In a manner similar to torture, it destroys the dignity and the agency of the individual. It is also a kind of 'social death' that eliminates the political agency of the group.
- 47 Starvation does not need to kill to accomplish these genocidal goals.
- 48 Consider the case of a population of 2.3 million people, that identifies itself as a substantial part of a nation, with political goals (self-determination) and societal aspirations (culture, dignity, possession of their land, etc.). It is a group protected, as such, by the Genocide Convention.
- 49 Consider that same 2.3 million people, reduced to the status of atomised individuals, stripped of any collective agency and national identity, shorn of culture, dignity and land. It could be argued that the perpetrator who carries out this reduction, intending that outcome,

²⁹ https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocities-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf

has perpetrated genocide, even if no individuals actually perish during their operations. This is how starvation rationing can accomplish genocide.

- 50 In Gaza, starvation rationing can be considered genocidal in that it is simultaneously killing Palestinians, and dismantling the fabric of Palestinian society.

2 *Siege, Humanitarian Crisis, and the Provision of Aid from 9 October 2023 to 2 March 2025*

- 51 Encroaching on Palestinian food sovereignty and conditions of life has long been used by Israel as a form of collective punishment.³⁰
- 52 Since 2007, when Hamas took control of Gaza, Israel has placed restrictions on all provisions coming into Gaza through crossings controlled by the Israeli military, thereby exercising almost complete control over conditions of life.³¹ Over time, the quantity of food per person entering Gaza was reduced to the minimum calories deemed necessary for survival, with the total amount calculated according to a population count which factored in age and gender.³² At the same time, electricity supply was calibrated to bring life in Gaza to a near standstill.³³ By 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur for the Situation of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) declared that Gaza was ‘unliveable.’³⁴
- 53 By 7 October 2023, approximately half of the population of Gaza was reportedly ‘food insecure’, and more than 80% relied on humanitarian aid.³⁵ Under the terms of a strict blockade, over 80% of goods and two-thirds of foodstuffs entered Gaza through Israeli checkpoints.
- 54 FA’s previous analysis of attacks on aid found that the Israeli military repeatedly targeted aid across Gaza since the Israeli military campaign began in October 2023. During the first year of the war alone, from October 2023 to October 2024, FA documented more than 322 attacks on aid, including aid workers and civilians seeking aid, as well as twenty-two attacks on convoys of trucks transporting aid, including trucks belonging to the World Central Kitchen (see [Figure 2](#)).³⁶
- 55 The findings showed that Israel relentlessly attacked aid infrastructure, such as warehouses, aid convoys, aid personnel, bakeries, and communal kitchens.³⁷ Simultaneously, the systematic destruction of agriculture and fisheries left Palestinians completely dependent on food coming in from the outside (see [Figure 1](#)). Israel’s control of all entries and supply routes into Gaza gave it total control over the amount of food coming in, as well as complete responsibility for this aid. Many of these approaches have continued since 18 March, or evolved within the new military model (see [p.26](#)).

³⁰ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/5141/2022/en/>

³¹ <https://features.gisha.org/gaza-up-close/>

³² <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/17/israeli-military-calorie-limit-gaza>

³³ <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/7/24/how-gaza-was-made-into-an-unlivable-place>

³⁴ <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza-unliveable-un-special-rapporteur-for-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-opt-tells-third-committee-press-release-excerpts/>

³⁵ <https://www.unicef.org/mena/documents/gaza-strip-humanitarian-impact-15-years-blockade-june-2022>

³⁶ https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FA_A-Spatial-Analysis-of-the-Israeli-militarys-conduct-in-Gaza-since-October-2023.pdf

³⁷ Ibid.

- 56 Notably, Israeli control over the distribution of aid is so absolute that a ceasefire is not enough to ensure safe and sufficient access to food and other essentials of life.




Figure 1. Map of agricultural land (green), destroyed agricultural land between October 2023 and May 2024 (black), and destroyed agricultural land between May 2024 and May 2025 (red).




Figure 2. Map of attacks on aid (aid convoys, aid infrastructure, civilians seeking aid, aid personnel, bakeries, shelters and markets), documented between 7 October 2023 and 1 November 2024.

3 *Israel's Control Over the Narrative*

57 Since 7 October 2023, there have been at least three characteristics to Israel's efforts to control the narrative around aid: making humanitarian gestures in response to public opinion; concealing and suppressing the evidence of suffering; and accusing Hamas of diverting aid.

3.1 Making Humanitarian Gestures in Response to Public Opinion

58 Israel has demonstrated its ability to permit an effective humanitarian aid programme, and yet it has consistently alternated between tightening and loosening restrictions on humanitarian access.

59 In August 2024, Israel facilitated an effective humanitarian effort when polio was identified in the Gaza Strip.³⁸ The polio virus is highly transmissible and risked spreading to Israeli communities that had not vaccinated their children. Israel permitted the UN and other humanitarian agencies to implement a vaccination programme which was carried out rapidly. It reached the epidemiologically critical threshold of 94% of children and was sufficiently well-coordinated with military operations that it was safe for aid givers. It shows what could be achieved throughout Gaza, consistently and comprehensively, should Israel choose to do so.

60 On other occasions, Israel has loosened restrictions on humanitarian access in correlation with an upsurge in international criticism, and the proximity of the humanitarian crisis to a 'famine' classification. On 19 May 2025, when the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu permitted a small number of aid trucks to enter Gaza for the first time in two and a half months, he explained that Israel's allies cannot tolerate 'images of mass famine'.³⁹ Commenting on the same loosening of restrictions, in a public briefing, Israel's Minister of Finance and Minister in the Ministry of Defence said 'the required minimal amount will reach the population, simply so the world doesn't stop us and accuse us of war crimes'.⁴⁰

61 Between November 2023 and December 2024, Israel averted a famine designation in part by permitting a limited international aid programme compatible with Israel's military and political strategies. On the occasions when the reported humanitarian conditions were at the point of breaching the threshold of the UN's Integrated food security Phase Classification system (IPC) phase five, 'famine', Israel permitted additional aid supplies to reach the Palestinian population. This was evident, most notably, in March-April 2024.⁴¹

³⁸ <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/polio-vaccination-campaign-resume-northern-gaza#:~:text=Though%20in%20the%20past%20few,decision%20to%20resume%20the%20campaign.>

³⁹ <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-gaza-war-netanyahu-faces-sanctions-threat-palestinians-starvation/>

⁴⁰ <https://youtu.be/STymrqvry2k?si=EFmM8YjxoNprPx8L>

⁴¹ <https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v47/n02/alex-de-waal/how-to-measure-famine>

62 Israel continues to correspond humanitarian aid access to negative shifts in public opinion. For example, on 27 July 2025, Israel announced a daily ‘tactical pause in military activity’⁴² to allow what Netanyahu described as a ‘minimal’ amount of aid into the territory.⁴³ The Israeli military explicitly said that this would ‘refute the false claim of deliberate starvation in the Gaza strip’.⁴⁴ There had been growing and widespread global outrage at the appalling humanitarian conditions. On 21 July 2025, the UK and thirty-one international partners had released a joint statement on conditions in Gaza, which stated ‘The Israeli government’s aid delivery model is dangerous, fuels instability and deprives Gazans of human dignity... The Israeli Government’s denial of essential humanitarian assistance to the civilian population is unacceptable.’⁴⁵

3.2 Concealing and Suppressing Information About the Scale of Suffering

- 63 Israel has not only loosened aid restrictions at times when humanitarian conditions were at the point of breaching the UN threshold of famine, but simultaneously prevented the collection of the data needed for the determination to be made.
- 64 Israel has not permitted international journalists into the Gaza Strip except when embedded within IDF units, who control where they go, what they see and who they talk to.
- 65 The authoritative mechanisms for measuring acute insecurity and famine are the UN’s Integrated Food Security Phase Classification System (IPC) and the US Famine Early Warning System (FEW NET).⁴⁶ The UN or the United States reaching a determination of ‘famine’ carries a heavy stigma. It may push lawmakers in western countries to investigate whether Israel is obstructing humanitarian aid, which can have material consequences such as restrictions on arms transfers.
- 66 In November 2023–December 2024, Israel not only permitted aid into Gaza, narrowly avoiding famine designation, but also exploited the in-built caution in the IPC system, whereby its analysts will not determine ‘famine’ unless all the evidence is available. Indeed, the assessments made by the IPC and FEWS NET between December 2023 and May 2024 prompted ‘controversy over whether the conditions amounted to ‘famine’ or were just short of the metrics needed for that threshold to be crossed’.⁴⁷ Acknowledging the limitations of the system, ‘the specialists who made the assessments insisted that, even if “famine“

⁴² <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/27/middleeast/israel-pausing-operations-gaza-starvation-intl>

⁴³ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/27/israel-announces-daily-military-pauses-as-fury-mounts-over-starvation-in-gaza>

⁴⁴ <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/27/middleeast/israel-pausing-operations-gaza-starvation-intl>

⁴⁵ <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-the-occupied-palestinian-territories>

⁴⁶ Appendix A, p. 145

⁴⁷ Ibid.

conditions could not definitively be identified, conditions of life endured by Palestinians in Gaza were entirely unacceptable.’⁴⁸

67 Evidence collection limitations continue to impede the IPC reaching a famine classification. Since 7 October 2023 ‘Israel has not permitted the UN and other agencies to collect the data necessary for a comprehensive assessment’.⁴⁹ In December 2024, on the occasion when a report determined that famine conditions existed, the US Administration retracted the report — written by its own humanitarian information monitoring system, FEWS NET. This was the first occasion in forty years that a report by FEWS NET was retracted.⁵⁰

68 On 29 July 2025, the UN reported that the IPC has declared that ‘two out of the three famine thresholds have been reached in Gaza: plummeting food consumption and acute malnutrition. Famine has not been formally determined as the third criteria, an elevated non-trauma death rate, cannot accurately be demonstrated.’⁵¹

4 *Assessing Israeli Claims of the Theft of Aid by Hamas*

69 To justify disrupting and withholding aid, Israel has repeatedly claimed that Hamas is stealing, hoarding or profiting from humanitarian assistance, and that aid provided by the UN and organisations such as the Palestinian Red Crescent benefits Hamas. Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israeli Minister of National Security said, ‘we need to explain to him [President Trump] that this aid goes to Hamas, and Hamas are Nazis, and they shouldn’t be given a single grain of food.’⁵²

70 As part of these claims, on multiple occasions Israeli officials have circulated videos of armed individuals in Gaza, labelling them as Hamas members without providing evidence. Clan members, gangs, and other armed groups — including some directly supported by the Israeli military⁵³ — also carry weapons. Forensic Architecture has disproved a number of these claims:

- 1) On 1 June 2025, the Arabic spokesperson of the Israeli military published drone footage on his X account, showing armed individuals around a known location of aid diversion in Khan Younis. He links the armed men seen in the drone footage to Hamas, portraying them as part of the group’s alleged efforts to obstruct aid distribution in Gaza.⁵⁴ He cites no evidence, and another video, which we verified to be from the same incident, disproves his claim. The video, filmed at the same location but from the ground, shows

⁴⁸ Appendix A, p. 145

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/07/1165517>

⁵² <https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan/kan-b/p-9969/>

⁵³ <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/06/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-palestinian-militia-hamas-abu-shabab.html>

⁵⁴ <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1929220410471538728>

civilians queueing outside a private property to buy resold aid from what Palestinian sources identified as a local gang family (see p.57).

- 2) Another video published by the Arabic spokesperson of the Israeli military, on 29 July 2025, showed armed individuals taking control of a truck. He claimed these individuals to be members of Hamas, again without providing any evidence.⁵⁵ We geolocated this video and verified its location to be in one of the known aid diversion locations by gangs and desperate civilians near Zikim crossing [ID: 50729-03946].
- 3) On 25 June 2025, a video [ID: 50625-25069] was posted online by a senior Israeli politician, showing aid trucks making their way from the Zikim crossing, many of which had men—some armed—atop them. Israeli politician, Naftali Bennett — who posted the video —referred to it as an example of Hamas stealing aid. We verified the video; it shows members of Palestinian clans protecting aid convoys, until they were delivered to Anera warehouse in Gaza City. One day after this successful civilian-protected aid delivery, the Zikim crossing was closed (see p.145).⁵⁶

- 71 Israel has never responded to challenges to produce information to confirm its allegations. In April 2024, USAID Administrator Samantha Power said that Israel had not produced evidence of systematic diversion at that time.⁵⁷ An internal US-government analysis completed in June 2025 analysed 156 incidents of theft or loss of US-funded supplies in Gaza between October 2023 and May 2025. It found no evidence of systematic theft of US-funded humanitarian supplies by Hamas, and ‘no reports alleging Hamas’ benefited from US-funded supplies. A State Department spokesperson rejected the findings, claiming that video evidence exists of Hamas looting aid, but offering no such footage.⁵⁸
- 72 In January 2024, Israel alleged that nineteen UNRWA employees were involved in the attacks of 7 October 2023.⁵⁹ The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) investigated, finding ten cases to have no or insufficient evidence, and ‘In the remaining nine cases, the evidence obtained by OIOS - if authenticated and corroborated - might indicate that the staff members may have been involved, and their employment was terminated in the interest of UNRWA’. UNRWA employs more than 30,000 people.⁶⁰
- 73 After the reimposition of the blockade on 2 March 2025, the UN developed additional mechanisms for monitoring designed to meet Israel’s exceptionally strict requirements (see p.161).

⁵⁵ <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1950093782394753405>

⁵⁶ <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ocha-humanitarian-situation-update-306-gaza-strip/>

⁵⁷ <https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/12/19/extermination-and-acts-genocide/israel-deliberately-depriving-palestinians-gaza>

⁵⁸ <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/usaid-analysis-found-no-evidence-massive-hamas-theft-gaza-aid-2025-07-25/>

⁵⁹ <https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/investigation-completed-allegations-unrwa-staff-participation-7-october>

⁶⁰ <https://www.unrwa.org/careers/working-unrwa>

- 74 Notably, our analysis finds that, in their current form, neither of the military alternatives to the civilian model — airdropped aid or the GHF ration stations — enable the Israeli military to control who receives the rations that are distributed. Therefore, the claim that Israel restricts aid through the civilian model to prevent Hamas from accessing aid is unsubstantiated.

G TWO MODELS OF AID DISTRIBUTION

- 75 Aid delivery in Gaza since March 2025 can be understood in terms of two ‘models’ of distribution: what this report will refer to as the ‘civilian model’ and the ‘military model’. The civilian model relies upon existing social and civic networks working alongside humanitarian agencies and NGOs to distribute aid, while the military model — the official Israeli approach — excludes humanitarian organisations and civic structures. These two contrasting approaches to aid distribution have been acknowledged by the Israeli Minister of Culture, Miki Zohar: ‘The despicable murderers in Gaza do not deserve any humanitarian aid from a civilian or military system.’⁶¹
- 76 This section will explore each model in turn, laying out their functions and comparing their distinct structural organisation. Understanding these models as distinct entities lays the groundwork for understanding the Israeli system of starvation rationing (p.35), and patterns of events taking place within this system (p.95).

1 *Civilian Model*

- 77 The civilian model of aid distribution in Gaza follows a well-established approach that is common to humanitarian crises around the world, while incorporating context-specific knowledge accumulated from serving the majority-refugee population of Gaza since 1948. It follows international law and principles of humanitarianism laid down in the code of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. It is founded upon the operation of international aid agencies, including UNRWA, the WFP, the Red Crescent Society, World Central Kitchen, Oxfam, and Anera, and is supported by local institutions, social networks and Palestinians’ own efforts to adapt and overcome the hardship imposed by Israeli occupation.
- 78 UNRWA was established to support the Palestinian refugee population in Gaza and elsewhere in 1949, including the 1,476,706 refugees registered in Gaza alone. Its human development and humanitarian services encompass primary and vocational education, primary health care, relief and social services, infrastructure and camp improvement, microfinance, and emergency response.⁶²
- 79 Before October 2023, amongst other forms of aid, UNRWA provided vital food baskets, or rations, distributed every three months to registered refugees through food vouchers. This included female-headed households and those living below the abject poverty line.⁶³ These

⁶¹ “Minister of Culture, Miki Zohar, @zoharm7, Tweet (10:26 am, 16 April 2025), <https://x.com/zoharm7/status/1912422324034293879>

⁶² <https://eservices.unrwa.org/>

⁶³ <https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/features/supporting-most-vulnerable-gaza-vital-food>

food baskets, exchanged for vouchers or coupons, are referred to by Palestinians in Gaza as *cabona*.⁶⁴

- 80 Under the civilian model, UNRWA is deeply embedded in Palestinian society in Gaza, enabling it to adapt its delivery methods to respond to the mass displacement caused by Israeli attacks and evacuation orders. It shifted aid distribution to areas where displaced Palestinians sought shelter, including UN schools, and supported local bakeries with flour supplies to ensure access to bread.
- 81 The civilian model in Gaza extends beyond the work of UNRWA and other humanitarian agencies. It relies on Palestinians' own efforts to adapt under conditions of siege, displacement, and Israeli attacks. Civilian institutions supporting the vulnerable are rooted in the Islamic practice of feeding the poor — a tradition still present in Gaza today through community kitchens, known in Arabic as *Takiyya*, which originated in Ottoman-era Palestine.
- 82 Additionally, since October 2023, the locations of the main markets have shifted along with the displaced population, including the emergence of a market inside al-Shifa Hospital, before it was occupied and destroyed by the Israeli military between 18 March and 1 April 2024. Smaller businesses also emerged to meet urgent needs — distributing water, providing stations to charge phones and access the internet, or selling cold water — typically run by those with access to solar power or water wells. Other initiatives included building clay ovens for baking bread when flour was available, and serving nearby communities during periods when Israel barred the entry of cooking gas and when electricity shortages made electric ovens unusable.
- 83 At the core of these Palestinian efforts to adapt is the fact that most can no longer access vital services in their homes due to the Israeli siege, the destruction of housing, and mass displacement.
- 84 The civilian model has a number of strengths:
- 1) It seeks to bring aid to the population of Gaza wherever they are, so that people do not have to travel far and do not have to queue for long periods to receive aid. Notably, under the civilian model the UN distributed aid from around 400 sites across Gaza since October 2023.
 - 2) The civilian model seeks, as far as possible, to provide specialised nutrition and care for the most vulnerable, especially young children and pregnant mothers.
 - 3) Wherever possible, it uses local community mechanisms so that information can be shared, and people know what to expect. Mutual confidence between the aid provider

⁶⁴ <https://www.facebook.com/reel/1138566580975283>

and the beneficiary group is an essential component of a well-run system. Communities know that they will receive aid in accordance with an established rota and will therefore not rush to grab whatever assistance arrives.

- 85 Ordinarily, the UN and other international aid agencies provide other essential services beyond food, such as clean water, sanitation, habitation, communications, security, electricity, and other power sources. In Gaza, since October 2023, Israel has failed to allow agencies to cooperate with civil authorities, meaning these modalities of assistance have not been able to operate at anything approaching their full potential.

2 Military Model

- 86 Unlike the civilian model, which functions like an ecosystem, involving multiple actors to deliver aid through existing social structures, the military model is a top-down system.
- 87 The primary feature of the military model as it exists in Gaza today is the GHF, a nonprofit organisation founded in the US in February 2025 to distribute rations. It is backed by the Israeli and US governments and began operating on 27 May 2025 in response to Israeli claims that Hamas was diverting aid.
- 88 Prime Minister Netanyahu described the function of the GHF as being ‘to preserve our freedom of military operation and allow our good friends [allies] to keep supporting us’.⁶⁵ Indeed, the GHF works to appease international criticism by distributing rations to the population of Gaza, while ensuring Israel maintains complete control over the population, their movement, and its ‘military operation’.
- 89 As of July 2025, the GHF system operates out of four aid distribution points. The GHF calls these ‘secure distribution sites’. In this report we refer to them as ‘ration stations’, because the GHF is not a recognised humanitarian organisation, and because its actions cannot be considered humanitarian, nor do they provide security to the Palestinians who visit them. These ration stations—mostly constructed from earth berms—were built by the Israeli military and its subcontractors within areas explicitly designated as military zones (see p.71).
- 90 We identified seven characteristics of the military model which distinguish it from the civilian model:
- 1) It provides a minimum, mostly dry ration (see Figure 3).⁶⁶
 - 2) Individuals have to travel to ration stations to collect their rations. In other words, rather than delivering aid to Palestinian population centres, whether to local warehouses, bakeries, or UN schools, the GHF system requires Palestinians to walk sometimes dozens of kilometres (see Figure 31).
 - 3) To visit the GHF ration stations, individuals must enter Israeli military zones. Three ration stations are located within the military zone which is bounded by the Philadelphi corridor to the south, along the border with Egypt, and the Morag corridor to the north, which crosses Gaza between Rafah and Khan Younis. The fourth ration station was established south of the Netzarim corridor, also within an area controlled by the Israeli military. All four ration stations are located within an area designated by the Israeli military as an active combat zone (see Figure 29).⁶⁷

⁶⁵ <https://www.youtube.com/live/7jsT5U70H44>, [6:31-07:55]

⁶⁶ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cd787er1qz4o>

⁶⁷ <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1933524803266531362>

- 4) The stations are only open for short periods, often for a few minutes at a time, and often at times that are signalled only a few minutes in advance. To ensure that they receive any rations before the stations close, people often need to relocate to locations in proximity to the ration stations.
- 5) The ration stations do not provide other essential assistance or services beyond food, such as shelter, water, sanitation, electricity, or specialised care for children.
- 6) The GHF system operates outside of existing societal institutions.
- 7) There is no audit of the rations after they leave the sites, or follow-up to assess the impact of the programme on the targeted population. The GHF cannot, for example, know how many people are fed, or provide assurances that its rations are not consumed by members of armed gangs or sold by them on the black market for profit, nor can it ensure that Hamas does not gain access to these rations.

⁹¹ In combination, these features mean the GHF ration stations, as currently implemented, routinely expose individuals to direct danger of violence from the Israeli troops on site. Numerous reports suggest that both Israeli and US contractors have used lethal force to maintain order in these stations, and have killed upwards of 800 Palestinians.⁶⁸ The military units operating at these sites have not been trained in crowd control and do not possess equipment suitable for this task. There are reports that they were ordered to use live ammunition, fully knowing the likelihood of death and injury (see p.118).⁶⁹

⁹² Israel seeks to maintain the four ration stations as part of the arrangements for the temporary ceasefire currently being negotiated. FA's previous research on ceasefire violations shows that civilians who approach areas close to the military buffer zone are targeted even during a ceasefire.⁷⁰ This means that if the militarised GHF system of aid distribution continues in its current form during a ceasefire, there is no guarantee that the killing of civilians will stop. Our analysis shows maintaining the four ration stations in any possible ceasefire would further destroy the social structures of Palestinian Gaza (see p.132).

⁷¹

⁶⁸ <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/08/1165552>; <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/08/01/gaza-israeli-killings-of-palestinians-seeking-food-are-war-crimes>

⁶⁹ <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-06-27/ty-article-magazine/.premium/idf-soldiers-ordered-to-shoot-deliberately-at-unarmed-gazans-waiting-for-humanitarian-aid/00000197-ad8e-de01-a39f-ffbe33780000>

⁷⁰ https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/2025.02.25_FA_Ceasefire_Report.pdf

⁷¹ <https://x.com/NaksBilal/status/1927379241684889755>



Figure 3. Verified video from 27 May 2025, showing contents of aid rations distributed by the GHF. [ID: 50527-33860]

3 *Comparison of the Two Models of Aid*

93 This section analyses the two contrasting models of aid distribution in relation to the seven elements of Israel's conduct regarding aid distribution outlined the 'Scope' (p.13).

94 The civilian aid model seeks to ameliorate the impacts of each of the seven elements of Israel's conduct, and the militarised model seeks to further all elements.

1) Destruction of food sovereignty:

- i) Neither model protects or promotes food sovereignty, though without Israeli restrictions the civilian model would be providing seeds, tools, fishing nets, and other support to food-producers' livelihoods.

2) Siege and blockade, which has alternated between a total and partial blockade:

- i) The civilian model provides food rations, both dry rations and cooked food, to as many places as possible, and close to where the population is living. This includes specialised nutritional support for young children. Until recently, it was providing other forms of aid, such as water, hygiene kits, medical equipment, and malnutrition treatments such as therapeutic feeding. It seeks to protect women and children from exploitation and abuse.
- ii) The military model provides less than a minimum ration for the population as a whole and no specialised nutritional support. If we take the most generous reading of the GHF plans it may achieve an aggregate supply of calories sufficient for a minimum ration, but it has no mechanism for ensuring that the food entitlements of the most vulnerable are met, and therefore it cannot function as an effective mechanism to prevent mass starvation.

3) Concealing or suppressing information about the nature and scale of suffering:

- i) Humanitarian organisations collect, as far as possible, data that allows them to assess the effectiveness of their approach and make necessary improvements to it. This data is also made public and have become the basis for public advocacy for Israel to change its policies, and for foreign governments to change their policies towards Israel.
- ii) The militarised model is opaque. It may be the case that the GHF and Israeli military have data, e.g. personal identity and surveillance data, but insofar as they also have humanitarian data, they do not share it.
- iii) The militarised model has no monitoring or follow-up once rations leave the site.

4) Destruction of essential infrastructure and objects indispensable to survival:

- i) The civilian model helps to maintain some fuel, water, sanitation, and communication capacity, though far less than is desirable due to Israel's restrictions on what can enter Gaza, and on humanitarian agencies cooperating with civil authorities.
 - ii) The military model does none of the above.
- 5) Forced displacement and re-concentration:
 - i) The civilian model tries to bring aid to where people are, rather than requiring them to move to where aid is.
 - ii) The military model promotes forced displacement/re-concentration of the Palestinian population (see p.95).
- 6) Making reaching aid dangerous or deadly:
 - i) The civilian model is designed to maximise the protection and safety of recipients. Its many distribution sites and integration into the local community are designed in a way that protects aid and the people seeking it. This does not preclude it from being weaponised by the Israeli military, who have brought about the planned failure of the civilian model (see p.37), and made seeking aid by any means deadly (see p.118).
 - ii) By its very nature, the military model combines the receiving of rations with the engagement in a military system: aid distribution controlled by the Israeli military, with rations delivered in military zones, often by military personnel (whether US or Israeli) not trained in crowd control. Receiving rations through this system requires Palestinians to engage with an infrastructure designed to prioritise Israeli military and political objectives (see p.67), exposing them to opportunities for violence (see p.118).
- 7) Undermining civil order and dismantling the social fabric:
 - i) The civilian model is embedded in the social fabric. It works with and through community organisations, giving people confidence that aid will be forthcoming to the extent that the aid-providers are able to do this, and using social networks to assist in distributing and protecting aid.
 - ii) The military model further dismantles the social fabric. In restricting the reach of any form of aid administration to the confines of the four ration stations, this model designates the remainder of the territory as something akin to a governance wilderness. In this ungoverned territory, Israel promotes the lawlessness of criminal gangs and proxy forces (see p.132). The attacks on aid workers, health workers, and community leaders, is part of this.

iii) Of special note, the societal aspect of mass starvation is the element that is least represented in standard humanitarian data but is highly relevant to the argument for genocide.

95 Even if the GHF ration stations were to provide sufficient calories to sustain life for most people (which they do not), the military model of aid distribution furthers a broader strategy of societal destruction. Under the military model, Palestinians face starvation and, even if they survive as individuals, Palestinians in Gaza as a meaningful community cannot. The next section analyses how Israel has brought this about.

H THE ISRAELI AID SYSTEM: STARVATION RATIONING IN PRACTICE

96 Since March, Israel has continued its longstanding targeting, dismantling, and disruption of the civilian model, crippling a system which has proven to be effective, without robust justification. In its place Israel has established the military model, implemented first through the GHF stations and now in a reintroduction of airdropped aid (see [Figure 4](#)). Neither approach addresses the issue of preventing aid falling to the hands of Hamas or armed gangs.

97 We found that Israel's system of aid starves, displaces and reconcentrates Palestinians, increases violence towards those seeking aid, and dismantles the civil order and social fabric of Gaza.

98 This militarisation of aid by Israel was described Philippe Lazzarini, Commissioner-General of UNRWA, on 2 August 2025:

99 'The manmade famine in Gaza has been largely shaped by the deliberate attempts to replace the UN coordinated humanitarian system through the politically motivated "GHF". It is a so called "aid system" responsible for the killing of nearly 1,400 starving people. All has been further deepened by preventing UNRWA, the backbone of humanitarian response, to bring in any assistance to Gaza for months now (since 2 March).'⁷²

100 Dr Nick Maynard, a medic who visited Gaza between 24 June and 22 July 2025, gave a witness statement to the International Centre of Justice for Palestinians (ICJP) on 4 August 2025. He described the conditions in Gaza:

*'What was very striking from the very first day was how terrible the malnutrition was. Many of the patients were very thin. Many of the staff were friends I've met previously and worked with, they had lost loads of weight, some of whom I hardly recognised due to that. So not only did we have explosive injuries to operate on, but there was also a never-ending stream of patients who had to return to the operating theatre so we could deal with infectious complications arising from malnutrition. [...] It is important to note here that I've been to Gaza two other times since the 7th of October 2023 [...] This time though there were really extreme forms of malnutrition, and the sheer volume of malnutrition and comparisons between this time and my recent trips was striking.'*⁷³

101 It takes sixty to eighty days for someone to die from hunger: starvation does not happen by chance, or without warning.⁷⁴ At least 6,000 UNRWA trucks of expiring food, medicines and

⁷² <https://x.com/UNLazzarini/status/1951652951539216618>

⁷³ Dr Maynard's statement, pp.2-3

⁷⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/23/starvation-in-gaza-is-destroying-communities-and-will-leave-generational-scars>

other basics have been held outside Gaza for months, and are still being prevented from entering.⁷⁵

- 102 This section explores how, under an Israeli system in which the civilian model of aid distribution has been dismantled and replaced with a militarised approach, starvation in Gaza is not by accident but by design.




Figure 4. Map of infrastructure for the civilian model (black) — warehouses, roads, distribution points — and the military model (blue) — GHF sites and access roads — with all geolocated incidents related to aid (red dots), such as attacks on civilians seeking aid, aid diversion, military presence in relation to aid, presence of aid.

⁷⁵ <https://x.com/UNRWA/status/1948669565086695474>

1 *Dismantling the Civilian Model*

- 103 Under the longstanding civilian model, aid was distributed by experienced aid organisations, the local government, civil society, and the private sector, operating a network of hundreds of aid distribution centres and community kitchens. Even after 7 October 2023, when only limited food supplies were allowed into Gaza irregularly, these institutions succeeded in mitigating some of the negative effects of Israeli control over aid distribution, averting starvation.
- 104 This civilian model has been consistently targeted by the Israeli military since it began its campaign in Gaza in October 2023, leading to its deterioration. Remaining local food production sources — such as agricultural land and greenhouses not yet destroyed — now lie within areas under Israeli military control. According to UN figures from August 2025, only 1.5% of Gaza's agricultural land remains accessible and undamaged.⁷⁶ Similarly, large numbers of aid warehouses storing food reserves have also fallen under Israeli control, rendering them inaccessible to humanitarian organisations: on 31 July, UNICEF's Deputy Special Representative told Al Jazeera that '88% of Gaza is designated either as evacuation zones or military zones, and we are unable to access our warehouses.'⁷⁷
- 105 After Israel ended the ceasefire on 18 March 2025, many tent camps set up by humanitarian organisations during the ceasefire to shelter displaced Palestinians and provide essential services, were dismantled (see [Figure 5](#)). Repeated displacement, especially following a sudden Israeli invasion, inhibits families' ability to store food: relocating at short notice, often on foot, people have to choose between carrying their children or the food they had managed to store.

⁷⁶ <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/08/1165587>

⁷⁷ <https://x.com/AJABreaking/status/1950878027401077241>



Figure 5. Satellite imagery from 18 March and 25 March 2025, showing tent camps in Beit Hanoun (top) and Beit Lahia (bottom), in northern Gaza. Images from 18 March (left) show camps established during the ceasefire as people returned to northern Gaza. The same locations on 25 March (right) show significantly fewer tents, after they were dismantled following the ceasefire, with Israel's renewed military operations. [Satellite images ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]

106 In addition to the effect of its military operations, Israel has actively brought about the failure of the civilian model by:

- 1) Destroying essential infrastructure, and objects indispensable to survival.
- 2) Creating conditions for aid diversion.

107 Between 2 March and 19 May 2025, no aid was allowed to enter Gaza. During this period, Israel attacked aid warehouses and community kitchens, exacerbating the conditions of

starvation. When aid trucks were finally permitted to re-enter Gaza at the end of May, ending the nearly three-month blockade, efforts to deliver supplies to warehouses faced significant challenges.

- 108 Heightened anxiety over food security and the limited amount of incoming aid caused multiple instances of aid diversion, as both desperate civilians and armed groups intercepted convoys, or broke into aid storage facilities. With supplies limited and aid routes no longer protected, the civilian model was no longer effective. A small number of aid trucks from humanitarian organisations are still entering Gaza,⁷⁸ but by Israel's design it is nowhere near enough, and they are no longer sufficiently protected (see p.46).
- 109 Recent developments further confirm Israel's planned move away from the civilian model: the US Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) announced that Israel will gradually permit the entry of goods into the Gaza Strip under a new mechanism through the private commercial sector. The stated goal is to 'increase the volume of aid entering the Gaza Strip, while reducing reliance on aid collection by the UN and international organizations.'⁷⁹

1.1 Destruction of Essential Infrastructure, and Objects Indispensable to Survival

- 110 From October 2023, Forensic Architecture's findings show that Israel has targeted sites and systems related to humanitarian aid as and when they became the main mode of aid facilitation.⁸⁰ This includes essential infrastructure like electricity and water, as well as food infrastructure like aid warehouses, bakeries and restaurants.⁸¹
- 111 On 3 March 2025, Israeli Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir posted on X:
- 'Nazis don't need electricity; we should bomb all their generators. If our hostages don't have electricity, let them have no electricity. . . we need to explain to him [President Trump] that this aid goes to Hamas, and Hamas are Nazis, and they shouldn't be given a single grain of food. Not only [should we] not give them, not only [should we] not give them, but [we should] bomb all of their food reserves. This is my opinion, this is my position.'*
- 112 Between 2–9 March 2025, Israel imposed a total blackout by severing electricity supply to Gaza's sole desalination plant, which led to a sharp decline in water production, from

⁷⁸ <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/eu-assessment-finds-significant-obstructive-factors-undermine-humanitarian-2025-08-07/>

⁷⁹ <https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1952607873474740567>

⁸⁰ https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FA_A-Spatial-Analysis-of-the-Israeli-militarys-conduct-in-Gaza-since-October-2023.pdf, pp. 720-783

⁸¹ https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FA_A-Spatial-Analysis-of-the-Israeli-militarys-conduct-in-Gaza-since-October-2023.pdf, p. 733

18,000 m³/day to just 3,000 m³/day.⁸² Our evidence confirms that food reserves have been targeted and repeatedly attacked, both before and since Ben-Gvir's statement. The continued siege imposed on essential infrastructure beyond the food system is significant in this context, because basic amenities like fuel and water are often necessary elements for preparing food.

113 On 12 July 2025, the Israeli military announced the imposition of strict security restrictions along Gaza's coastline, prohibiting entry into the sea. In a statement issued in Arabic, it warned that Israeli forces would act against any violations of this restriction, and called on fishermen, swimmers, and divers to stay out of the water. The measure also denies Palestinians access to fisheries as a key local food source.⁸³

114 FA has verified the following attacks on infrastructure during the period covered in this report (see [Figure 6](#), [Figure 7](#), [Figure 8](#), [Figure 9](#)):

- 1) **Aid warehouses** — After the ceasefire, we confirmed at least 5 attacks on aid warehouses.
- 2) **Water facilities** — We verified at least 4 incidents related to attacks on water infrastructure. Gaza Municipality spokesperson Asem Alnabih wrote that while global attention is focused on starvation in Gaza, severe thirst is also gripping the population, with only minimal amounts of water available — most of it unsafe for drinking.⁸⁴
- 3) **Community kitchens** — Israeli attacks have also extended to community kitchens established in areas with a high density of displaced Palestinians. According to the Government Media Office in Gaza, Israeli forces have targeted at least 26 field kitchens since 7 October 2023.⁸⁵ Confirmed attacks within the scope of this report include: a field kitchen in Nuseirat on 4 May 2025 [ID: 50504-85112], the al-Khair field kitchen in Khan Younis, where three workers were killed on 5 April [ID: 50405-36676]; a field kitchen on al-Jalaa Street in Gaza city, struck on 2 May, killing six people [ID: 50502-20935]; and the al-Nafaq Street field kitchen in Gaza City, struck on 21 May 2025 [ID: 50521-26498].
- 4) **Schools and shelters** — Israeli attacks have also targeted multiple schools serving as shelters, where food and other aid were distributed [IDs: 50529-38549, 50717-27434].

⁸² <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/israels-decision-to-cut-off-electricity-supply-to-gaza-desalination-plant-cruel-and-unlawful/>

⁸³ <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1943937588282503499>

⁸⁴ <https://x.com/AsemAlnabeh/status/1949465674868285578>; <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2025/07/mil-250729-ohchr01.htm>

⁸⁵ <https://t.me/mediagovps/3541>

5) Greenhouses — The Israeli military’s ground operation, particularly in Rafah where the Morag corridor was established, has extensively destroyed greenhouses that could have served as a local food source for Palestinians in Gaza. Satellite imagery analysis shows large-scale, systematic destruction of greenhouses within areas invaded by the Israeli military (see [Figure 10](#)). The pattern of destruction indicates that the attacks extended beyond the locations where new military corridors were established, to encompass all greenhouses in these areas.

- 115 Measures taken by Palestinian society in Gaza to adapt under siege have also been targeted. These include small businesses that emerged to meet urgent needs — distributing water, providing stations to charge phones and access the internet, or selling cold water — typically run by those with access to solar power or water wells. From March 2025, Israeli attacks also included phones charging points, and cafes and restaurants providing electricity and internet connection to young professionals.
- 116 One of these attacks was on Al-Baqa Café — a popular beachfront meeting and co-working spot for young professionals in Gaza. On 30 June 2025, the café was struck by an Israeli airstrike, killing at least forty-one people, including visual artist Amina al-Salmi and photojournalist Ismail Abu Hatab, and injuring around seventy-five others, among them freelance journalist Bayan Abusultan, who was wounded by shrapnel in the chest and head [ID: 50630-96357].⁸⁶

⁸⁶ <https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2025/7/1/aftermath-of-an-israeli-air-attack-on-a-gaza-cafe>; <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250701-gaza-mourns-those-killed-in-israeli-strike-on-seafront-cafe>




Figure 6. Map of attacks on essential aid infrastructure (including aid warehouses, kitchens, restaurants, cafeterias, bakeries and water points) between 18 March 2025 and 1 August 2025. See [Figure 7](#), [Figure 8](#), and [Figure 9](#) for details of specific incidents.



Figure 7. Verified video from 20 May 2025, showing a community kitchen and adjacent internet service point that was hit by an Israeli military airstrike, on al-Nafaq Street in Gaza City. See location in [Figure 6](#). [ID: 50521-26498]



Figure 8. Verified videos from April 2025 showing attacks on aid warehouses and distribution points. See locations in **Figure 6**. [IDs: 50403-17784, 50413-41064, 50509-37069]



Figure 9. Verified videos from April and May 2025 showing attacks (from left to right) on the Al-Saftawi cafeteria in Nuseirat, Palmyra restaurant, and the Abu Iskandar bakery in Gaza City. See locations in **Figure 6**. [IDs: 50423-31709, 50507-25172, 50529-14055]



Figure 10. Satellite images showing the destruction of greenhouses in Gaza since 18 March 2025. Images on the left show greenhouses in Rafah on 5 April. Images on the right, from the same location on 30 May, show they have been almost entirely destroyed. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]

1.2 Creating Conditions for Aid Diversion

117 Israel has brought about the failure of the civilian model in Gaza by attacking the two conditions it requires to deliver aid effectively:

- 1) Sufficient aid supply (see [Figure 11](#)).
- 2) Secure aid routes.

118 When aid supplies are limited — i.e. condition 1. is not met — delivering aid to warehouses or securing aid inside them to ensure fair distribution becomes increasingly difficult. The scarcity of aid increases demand, incentivising criminal gangs to divert aid trucks and distribution centres, and increasing the likelihood that starving Palestinians will attempt to break into warehouses, or divert trucks along known aid routes (see [Figure 12](#)).

119 When condition 1. is not met, protecting aid trucks and warehouses — condition 2. — becomes essential to ensure that the limited aid entering Gaza is distributed fairly, rather than being stolen and resold on the market at inflated prices (see [Figure 13](#)). However, due to direct Israeli attacks on these forces, most aid trucks are now left without any protection (see [p.140](#)).




Figure 11. The established system of the civilian model functions effectively when aid flows are adequate, exemplified by the width of the aid arrow. Because supply is sufficient, Palestinians are confident that aid will reach them where they are. With market food prices low, gangs have little incentive to divert aid.




Figure 12. When aid supplies are limited, delivering aid to warehouses and securing it inside them to ensure fair distribution becomes increasingly difficult. With less supply, there is more demand: both desperate civilians and armed gangs attempt to divert the food trucks before they arrive to the warehouses.




Figure 13. Protecting aid convoys when the supply is limited is essential to prevent aid diversion. However, Israel frequently attacks those protecting aid (see [p.140](#)).

- 120 The best guarantee of non-diversion of aid includes the existence of a functioning civil administration like a police force, and active community engagement in, and support for, mechanisms of aid distribution. Instead, the people tasked with protecting aid under the civilian model have been attacked by the Israeli military as Hamas members (see [p.140](#)).
- 121 Those intent on stealing rations will focus on bulk supplies of dry rations, as small quantities are not worth their while, and cooked food or nutritional supplements for children have no value beyond immediate consumption. The civilian model of aid distribution using multiple small distribution centres and kitchens was designed to reduce diversion.
- 122 Also central to the design of the civilian model is the sharing of information with the affected community, so that people know what to expect, when and where, and can prepare to receive aid in an orderly manner. This transparency reduces the food anxiety that motivates civilians to wait along truck routes, and mobilises the entire community, limiting the activities of lawless groups.

- 123 By attacking and killing police officers, undermining civil authorities and established communities, and enabling irregular proxy forces in their place, Israel is creating conditions conducive to the diversion of humanitarian aid, dismantling the civilian model (see [Figure 14](#)).
- 124 In addition to controlling the quantity and frequency of aid entering Gaza, Israel dictates the crossings through which aid trucks enter, the roads they travel, and the organisations whose warehouses they may access. The ‘first mile’ of the delivery chain — transporting aid from crossing points to humanitarian facilities for onward distribution — is the most vulnerable to aid diversion and robbery.⁸⁷ This ‘first mile’ begins in areas under Israeli military control, including the expanding military, buffer, or no-go zones (see [Figure 14](#)). In these areas, those tasked with securing aid, such as the Palestinian police, cannot operate, as they are repeatedly targeted by the Israeli military (see [p.140](#)). Meanwhile, Israeli-backed groups responsible for stealing aid are not attacked by Israel within these areas, and are therefore allowed to operate.⁸⁸
- 125 Since late May 2025, Israel has allowed only a small number of aid trucks to enter Gaza, mainly through the Kerem Shalom (Karm Abu Salem) crossing in the south, and the Zikim crossing in the north.⁸⁹
- 126 Aid trucks entering from the Kerem Shalom (Karm Abu Salem) crossing travelled along Salah al-Din Road from May until mid-July, when Israel’s construction of a new military corridor — referred to as the Megan Oz corridor— forced them to reroute onto the smaller Omar ibn al-Khattab Road (see [Figure 14](#), [Figure 16](#)). We have documented 37 incidents of aid diversion by desperate civilians, gangs, and Israeli-backed groups (see [Figure 14](#)). Our analysis indicates that aid transported along Salah al-Din Road was looted in two main locations: first by the Abu Shabab group within areas of Rafah under Israeli military control, between the Morag and Philadelphia corridors (see [p.53](#)); and second in Khan Younis near the al-Tahliya roundabout, where both gangs and desperate civilians intercepted aid convoys (see [p.57](#)). Once truck routes were shifted to Omar ibn al-Khattab Road, incidents of aid diversion began occurring there as well (see [p.61](#)).
- 127 Aid trucks entering through the Zikim crossing in northern Gaza travel along the coastal al-Rashid Road, where FA have also documented multiple cases of aid diversion. Aid from this crossing is the primary food source for the population north of Wadi Gaza.
- 128 The diversion of aid prevents the most vulnerable from accessing assistance, as they are unable to compete under the chaotic conditions created by repeated interruptions to distribution. A verified video from Khan Younis shows individuals collecting flour scattered

⁸⁷ Appendix B

⁸⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/05/israel-accused-of-arming-palestinian-gang-who-allegedly-looted-aid-in-gaza>

⁸⁹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/31/the-mathematics-of-starvation-how-israel-caused-a-famine-in-gaza>; <https://logcluster.org/en/ops/pse23a>; <https://www.wfp.org/publications/wfp-palestine-monthly-market-dashboard-0>

on the ground, mixed with sand, highlighting the desperation of the situation (see Figure 15). Similar videos show children scraping aid off the ground in Gaza City and Rafah, near the GHF ration stations.⁹⁰




Figure 14. Map of the civilian model of aid distribution, with geolocated incidents of aid diversion between 18 March 2025 and 1 August 2025. Highlighting four key areas in Rafah (A, C), Khan Younis (B), and northern Gaza (D). See Figure 15 for incident 50531-15369 (at location B).

⁹⁰ https://x.com/abn_gaza90/status/1932878105737064624; <https://x.com/AIAinNews/status/1927722812703494237>



Figure 15. Verified video from 31 May 2024, showing three civilians collecting flour scattered on the ground, near the al-Tahliya roundabout in Khan Younis. The woman pictured begins to scream, and then, overwhelmed with frustration, flings the flour she had collected into the air. The flour, visibly mixed with sand, is unusable. See location in [Figure 14](#). [ID: 50531-15369]

(A) Aid Diversion by Israeli-Backed Groups

- 129 The first location of aid diversion on Salah al-Din Road lies just south of the Morag corridor and is under Israeli military control (see [Figure 16](#)). Armed groups backed by the Israeli military operate here, including the Abu Shabab group, led by Yasser Abu Shabab, a former drug trafficker.⁹¹ Videos from accounts affiliated with armed gangs show their members seizing aid trucks on Salah al-Din Road and distributing WFP-labelled flour in the area (see [Figure 17](#) and [Figure 18](#)).⁹²
- 130 Abu Shabab previously admitted to intercepting several aid trucks. In a November 2024 interview with *The New York Times*, Abu Shabab acknowledged that his group had intercepted several aid trucks since the beginning of the war.⁹³ He claimed the motivation was survival rather than profit, stating that they took the trucks to feed their families, not to sell the aid.⁹⁴ The Israeli military took no measures to prevent the diversion of aid by the armed groups it supports in the area.

⁹¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/10/abu-shabab-the-israeli-agent-gaza-war>

⁹² IDs: 50603-81250; 50610-90774; 50529-59817; 50526-07894

⁹³ <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/06/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-palestinian-militia-hamas-abu-shabab.html>

⁹⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/10/abu-shabab-the-israeli-agent-gaza-war>




Figure 16. Map of the civilian model of aid distribution, with geolocated incidents of aid diversion between 18 March 2025 and 1 August 2025, on Salah al-Din Road and Omar ibn al-Khattab Road in southern Gaza. Highlighting three key areas in Rafah (A, C) and Khan Younis (B). Members of Abu Shabab's group have been documented operating in area (A), the Israeli military-controlled area south of the Morag corridor. See [Figure 17](#) and [Figure 18](#) for details of specific incidents.



Figure 17. Verified videos, published between March and June 2025 by social media accounts associated with the Abu Shabab group, show aid diversion on Salah al-Din Road. See locations in [Figure 16](#); two of the videos (middle and bottom) are within the Israeli military zone in Rafah.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ IDs: 50610-90774; 50529-59817; 50526-07894.



Figure 18. Verified video from 3 June 2025, showing aid diversion by individuals associated with the Abu Shabab group, on Salah al-Din Road in Rafah (see locations on [Figure 16](#)). Flour bags have the WFP logo, and the Abu Shabab group has their logo visible on the top-right of the video frames. See location in [Figure 16](#). [ID: 50603-81250]

(B) Aid Diversion near Al-Tahliya Roundabout

- 131 The second location of diversion on Salah al-Din Road, location B, is at al-Tahliya roundabout in Khan Younis, where both gangs and desperate civilians wait for aid trucks entering from Karm Abu Salem crossing (see [Figure 16](#)).
- 132 We confirmed at least seven incidents in the vicinity of al-Tahliya roundabout, along Salah al-Din Road in Khan Younis, where both gangs and desperate civilians intercepted aid trucks (see [Figure 19](#), [Figure 20](#)). [IDs: 50531-15369, 50531-55893].
- 133 A video published on 1 June shows armed individuals reportedly organising the resale of stolen aid, less than 2kms southwest of the al-Tahliya roundabout. The day before, we confirmed videos of aid diversion at the roundabout [ID: 50531-55893]. The video shows civilians queuing along a fence in a residential area to buy bags of flour from an armed family reported to run organised aid theft (see [Figure 21](#), ID: 50601-04742).⁹⁶ Before this video was widely circulated, the Israeli military published drone footage of the same incident connecting the video with Hamas, without providing any evidence (see [Figure 22](#)).⁹⁷ On the same day, the Gaza Media Office published a statement saying that the drone footage published by the Israeli military shows activities of gangs supported by the Israeli military, and claiming the timing of the video's publication was intentional, to distract from the fact that Israel killed thirty-one Palestinians at the GHF station in Rafah that day.⁹⁸ We verified this claim using a Palestinian source, who identified the men visible in the videos as members of a local gang family.

⁹⁶ <https://x.com/AbuLocation/status/1929232952837455915>; <https://x.com/RamAbdu/status/1929257494724932031>

⁹⁷ <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1929220410471538728>

⁹⁸ <https://t.me/mediagovps/3675>




Figure 19. Map of the civilian model of aid distribution, with geolocated incidents of aid diversion, including desperate civilians seeking aid, between 18 March 2025 and 1 August 2025, on Salah al-Din Road. See Figure 20, Figure 21 and Figure 22 for details of specific incidents.



Figure 20. Verified videos from May and June 2025 showing aid diversion by desperate civilians seeking aid on Salah al-Din Road, around al-Tahliya roundabout in Khan Yunis. See locations in Figure 19.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ IDs: 50531-15369; 50531-55893



Figure 21. A verified ground-level video from 1 June 2025 showing armed individuals attacking civilians who are queuing along a fence in a residential area to buy bags of flour, reportedly stolen from aid trucks near the al-Tahliya roundabout. See the location of the incident in the red square in [Figure 19](#). See [Figure 22](#) for a different angle of the incident. [ID: 50601-04742]



Figure 22. Verified video from 1 June 2025 showing armed gangs intimidating crowds of civilians while attempting to 'organise' the resale of stolen aid, near the al-Tahliya roundabout in Khan Younis. The Israeli military published the video claiming these armed individuals are affiliated with Hamas. See the location of the incident in the red square in [Figure 19](#). See [Figure 21](#) for a different angle of the incident. [ID: 50601-04742]

(C) Aid Diversion at Omar Ibn Al-Khattab Road

134 Satellite images from 26 July show aid trucks rerouted to a smaller road heading north from the Israeli military zone between the Morag and Philadelphi corridors. Since then, we have confirmed five cases of aid diversion along this road (see [Figure 23](#), [Figure 24](#), [Figure 25](#)).¹⁰⁰



Figure 23. Map of the civilian model of aid distribution, with geolocated incidents of aid diversion by desperate civilians seeking aid, between 18 March 2025 and 1 August 2025, on

¹⁰⁰ IDs: 50726-26796; 50727-49624; 50729-12796

Omar ibn al-Khattab Road. Satellite image underlay from 26 July 2025. See [Figure 24](#) for detail A and [Figure 25](#) for details of specific incidents. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC].



[Figure 24](#). Satellite image from 26 July 2025, showing crowds of Palestinians (the dense, dark areas in the image) and aid trucks on Omar ibn al-Khattab Road in Khan Younis [ID: 50726-26796]. Detail A of [Figure 23](#). [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]



Figure 25. Verified videos from 27 and 29 July 2025 respectively, showing aid diversion by desperate civilians seeking aid on Omar ibn al-Khattab Road in Khan Yunis. See locations in Figure 23.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ IDs: 50727-49624, 50729-12796.

(D) Aid Diversion on Rashid Road

- 135 Aid is also diverted along al-Rashid Road in northern Gaza, where civilians wait for aid trucks entering from the Zikim crossing (see [Figure 26](#), [Figure 27](#) and [Figure 28](#)).
- 136 At the end of June 2025, members of Palestinian clans organised to protect aid convoys entering from Zikim crossing in northern Gaza. They managed to successfully deliver aid to warehouses in Gaza City, and Israel closed the crossing the following day (see [p.145](#)).



Figure 26. Map of civilian model of aid distribution, with geolocated incidents of aid diversion by desperate civilians seeking aid, between 18 March 2025 and 1 August 2025, on al-Rashid Road in northern Gaza with trucks arriving through Zikim crossing detail D. See [Figure 27](#) and [Figure 28](#).



Figure 27. Verified video from 22 June 2025, showing people carrying aid from a diverted aid truck on al-Rashid Road in northern Gaza. It arrived through Zikim crossing. See location on [Figure 26](#). [ID: 50622-77401]



Figure 28. Verified drone footage from 1 August 2025 showing a large crowd of desperate civilians, near the Oasis Roundabout on al-Rashid Road as aid trucks entered Zikim. It arrived through Zikim crossing. See location on [Figure 26](#). [ID: 50801-61057]

2 *Imposing a Military Model*

137 While the civilian model has been attacked and undermined, in its place has emerged an evolving military model of aid distribution.

138 This section covers the two main forms of Israeli militarised aid distribution: the GHF ration stations and the airdropping of aid. By design, both approaches not only fail to efficiently and effectively provide rations, but are simultaneously successful in dehumanising Palestinians, stripping people of their dignity, and undermining the social order.

2.1 Ration Stations Operated by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation

139 In contrast to the 400 aid sites of the civilian model, the militarised model of the GHF operates through four ration stations all located in central and southern Gaza, and within the Israeli military zone where their armed forces are active. The four ration stations are expected to serve more than two million Palestinians, many of whom must walk between 2.5km and 10km one way to receive aid (see [Figure 31](#)). Palestinians can only access these stations on foot¹⁰², and only from south of the Netzarim corridor (see [Figure 29](#)).

140 Ration stations in southern Gaza (see [Figure 30](#)):

- 1) Swedish village (West Rafah)
- 2) Saudi district (near Tel al-Sultan in Rafah)
- 3) Khan Younis

141 Ration station in central Gaza:

- 4) Wadi Gaza (south of the Netzarim corridor)

¹⁰² <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-starvation-experiment>




Figure 29. Map of locations of the GHF ration stations, and paths civilians are directed to use to get to the ration stations.




Figure 30. Map showing the four GHF ration stations and the routes designated to reach them, which are near the Morag and Netzarim corridors, and within areas designated by the Israeli military as 'dangerous combat zone' and therefore unsafe for Palestinians (see p.98).




Figure 31. Map showing the distance to the GHF ration stations, indicating the distance Palestinians have to travel to reach the sites.

(A) Ration Stations as an Extension of Military Infrastructure

- 142 Since November 2023, Israel has been expanding its military infrastructure in Gaza through new military and buffer zones, roads, military outputs, and corridors.¹⁰³
- 143 This began with the establishment of the Netzarim corridor in November 2023, effectively splitting Gaza in two. In May 2024, this was followed by the occupation of the Philadelphi corridor during the invasion of Rafah, and the creation of raid routes along the northern and eastern sides of Gaza.¹⁰⁴
- 144 During the ceasefire between January and March 2025, the Israeli army further expanded its infrastructure along the buffer zone, constructing new roads and military outposts. Since 31 March, all Palestinians have been ordered to evacuate Rafah, where virtually every built structure, including agrarian infrastructure, has been demolished (see [Figure 32](#), [Figure 33](#), [Figure 34](#)). In May 2025, following the destruction of Rafah, the Israeli army established a new military corridor known as the Morag corridor. This military infrastructure has implemented a system of ‘divide and control’, whereby Palestinian’s freedom of movement has been restricted. Population control through military architecture has evolved one step further with the creation of the GHF stations.
- 145 Three of the four ration stations are located within this newly established military zone, situated between the Philadelphi and Morag corridors (see [Figure 32](#) and [Figure 35](#)). Within this zone, Israel has expanded its military control, through new large bases, berms, and routes. Part of this new infrastructure is also used by security and aid convoys at GHF ration stations.
- 146 The fourth ration station is situated near Wadi Gaza, within the former buffer zone of the Netzarim corridor, and is served by the military infrastructure of the Netzarim corridor¹⁰⁵. Both in southern Gaza and near Netzarim, the newly established ration stations function as extensions of the broader military infrastructure developed by the Israeli military (see [Figure 36](#)).

¹⁰³ https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FA_A-Spatial-Analysis-of-the-Israeli-militarys-conduct-in-Gaza-since-October-2023.pdf

¹⁰⁴ https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FA_A-Spatial-Analysis-of-the-Israeli-militarys-conduct-in-Gaza-since-October-2023.pdf, pp. 48-56

¹⁰⁵ https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FA_A-Spatial-Analysis-of-the-Israeli-militarys-conduct-in-Gaza-since-October-2023.pdf, p. 49




Figure 32. Map of three GHF ration stations (blue), located near the Morag corridor in Rafah. These sites were constructed in parallel with large scale destruction and clearing of Rafah by the Israeli military between March 2025 and May 2025.



Figure 33. Satellite images from 3 April 2025 (left) and 11 May 2025 (right), showing the destruction of residential areas in Rafah. See [Figure 34](#) for detail A. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]



Figure 34. Location A identified in **Figure 33**. Verified image from 30 April 2025, showing the Israeli private company Uriah Force, hired to assist with the demolition, holding a ‘Memorial Day’ ceremony among ruined buildings in central Rafah.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ <https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1920890637634633883>; <https://x.com/YinonMagal/status/1917560269007470856>; <https://x.com/JBreakingNews/status/1917590413969428868>




Figure 35. Map of the GHF ration stations (Swedish Village and Saudi District) in Rafah. Civilians move (cyan) to GHF infrastructure (blue) within militarised areas (red). [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]




Figure 36. Map of the GHF ration station (Wadi Gaza) in Bureij, central Gaza. Civilians (cyan) move to GHF infrastructure (blue) within militarised areas (red). [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]

(B) Internal Architecture of the Ration Stations

147 Each ration station is at the intersection of three types of infrastructure:

- 1) Supply routes for aid trucks.
- 2) Israeli military routes and security outposts.
- 3) Access routes for Palestinians arriving on foot.

148 In the southern ration stations of the Swedish Village, the Saudi District and Khan Younis, supplies are delivered from Karem Abu Salem crossing, along the Philadelphi and Morag corridors (see [Figure 32](#)). Perimeter security is provided by the Israeli army with outposts along the roads. Within the centres themselves, security and logistics are provided by private US security contractors.¹⁰⁷

149 The compounds are connected to three routes. The ‘back side’ of the compound is linked to a traffic corridor along which aid trucks arrive. The ‘front side’ is accessed by pedestrians through an ‘entry’ route separated from an ‘exit’ route. In at least one of the sites, the ‘entry’ route is divided into five narrow fenced corridors, where Palestinians queue before entering the ration station (see [Figure 39](#)). Along the perimeter of each site, we have identified at least four watchtowers (see [Figure 37](#), [Figure 38](#), [Figure 40](#), [Figure 42](#), and [Figure 43](#)).

150 Our findings show that the military model — with its short time for Palestinians to collect food, limited number of ration stations and militarised architecture — often creates a chaotic and violent outcome.

151 Verified footage from the Swedish Village ration station shows security personnel pointing guns at civilians waiting for aid on 11 June, forcing them to gather in large numbers beyond the fences and berms [ID: 50611-53424]. After the civilians are shouted at, the footage shows people desperately running toward the centre of the site, where aid boxes had been left by the GHF. Further footage on 10 June shows a similar scene at the Saudi Village station, with large numbers of civilians looking through boxes inside the ration station [ID: 50610-23501]. Footage from 12 June shows large number of civilians waiting outside the GHF ration station in Wadi Gaza, where shooting is audible and use of gas canister on civilians is visible [ID: 50612-21943]. See also [p.118](#).

152 Dr Maynard recalls consistently hearing accounts of chaos at the GHF ration stations:

‘There was one anaesthetist I worked with who in between operations had gone out to one of these food distribution sites to get food and came back with his arms covered in cuts and bruises and grazes because of the fighting there to get the food.

¹⁰⁷ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cn4g0xmem2lo>

*The stories we were getting from all the relatives, and these coworkers were consistent. We were repeatedly told that GHF sites were set up to create chaos and rioting, and that IDF and quadcopter drones would shoot many of these boys. There was no question in my mind regarding the accuracy of what's been relayed to me.'*¹⁰⁸




Figure 37. Annotated satellite image from 5 June 2025, showing movement of civilians and aid trucks, and the militarised architecture (berms, watchtowers, barriers) of the Swedish Village GHF site. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]

¹⁰⁸ Dr Maynard's statement, p.5



Figure 38. Satellite image from 5 June 2025, showing the Swedish Village GHF site. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]



Figure 39. Verified image from 27 May 2025, showing Palestinians forced to queue inside fenced pathways to receive aid from the Swedish Village GHF site. Location A in **Figure 37**.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ <https://x.com/AjAqrabawi/status/1927362743008452996>



Figure 40. Annotated satellite image from 28 May 2025, showing movement of civilians and aid trucks, and the militarised architecture (berms, watchtowers, barriers) of the Saudi District GHF site. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]



Figure 41. Annotated satellite image from 18 July 2025, showing Palestinians within the militarised architecture of the Saudi District GHF site. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]



Figure 42. Annotated satellite image from 30 May 2025, showing movement of civilians and aid trucks, and the militarised architecture (berms, watchtowers, barriers) of the Khan Younis GHF site. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]



Figure 43. Annotated satellite image from 5 June 2025, showing movement of civilians and aid trucks, and the militarised architecture (berms, watchtowers, barriers) of the Wadi Gaza GHF site. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]

(C) Timing of Openings and Closures


153 Beginning on 29 May, two days after the GHF began distributing rations, they communicated the timing of ration stations' openings and closures via their official Facebook page.¹¹⁰ FA collected and analysed 160 such announcements issued between 29 May and 4 July (see [Figure 44](#)).

154 We have identified four main observations in the timing of openings and closures:

- 1) 60% of the announcements were posted less than one hour before the facility opened. Given that Palestinians often need to walk between 2.5km and 10km from their shelters to reach the ration stations, it is unlikely they could arrive there in time, forcing many to remain in dangerous areas near the distribution points while awaiting the next opening.
- 2) The average duration a ration station was open for at one time was 23 minutes. After 19 June this value fell to 10 minutes.
- 3) In 23% of cases, the closing time was announced before the previously communicated opening time.
- 4) In 16% of cases, only the opening or closing time was communicated.

¹¹⁰ <https://www.facebook.com/people/Gaza-Humanitarian-Foundation/61576929655481/>. Note that announcing opening hours via Facebook presupposes access to a stable internet connection.

■ Open period
 ■ Time between announcement and opening
 ■ Closure declared before scheduled opening
 ● Open announcement
 ● Close announcement






Figure 44. Timeline of opening and closing times of the four GHF ration stations between 29 May and 4 July 2025.

2.2 Airdropped Aid: Another Militarised Model

- 155 The Israeli military has experimented with multiple methods of delivering aid to Gaza, largely adapting their approaches in accordance with periods of mounting international criticism (see p.21). Last year, both airdropped aid and the US-constructed maritime port (operational from May to July 2024) were tested — the latter was used to deliver aid to Israeli military bases within the Netzarim corridor. These efforts disregard numerous reports by humanitarian organisations that the most effective way to deliver aid to Gaza is via land.¹¹¹
- 156 In March 2024, Israel allowed multiple countries to airdrop food packages over northern Gaza for the first time, following its siege of the territory which had caused worsening starvation.
- 157 On 25 July 2025, again after a period of worsening starvation and international criticism, the Israeli military carried out its own first direct aid drop on Gaza, reportedly delivering seven pallets of food.¹¹² The Israeli Prime Minister subsequently invited other countries to do the same, prompting several countries to announce plans to airdrop aid.¹¹³ Delivering via this method does not provide enough aid to reverse starvation.¹¹⁴ Dropping seven pallets succeeds only as a performative act designed to appease international critics. On the same day, UNRWA posted on X that 6,000 trucks loaded with food and medical supplies were waiting outside Gaza, barred from entering by Israel.¹¹⁵
- 158 In videos showing Palestinians attempting to collect airdropped aid, some describe the humiliation of receiving assistance in this way. In one video we verified, filmed within the al-Zawayda area near Deir al-Balah, and shared on 5 August, a Palestinian man is seen waiting for an airdrop and then managing to collect some items after chasing falling pallets.¹¹⁶ Later in the video he says that all he received was part of a parachute, which he could use for shelter, and half a bag of rotten bread. The video shows him opening a bag labelled as Lebanese bread — verified by us to closely match bread sold in Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey, and markedly different from bread typically made in Gaza — further supporting that this rotten bread had been airdropped.
- 159 Features of the airdropped model:
- 1) Airdropped food packages carry a quantity of food which, even if multiplied by many drops, is not enough to stave off starvation in any significant or sustainable way.

¹¹¹ <https://palestine.un.org/en/269122-aid-delivery-floating-dock-welcomed-land-routes-%E2%80%98more-important%E2%80%99>

¹¹² <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cn437jjygl9o>

¹¹³ <https://www.dw.com/en/gaza-airdrops-not-enough-to-address-humanitarian-crisis/a-73530769>

¹¹⁴ <https://x.com/UNRWA/status/1949069597472084070>

¹¹⁵ <https://x.com/UNRWA/status/1948669565086695474>

¹¹⁶ <https://x.com/EyeonPalestine/status/1952633049662788071>

- 2) The flights are far more expensive than delivering aid by land.
- 3) When packages land, they fall into one of the two zones into which Israel has divided Gaza: a military-controlled zone covering over 80% of the Strip, and a displacement zone where nearly the entire population has taken refuge in overcrowded tent camps. Aid drops in either zone expose Palestinians to distinct forms of danger.
- 4) There's no way to fully control where these packages will land. Therefore:
 - i) Not all packages land in areas which are accessible. In some cases, food packages were dropped into the sea. Verified videos show people jumping over walls to where a drop is landing.¹¹⁷
 - ii) It's impossible to determine exactly who will receive them and how the packages will be distributed.
 - iii) There is no control over who receives the aid, failing to fulfil the Israeli government's stated aim of implementing a model of distribution designed to avoid the diversion of aid by Hamas.

¹⁶⁰ In combination aid drops are not only ineffective but dangerous. Each of the above factors have greatest impact upon the most vulnerable and those most in need of humanitarian support, like the elderly and disabled, who are unlikely to be able to reach drops which fall at unspecified locations with little notice.

¹¹⁷ ID: 50730-88132, <https://x.com/eyeonpalestine/status/1950857811694362923>




Figure 45. Map of flight paths of planes that provided airdrops of aid in Gaza between 31 July and 1 August 2025 in relation to the 'dangerous combat zone'. Showing verified incidents of airdropped aid documented parachuting, and confirmed as landed.¹¹⁸ See Figure 46 and Figure 47 for details A and B respectively.

¹¹⁸ <https://globe.adsbexchange.com/>

(A) Airdrops in Militarised or 'No-Go' Zones

- 161 One of the two possible locations in which a drop can land is in a militarised or 'no-go' zone, which currently accounts for more than 88% of Gaza (see [Figure 45](#)). The no-go zones are designated by the Israeli military and communicated via evacuation orders.¹¹⁹ Entry into these areas carries the explicit risk of being targeted by the Israeli military.
- 162 In April 2024, when several aid pallets were dropped within the Israeli buffer zone, Israeli forces opened fire on Palestinians attempting to collect them. An incident captured in a video published by Al Jazeera, shows a Palestinian civilian killed while trying to retrieve aid within the buffer zone east of Shuja'iyya.¹²⁰
- 163 Since July 2025, we have verified at least four incidents of airdropped aid falling within areas designated by the Israeli military as a no-go zone (see 'aid airdrop parachuting', [Figure 45](#)) and three incidents of airdropped aid landing in the no-go zone (see 'aid airdrop landed' [Figure 45](#)).
- 164 In this scenario, Palestinians are faced with two options:
- 1) Abide by the military's restrictions by not entering the area and therefore guarantee not accessing the aid.
 - 2) Or enter the area and risk being targeted with no guarantee of being able to reach the aid.

¹¹⁹ <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-307-gaza-strip>

¹²⁰ https://youtu.be/mXuJvR3Z0z4?si=VZa_-Nmeer9qshwY; https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FA_A-Spatial-Analysis-of-the-Israeli-militarys-conduct-in-Gaza-since-October-2023.pdf, p. 62



Figure 46. Map of flight paths of planes that provided airdrops of aid in Gaza between 31 July and 1 August 2025, in relation to the 'dangerous combat zone' and Israeli military vehicles on 26 July 2025 in northern Gaza. Detail A of **Figure 45**. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]

(B) Airdrops in High-density Populated Areas

165 The second possible location in which a military aid drop can land is in the 12% of area not covered by a military zone. These areas have a high population density, sheltering almost the entire population of 2.3 million Gazans in overcrowded conditions (see **Figure 47**). In this scenario, the aid drop poses two major risks, neither of which can be completely avoided in such crowded areas:

- 1) The drop lands on civilians, causing injury or death.

2) The drop lands on people's property, shelter or infrastructure causing damage.

- ¹⁶⁶ On 8 March 2024, five people were killed and several injured after the parachutes failed to open on airdropped parcels, falling on a crowd of people.¹²¹ The Gaza Media Office stated that: 'Dropping aid in this way is flashy propaganda rather than a humanitarian service, ... We previously warned it poses a threat to the lives of citizens in the Gaza Strip, and this is what happened today when the parcels fell on the citizens' heads.'¹²² In October 2024, Al Jazeera also reported that a child was killed in Khan Younis as a result of airdropped pallets falling on a tent camp.¹²³
- ¹⁶⁷ On 4 August 2025, the current phase of airdropping aid killed Palestinian nurse Uday Nahid Al-Qara'an, when an aid box fell directly on his head in al-Zawaida in central Gaza.¹²⁴ A few days before his death, Al-Qara'an appeared in a video condemning the airdrop of humanitarian aid, describing it as a humiliation for the people of Gaza.¹²⁵
- ¹⁶⁸ Additionally, reports indicate that at least eleven Palestinians were injured in northern Gaza on 26 July 2025 when aid pallets fell on tents for displaced people.¹²⁶

¹²¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/08/gaza-aid-airdrop-kills-civilians-when-parachute-fails-to-open-witness-says>

¹²² <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2024/3/8/israels-war-on-gaza-live-60000-pregnant-women-face-malnutrition-in-gaza?update=2758664>

¹²³ <https://www.instagram.com/reel/DBWZ3LGvQJ0/>

¹²⁴ <https://x.com/AnasAlSharif0/status/1952320395673059721>

¹²⁵ <https://x.com/MegaphoneNewsEN/status/1952359965387063432>

¹²⁶ <https://aje.io/adw4gg>



Figure 47. Map of flight paths of planes airdropping aid in Gaza between 31 July and 1 August 2025 (dashed black lines), in relation to the density of tents in Gaza City (green). Detail B of **Figure 45**. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]

I PATTERNS

169 Forensic Architecture have identified that Israel's weaponised system of aid distribution — expressed through the dismantling of the civilian model and imposition of the militarised model — has contributed to three main patterns: forced displacement and re-concentration of Palestinians through the locations of the ration stations, making reaching aid deadly and dangerous, and the undermining of civil order and dismantling of the social fabric.

170 The analysis finds the Israeli system of aid distribution has created chaos, displacement, and death, which appears to threaten the very existence of the Palestinians of Gaza as a group.

1 *Forced Displacement and Re-Concentration of the Civilian Population*

171 Israel's establishment of dependence upon the four GHF ration stations in the south of the Gaza Strip — three in the southernmost part — requires people to move from their areas of residence toward these ration stations, in areas which put their lives at risk, and which cannot sufficiently support civilian life. It aligns with plans made public by Israeli officials to concentrate the population in the south of Gaza as a step toward pushing them into Egypt (see Figure 48). In a non-public session of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee on 11 May 2025, for the first time Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly said that receiving aid would be conditional on Gazans not returning to the areas they came from.¹²⁷

172 On 5 July, Netanyahu again mentioned re-concentration and displacement in a government meeting on the ceasefire-hostage deal: he reportedly reprimanded the Israeli army's Chief of Staff, Eyal Zamir, for delays in establishing a large humanitarian compound in southern Gaza, intended to concentrate Palestinians from all parts of Gaza, and primarily from northern Gaza, in a way that would 'isolate Hamas', and as a stage towards their expulsion from Palestine.¹²⁸

173 Days later, on 7 July, this plan was talked about publicly: Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz told journalists about plans for the Israeli military to relocate the entire population of Gaza into an enclosed area between the Philadelphi and Morag corridors, fed by three ration stations.¹²⁹ Described as a so-called 'humanitarian city', the site would function rather like a concentration camp in that it would be a place for gathering a scattered population so as to control them.¹³⁰ Entry into the camp will be screened and Palestinians who enter will not be allowed to leave. Whoever is left outside the 'humanitarian city' in other parts of the strip could be identified as a member of Hamas and be killed. According to Katz, perimeter

¹²⁷ <https://www.maariv.co.il/news/politics/article-1195611>

¹²⁸ <https://www.timesofisrael.com/cabinet-approves-plan-to-let-more-aid-into-northern-gaza-over-hardliner-protests/>

¹²⁹ <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-07-07/ty-article/.premium/defense-minister-israel-to-concentrate-all-gaza-population-in-rafah-humanitarian-zone/00000197-e56a-d1ad-ab97-e5ef764e0000>

¹³⁰ Appendix B, p.9

security will be provided by Israeli forces, with policing tasks delegated to mercenaries and collaborators. He stated that the initial phase would involve the transfer of 600,000 Palestinians — primarily displaced people already in the al-Mawasi area — into the closed-off concentration camp. The long-term objective, he noted, is to incarcerate the entire population of Gaza there — one stage in the implementation of what he referred to as ‘the transfer plan’ outlined in February 2025 by US President Donald Trump.¹³¹

- 174 Finally, the re-concentration of the population of Gaza was in the GHF’s proposal from the beginning. In a proposal to the Trump administration sometime after 11 February 2025, it included a plan to build large-scale camps called ‘Humanitarian Transit Areas’ inside, and possibly outside, of the territory of the Gaza Strip. The area would house the entirety of Gaza’s civilian population, and would be ‘replacing Hamas’ in exercising control over the population. In these camps, the civilian population could ‘temporarily reside, deradicalise, re-integrate and prepare to relocate if they wish to do so.’¹³²
- 175 These plans are primarily justified by two Israeli narratives. First, that the movement of the Gazan population is a necessary part of fulfilling the military objective of eliminating Hamas. Second, that relocation within Gaza towards aid distribution sites, or outside of Gaza to other countries, is voluntary not forced. We have found no evidence of systematic targeting of aid by Hamas, and our analysis indicates that Israeli evacuation orders appear to be forcing the displacement and relocation of Palestinians in Gaza.

¹³¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/07/israeli-minister-reveals-plan-to-force-population-of-gaza-into-camp-on-ruins-of-rafah>

¹³² <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-backed-aid-group-proposed-human-transit-areas-palestinians-gaza-2025-07-07>




Figure 48. Map of areas that have been issued with evacuation orders and are within the buffer zone, Israeli military ground invasion, militarised corridors (including, Netzarim, Philadelphi and Morag), and an area designated as 'aid zone' and 'humanitarian city' by Israeli officials in the city on Rafah, which has been destroyed and cleared by Israeli military operations since March 2025.

176 FA's analysis of Israeli evacuation orders, the construction of military infrastructure, and military attacks in Gaza since the breakdown of the ceasefire on 18 March is consistent with these displacement plans. This conduct is characterised by the following:

1.1 Evacuation Orders Forcing Palestinians into Constant Displacement, and Israeli Attacks on Areas to Which People Were Previously Ordered to Evacuate

¹⁷⁷ Since the dissolution of the ceasefire on 18 March 2025, and 1 August 2025, the Israeli military issued fifty-eight evacuation orders to Palestinians in Gaza, repeatedly forcing the population to evacuate towards the southwest. Many of these orders redefine the boundaries of the so-called ‘buffer zone’, gradually expanding the area designated for evacuation or military activity to 88% of the total area of the Strip (see [Figure 49](#)).¹³³

¹³³ <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-307-gaza-strip>



Figure 49. Map of the fifty-eight evacuation orders since the end of the ceasefire on 18 March 2025 to 1 August 2025, with the pre-ceasefire 'humanitarian zone' showing the concentration of the population along the coast, particularly in the southern coastal area of al-Mawasi. Arrows within the map are those drawn on Israeli evacuation orders. Over time, the buffer zone has grown to encompass areas that had previously been subject to evacuation orders, placing these areas under Israeli military control (see [Figure 50](#) and [Figure 51](#)).

178 Israel regards the buffer zone as a ‘kill zone’ where any Palestinian entering or present can be subjected to lethal fire.¹³⁴ This gradual expansion in the buffer zone (see [Figure 50](#) and [Figure 51](#)) has allowed the Israeli military, using bulldozers and sappers, to systematically demolish and clear the area of all buildings, civilian infrastructure, fields, greenhouses and farms. It then uses the bulldozers to shape the rubble of this destruction into military infrastructure like berms, used for bases, secured and protected routes, and the ration stations. Such destruction undermines Palestinian’s ability to return to the areas they’ve evacuated from, turning temporary evacuation into likely permanent displacement.

¹³⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/07/israel-military-gaza-perimeter-land-testimony-report>




Figure 50. Map of expansions in the buffer zone. We have documented four instances (18 March, 6 April, 12 April, 21 May) in which the declared boundaries of the buffer zone have subsumed areas that were previously subject to evacuation orders. As of 3 June 2025, the buffer zone had expanded to encompass the municipality of Rafah, as well as areas to the east of Khan Younis and in the north of Gaza.




Figure 51. Maps showing areas under evacuation orders in southern Gaza being gradually absorbed by the buffer zone. Map from 30 March 2025 (top-left), shows the buffer zone prior to the evacuation orders on Rafah on 31 March and 1 April. Maps from 1 April (top-right, bottom-left) show the evacuation order being subsumed by buffer zone. Map from 6 April (bottom-right) shows new buffer zone designated by the Israeli military in an evacuation order issued on 6 April.



Figure 52. Map of 58 evacuation orders and buffer zone issued by the Israeli military, between 18 March and 1 August 2025, and buffer zone from 21 May 2025.

179 Since 29 May 2025, the Israeli military has released evacuation orders without the buffer zone boundary in the maps they share. This has been superseded by a boundary referred to as the 'Dangerous combat zone', which, compared to the latest buffer zone established on 21 May covering 56% of Gaza (see [Figure 52](#)), has expanded significantly to cover 79% of Gaza as of 27 July 2025. As with the buffer zone, the designated 'Dangerous combat zone' (see [Figure 53](#)) has been shifting over time, with the blocks ordered to evacuate gradually being absorbed within this boundary. Evacuation orders showing this area are followed by messaging such as 'Returning to dangerous zones puts you in danger'.




Figure 53. Map of the 'dangerous combat zone' declared by the Israeli military on 27 July 2025.

180 Repeated evacuation orders have sent Palestinians to the coastal al-Mawasi area in the southwest of Gaza, where they have been concentrated in appalling conditions. Satellite imagery shows tents have been erected on the seashore, on piers extending into the sea, among the ruins of buildings, on sidewalks and roads, in gardens, and in garbage dumps (see Figure 54).




Figure 54. Satellite images showing the density of tents in al-Mawasi on 18 July 2025 (left), and in Gaza City on 31 July 2025 (right). Tents are visible along the piers, on the seashore, and on roads and roundabouts. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]

- 181 The process of evacuation/displacement is itself dangerous. We have documented a pattern in which Palestinians have been ordered by the Israeli military to move to certain areas, only for the Israeli military to attack those same areas shortly afterwards — either later on the day of the evacuation order, or the day after (see [Figure 55](#)).¹³⁵

¹³⁵ <https://frames.forensic-architecture.org/gaza/updates/attacks-on-7-and-8-april-2025>

¹⁸² Between 18 March and 26 April 2025, we documented six attacks in areas to which civilians were ordered to move. These attacks took place between six and thirty-six hours after the evacuation order was given:

1) 23 March [ID: 50323-43706]

¹⁸³ On the morning of 23 March, the Israeli military issued an evacuation order to the Tel al-Sultan neighbourhood of Rafah, ¹³⁶ directing civilians to move northeast. We verified an airstrike that evening which hit the Nasser Medical Complex, the largest functioning hospital in the area, northeast of Tel al-Sultan in Khan Younis.

2) 7 and 8 April [IDs: 50407-35898; 50408-60205; 50408-90638]

¹⁸⁴ On the morning of 7 April, the Israeli military issued an evacuation order to Deir al-Balah, directing civilians to move southwest. ¹³⁷ We verified an attack later that day on a residential building southwest of Deir al-Balah (see [Figure 55](#)). The following day, there were two attacks in areas southwest of Deir al-Balah (see [Figure 56](#)).

3) 13 April [ID: 50413-79590]

¹⁸⁵ On 12 April, the Israeli military issued an evacuation order to neighbourhoods in Nuseirat, ¹³⁸ directing civilians to move towards the south. We verified an airstrike on 13 April on a municipality building south of Nuseirat, in Deir al-Balah.

4) 26 April [ID: 50426-67886]

¹⁸⁶ On 25 April, the Israeli military issued an evacuation order to neighbourhoods in the east of Gaza City, directing civilians to move west. ¹³⁹ This evacuation order directed civilians in the direction of an area that had previously been issued an evacuation order on 26 March, and again on 3 April. We verified an airstrike carried out the next day, on 26 April, on a residential building west of those neighbourhoods, in al-Sabra.

¹³⁶ <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1903696196587180347>

¹³⁷ <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1909140394601832660>

¹³⁸ <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/191142356457312613>

¹³⁹ <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1915812977044853003>




Figure 55. On the morning of 7 April 2025, the Israeli military issued an evacuation order to residents of Deir al-Balah, directing civilians to move southwest. Later that day, there was an attack on a residential building southwest of Deir al-Balah. See [Figure 57](#) for details of specific incidents [ID: 50407-35898] See [Figure 57](#) for details of specific incidents. [ID: 50407-35898]



Figure 56. On 8 April, there were two attacks on areas of Deir al-Balah to which Palestinians were directed to move the previous day. See [Figure 57](#) for details of specific incidents. [IDs: 50408-60205; 50407-35898]



Figure 57. Still frames from videos of attacks on areas in Deir al-Balah to which civilians were ordered to evacuate to. See locations in Figure 55 and Figure 56. [IDs: 50407-35898; 50408-60205; 50408-90638]

1.2 Failure to Provide Safe Spaces for Civilians While Continuing to Strike the Previously Designated ‘Humanitarian Zone’ in the al-Mawasi Area

187 None of the fifty-eight evacuation orders issued to date designate a specific safe area for civilians to relocate to. The previously declared ‘humanitarian zone’ in al-Mawasi has been subject to repeated attacks, despite the growing number of displaced civilians sheltering there. We have confirmed at least thirty-one such incidents since 18 March 2025 (see Figure 58).

188 Dr Maynard described treating two women who were shot while in their tents in al-Mawasi area, near the GHF ration stations:

‘I also saw two women who came in with gunshot wounds during the last week. Both of the women lived in makeshift tents in Al Mawasi area, near the food distribution centre. One of the women had been breastfeeding her seven-month-old baby, and the other one was three months pregnant and resting. They told me about quadcopters shootings, and the families of these two women described to me in detail how the quadcopters were firing indiscriminately at the tents near the food distribution centre.

Both women sustained shot wounds in the abdomen, I operated on both of them. In the case of the pregnant woman, the bullet had missed her pregnant uterus by about a centimetre, but I had to remove quite a bit of her bowel, which had been severely damaged; the first lady who was breastfeeding, also had severe damage to her bowel which I operated on. Both women survived and did well after the surgeries. But I reiterate the fact that they were both in their shelters, and quadcopters indiscriminately fired at them, which is unbelievable.’¹⁴⁰

¹⁴⁰ Dr Maynard’s statement, p.8




Figure 58. Map of attacks within the previous 'humanitarian zone' in al-Mawasi between 18 March and 1 August 2025.

1.3 Adoption of an Aid Distribution Model That Requires People to Move Toward Ration Stations

189 The militarised model of aid distribution forces people to relocate toward ration stations because:

- 1) Rather than aid being delivered directly to their areas of residence, people must travel to receive food.
- 2) The locations and limited number of ration stations means many people must travel kilometres to reach them (see [Figure 31](#)).
- 3) Purposefully chaotic opening and closure system leaves civilians in dangerous zones.

190 As a result, there has been an increase in the number of tents housing displaced people, mostly near the Swedish Village ration station in Rafah. Some of these tents are located within zones that have been designated for evacuation.

191 For example, between 3 May and 30 May 2025, satellite imagery shows an increase in the density of tents in the al-Mawasi area. Notably, between 30 May and 18 July 2025, new tents appeared in zones placed under evacuation orders since 31 March, particularly in proximity to the GHF ration stations of the Swedish Village and the Saudi District (see [Figure 59](#) and [Figure 60](#)). This pattern suggests that overcrowding in al-Mawasi is compelling some displaced people to relocate to other areas near the ration stations, despite the risks.

192 Satellite imagery showing the appearance of tents near the GHF ration stations aligns with testimony describing repeated displacement and individuals moving toward aid centres. One account details a journey on foot from western Gaza City to the Fish Fresh area in southern Khan Younis, with an overnight stop near Moawiya Mosque along Al-Rashid Street, in an attempt to access rations at a GHF site. This testimony suggests that areas adjacent to the ration stations are being used as temporary gathering or encampment sites.¹⁴¹

¹⁴¹ <https://pchrgaza.org/dangerous-ordeal-to-get-box-of-aid>



Figure 59. Map of area (A) civilians have relocated to around the buffer zone in al-Mawasi, to access aid from GHF ration stations. See Figure 60 for detail A.




Figure 60. Satellite imagery from 30 May and 18 July 2025, showing a significant increase in tent density within the al-Mawasi area around the buffer zone, see areas of interest in white square. Detail A of Figure 59. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]

1.4 Israeli Proxy Actors Encourage Palestinians to Relocate to Specific Areas in Rafah, Using the Incentives of Shelter and Access to Aid

- 193 A video published by the Abu Shabab group on 3 June features a recorded audio message addressed to residents of eastern Rafah. In the message, residents are invited to return to Rafah, where they are promised access to shelter and aid shown in the footage (see [Figure 61](#) and [Figure 62](#)). Our analysis of satellite imagery confirms the emergence of the tent camp shown in the video, located within the military zone established between the Morag and the Philadelphi corridors, appearing on 30 May 2025 (see [Figure 63](#) and [Figure 64](#)). The tent camp disappeared by 16 June 2025, with no further information available regarding the reasons for its removal.
- 194 We found this to be part of a larger pattern where Abu Shabab and other proxy actors act in accordance with Israeli military objectives (see [p.139](#)).



Figure 61. Verified video from 3 June 2025 published by the Abu Shabab group, showing the construction of a tent camp within Israeli military-controlled Rafah. See location A on [Figure 63](#) and satellite imagery of location in [Figure 64](#). [ID: 50603-81250]



Figure 62. Verified video published by the Abu Shabab group on 3 June 2025, showing members of the group distributing aid to civilians who follow requests to move to Israeli military-controlled Rafah. [ID: 50603-81250]




Figure 63. Map of location A, where Abu Shabab encouraged people to move as seen in Figure 61, within Israeli military-controlled Rafah. See Figure 61 for details of specific location.



Figure 64. A close-up of satellite image from 30 May 2025 showing the location of the tent camp of the Abu Shabab group. See location in **Figure 63**.

2 *Making Reaching Aid Dangerous and Deadly*

- 195 The Israeli-sanctioned system is making reaching aid deadly, as Gazans are forced between slowly starving or risking their lives trying to access food. People are killed and injured both when seeking the little aid still available through the civilian model, as well as at and around the GHF ration stations. On 1 August 2025, the UN reported that ‘since 27 May, at least 1,373 Palestinians have been killed while seeking food; 859 in the vicinity of the GHF sites and 514 along the routes of food convoys’.¹⁴²
- 196 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated, ‘[The office] has no information that these Palestinians [killed or injured seeking aid] were directly participating in hostilities or posed any threat to Israeli security forces or other individuals. Each person killed or injured had been desperately struggling for survival, not only for themselves, but also for their families and dependents’.¹⁴³
- 197 Starving Palestinians are killed wherever they seek aid, including when they seek treatment for malnutrition. On 10 July, two women and ten children were killed while queuing outside Project HOPE health clinic in Deir al-Balah, where they had gathered to receive treatment for malnutrition [Incident ID 50710-23628].

2.1 Attacks on Civilians at the GHF Aid Distribution Centres

- 198 As we have established, the GHF ration stations are deadly by design: located in military zones, insufficient in number, inadequate in provision, and inconsistently open. At the GHF sites, starving Palestinians forced into dependency and desperation are consistently met with militarised brutality in what Israeli soldiers themselves have described as a ‘killing field’ involving ‘live fire with everything imaginable: heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, mortar’.¹⁴⁴ Israeli soldiers report being ordered to deliberately shoot at unarmed Palestinians waiting for rations.¹⁴⁵
- 199 In July, testimonies emerged that American contractors guarding the GHF ration stations in Gaza had also used live ammunition and stun grenades against Palestinians seeking aid.¹⁴⁶ One contractor, Tony Aguilar, came forward with a video he says he filmed on 29 May at the GHF station near al-Bureij.¹⁴⁷ The footage shows two of his colleagues celebrating after

¹⁴² <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/08/1165552>

¹⁴³ <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/08/1165552>

¹⁴⁴ <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-06-27/ty-article-magazine/.premium/idf-soldiers-ordered-to-shoot-deliberately-at-unarmed-gazans-waiting-for-humanitarian-aid/00000197-ad8e-de01-a39f-ffbe33780000>; <https://youtu.be/63XTo2EyLZA>.

¹⁴⁵ <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-06-27/ty-article-magazine/.premium/idf-soldiers-ordered-to-shoot-deliberately-at-unarmed-gazans-waiting-for-humanitarian-aid/00000197-ad8e-de01-a39f-ffbe33780000>; <https://youtu.be/63XTo2EyLZA>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uKpkZNAFwkc>

¹⁴⁶ <https://apnews.com/article/israel-military-gaza-ghf-aid-un-3c1bef17093a2a3eeda0764c220b857b>

¹⁴⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uKpkZNAFwkc>

shooting a Palestinian man in the crowd. We verified the location of the video as the Wadi Gaza GHF ration station near al-Bureij.

200 Dr Maynard's statement describes a pattern of injuries observed on young men who had visited the GHF sites:

'On 12th July 2025, we had four young boys who came in from the GHF food distribution site, all of whom had been shot in the testicles and groins. Their ages ranged between 12-15 years old. The urology specialist operated on them, I did not operate on them as it was not my speciality, but I saw the patients with the other doctors. The injuries were very striking.

[...] I was told that what we're seeing is a pattern of injuries when it comes to gunshot wounds, and I had personally observed this pattern.

*The pattern I'm referring to is the clustering of particular body part injuries on particular days. So, these were all young teenage boys, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15-year-olds who'd all gone to these Gaza Humanitarian Foundation food distribution points to get food for their starving families. The stories I was getting from the victims and from all their families and indeed from Gazan healthcare workers who had been out to these food distributions sites to get food for their own starving families.'*¹⁴⁸

201 This was not the only incident of this nature which Dr Maynard encountered:

'Haytham, the ER doctor told me that one day they had 20 young teenage boys all shot in the head and neck. Just head and neck. Another day it would be the abdomen. Other days it would be the chest, and on other days it would be the arms or the legs.

*I also remember on one day, Saturday July 19th, there were 80 young teenagers brought in from the food distribution point, 30 of them were pronounced dead on arrival, and 40 or 50 were injured, I operated on a few abdominal gun shot wounds, while other surgeons operated on other parts of the body.'*¹⁴⁹

202 We verified at least twenty-seven attacks against civilians near the Swedish Village, Saudi District (see [Figure 66](#), [Figure 67](#) and [Figure 68](#)) and Wadi Gaza (see [Figure 69](#) and [Figure 70](#)) ration stations in Rafah and Netzarim between 29 May and 1 August (see [Figure 65](#)).¹⁵⁰ These attacks included direct shooting at civilians [IDs: 50601-18477; 50610-23501; 50714-52104], and the use of tear gas [IDs: 50612-50079; 50612-21943]. Twenty occurred along

¹⁴⁸ Dr Maynard's statement, p.5

¹⁴⁹ Dr Maynard's statement, p.6

¹⁵⁰ Note: due to the complete destruction of the urban environment in Gaza, the precise geolocation of several pieces of footage was not possible.

the designated path communicated by the GHF for civilians to use to reach the ration stations.




Figure 65. Map of attacks on civilians seeking aid in proximity to the GHF ration stations.




Figure 66. Map of attacks on civilians seeking aid in proximity to the Swedish Village and Saudi District ration stations. See Figure 67 and Figure 68 for details of specific incidents. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]



Figure 67. Verified videos from May and June 2025 showing attacks on civilians seeking aid in proximity to the GHF ration station of the Swedish Village in Rafah. See locations in [Figure 66](#).¹⁵¹

¹⁵¹ IDs: 50527-33860; 50601-16998; 50601-18477; 50601-86860; 50602-11483; 50603-57383; 50608-70094; 50615-38883



Figure 68. Verified videos from June and July 2025 showing attacks on civilians seeking aid in proximity to the GHF ration station of the Saudi District in Rafah. See locations in Figure 66.¹⁵²

¹⁵² IDs: 50610-23501; 50712-58900; 50718-33132; 50719-90830




Figure 69. Map of attacks on civilians seeking aid in proximity to the Wadi Gaza GHF site. See Figure 70 for details of specific incidents. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]



Figure 70. Verified videos between May and July 2025, showing attacks on civilians seeking aid in proximity to the GHF ration station of the Wadi Gaza in Bureij, central Gaza. See locations in [Figure 69](#).¹⁵³

¹⁵³ IDs: 50530-59420; 50601-75795; 50612-21943; 50612-50079; 50623-39130; 50728-05165

2.2 Attacks on Civilians Seeking Aid Along Truck Routes

203 Outside of the GHF ration stations, we have verified at least 18 incidents in which civilians were attacked while waiting for aid along truck routes, all in proximity to Israeli military positions or infrastructure. Some of these incidents occurred on the Salah al-Din Road in Khan Younis, near a roundabout known as al-Tahliya, where both desperate civilians and armed gangs gather to intercept aid trucks arriving from the Karm Abu Salem crossing. Other incidents took place near al-Rashid Road, along the route used by trucks entering from the Zikim crossing in the north (see [Figure 71](#) and [Figure 74](#)).




Figure 71. Map of attacks on civilians diverting aid between 18 March 2025 and 1 August 2025. Highlighting three key areas in Rafah (A), Khan Younis (B), and northern Gaza (C) — along Salah al-Din Road, Omar ibn al-Khattab Road and al-Rashid Road. See [Figure 72](#) and [Figure 73](#) for details of specific incidents.



Figure 72. Verified video from 17 June 2025 showing attack on civilians seeking aid during aid diversion on Salah al-Din Road, near al-Tahliya roundabout in Khan Younis. Around fifty people were killed in the attack. See location in **Figure 71**. [ID: 50617-26125]



Figure 73. Verified video from 17 June 2025 showing the aftermath of an Israeli attack at al-Tahliya roundabout, reportedly killing over 60 Palestinians, as they were waiting for aid. See location in Figure 71. [ID: 50617-26125].



Figure 74. Map of attacks on civilians seeking aid in northern Gaza between 18 March 2025 and 1 August 2025, as aid trucks arrived from Zikim crossing. See Figure 75 for details of specific incidents.



Figure 75. Verified video from 14 and 25 June 2025 showing the aftermath of attacks on civilians waiting for aid. See locations in Figure 74. [IDs: 50614-98323; 50625-86552]

204 We verified a video published on 25 June 2025, that includes testimonies from desperate Gazans seeking aid in the Zikim area in northern Gaza [ID: 50625-13656]: ¹⁵⁴

- 1) **'Aid is the biggest trap in the world.** A man in his forties or fifties walks all the way to the end of the world to bring back aid—not even for himself, but for his son. **And in the end? He gets killed.'**
- 2) **'He feeds me and shoots me.** He feeds me and shoots me. People stand on the trucks, trying to fill their bags, and they get shot. **We know what's waiting for us, but we have no choice.** There's no aid delivered to us. If we don't go, the food will never reach our homes.'
- 3) **'The IOF targets us from every direction**—from quadcopters, from boats, even from land. They keep firing at us from all sides.'
- 4) **'Reaching that area is a death sentence.** We go out not knowing if we'll make it back to our children. I left my sons at home and came alone—**so that if I die, they survive.** They still have their lives ahead of them.'
- 5) **'The only message we're trying to send to the world is this: aid should be delivered in a legal, safe way. No one should get hurt. But if you're going to bring aid just to harm us, to trap us like bait in a snare, then we don't want any of it.'**

¹⁵⁴ <https://x.com/sahatenglish/status/1937871669315432688>

3 Undermining Civil Order and Dismantling the Social Fabric

205 The current system of aid distribution harms the social fabric of resilience among the Palestinians of Gaza by depriving both local and humanitarian institutions of any role in aid distribution. The Israeli military is attacking Palestinian police and aid workers, supporting gangs and armed militia, and attempting to use the social structure of clans and factional rifts to undermine civil institutions and prevent governmental bodies from maintaining order. As starvation sets in and desperation escalates, undermining such institutions promotes lawlessness. In turn, Israel cites this lawlessness, and the difficulty of ensuring that humanitarian assistance is not diverted, as justification for an individualised ration station system outside of community and civil structures.

206 Dr Maynard described the ‘lawlessness’ he witnessed as he was leaving Gaza, during his journey from Deir al-Balah to Netzarim corridor:

‘Our drivers who are UN employees, properly trained to do all this, had constant contact with either OCHA or COGAT, and they were stopping repeatedly following instructions, and would only move when they confirmed that the route was deconflicted. During the journey, which lasted 3-4 hours, we saw mass destruction, lots of teenage boys and teenage adults, who we were told by our drivers that they were also part of a criminal gang, not Al Shabab family, but another one who was terrorising the area and would loot food trucks. There had indeed been numerous reports of food trucks being hijacked, the drivers killed, and the food stolen by such gangs.

At some point, they surrounded our armoured vehicle and tried to get in. Our drivers were very chilled about the situation. They not only tried to get into the vehicle, but tried telling us to get out, and we clearly didn’t. At some point, they tried stabbing the wheels of the vehicle with knives.’¹⁵⁵

207 The first definition of genocide, by Raphael Lemkin in his 1994 book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, describes that ‘It is intended as a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.’¹⁵⁶ Bezalel Smotrich, Minister of Finance and Minister in the Ministry of Defence described Israel as ‘dismantling Gaza’ through a ‘total destruction never before seen in the world’.¹⁵⁷ This ‘total destruction’ is not only physical — demolition, death, injury, and starvation — but ‘dismantling’ the essential foundations of Gazan society.

208 We studied five ways in which Israel’s aid system actively undermines civil order and dismantles Gaza’s social fabric: exacerbating civil disorder due to desperation; supporting

¹⁵⁵ Dr Maynard’s statement, p.9.

¹⁵⁶ Appendix B, p.3.

¹⁵⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=STymrqvry2k>

gangs who steal aid; attacking security personnel securing aid; attacking aid workers; and preventing civilian efforts to protect aid convoys.

3.1 Desperation Exacerbating Civil Disorder

209 Under the conditions of severe food insecurity introduced in the military model of aid distribution, civilians have become increasingly desperate, and ‘as people become hungry... they become selfish, violating social norms, and engaging in undignified activities such as scavenging, begging... and other means of finding money or food that will tarnish their standing in the community’.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, desperation not only impacts access to food — as it is more likely to be intercepted before reaching the community — but contributes to the breakdown of social bonds necessary in a functioning society.

210 Dr Maynard described noticeably more crowding, fights and tension on the streets of Gaza than the previous year, as he travelled through al-Mawasi to Nasser hospital:

‘We left for the hospital early the next morning. I woke up between 6 and 6:30 am. I seem to remember leaving for the hospital at 8 am as we were waiting for the green light from the COGAT officer so we could make a move. We left the guest house in two MAP vehicles, through Al Mawasi to Al Nasser hospital in Khan Younis. The journey to the hospital was very tense, as tension levels were demonstrably higher than I had remembered from the previous year. One of the local MAP staff told me that tension levels were high due to the severe starvation and people constantly looking for food. The trip itself was very slow, as we transited through crowded roads, intermittent fighting was breaking out as people were looking for food, and it probably took us an hour to arrive at the hospital.’

‘On the way from the guest house to the hospital, we witnessed Palestinians fighting, we were told, the fights, which took the form of physical beatings with kicks, punches, sticks, were mainly revolved around food and lootings; one of the fights we witnessed was a gunfight. These fights caused delays at times, where the vehicle would stop and we wouldn’t be able to advance. It was also frightening to witness this as the crowds were tense, and we didn’t know when things were going to escalate even more.’¹⁵⁹

211 On 28 May 2025, thousands of Palestinians stormed the World Food Programme’s (WFP) Al-Ghafari warehouse in Deir al-Balah, central Gaza, in search of food supplies. The warehouse had recently been stocked with aid following an eighty-day blockade that had severely limited humanitarian assistance (see [Figure 76](#), [Figure 77](#) and [Figure 78](#)). During the incident, four people were killed—two were crushed in the crowd, and two died from

¹⁵⁸ Appendix B, p.4

¹⁵⁹ Dr Maynard’s statement, p.2, p.5

gunshot wounds—and several others were injured, according to officials at Al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital.¹⁶⁰



Figure 76. Verified video from 28 May 2025, showing desperate civilians breaking into the UNWFP warehouse in Deir al-Balah. See location in [Figure 77](#). [ID: 50528-47634]

¹⁶⁰ <https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-news-hostages-aid-05-28-2025-d4fdb80de0ac3edd24cf17227c0e3c2>




Figure 77. Satellite image from 22 May 2025 showing aid was delivered to WFP's Al-Ghafari warehouse in Deir Al-Balah, Central Gaza (evidenced by the number of trucks parked outside the compound). The same warehouse was broken into by desperate civilians seeking aid on 29 May 2025. See [Figure 76](#) and [Figure 78](#) for details of specific incident. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]



Figure 78. Verified video from 28 May 2025 showing civilians breaking into UNWFP warehouse in Deir al-Balah. [ID: 50528-47634]

- 212 A statement issued by the WFP following the incident stressed the urgent need to scale up food assistance in Gaza. It warned that limiting humanitarian aid risks triggering further such tragedies, adding: ‘This is the only way to reassure people that they will not starve.’¹⁶¹
- 213 Additional ground footage and satellite imagery since July show massive crowds clinging to aid trucks entering via Zikim crossing, or on Omar ibn al-Khattab Street (see **Figure 28** above and **Figure 79** below). Similar scenes of large-scale desperation are visible at ration stations, where large crowds rush in an effort to secure aid before they close (see **Figure 80**).

¹⁶¹ https://x.com/WFP_MENA/status/1927791635879932374/photo/1



Figure 79. Satellite image from 26 July showing aid trucks on Omar ibn al-Khattab Road. The dense, dark areas in the image are crowds of people surrounding the aid trucks. For larger context of the image, see [Figure 23](#). [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]



Figure 80. Annotated satellite image from 18 July 2025, showing Palestinians crowded into the militarised architecture of the Saudi District GHF ration station. [Satellite image ©2025 Planet Labs PBC]

3.2 Israeli Support for Gangs Stealing Aid

- 214 In early June 2025, reports surfaced alleging that the Israeli government was supporting and arming gangs and militias in Rafah, south Gaza, under the pretext of countering Hamas. Israeli media also circulated accusations that the Israeli government was backing ISIS-affiliated militias for this purpose.¹⁶² On 6 June, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel has ‘activated’ some Palestinian clans opposing Hamas in Gaza.¹⁶³
- 215 Israel is not only directly supporting gangs and armed groups through funding and weapons, but indirectly supporting them in failing to intervene when gangs divert aid. UN officials said that ‘most of the organised looting has been taking place in a zone the [Israeli military] control’. Another UN aid official in Gaza said he had seen armed looters ‘within spitting distance of an Israeli tank’.¹⁶⁴
- 216 Our analysis of satellite imagery and videos shared by social media accounts linked to the Abu Shabab group corroborates reports indicating that they are backed by Israel. We verified multiple incidents between 25 and 29 May involving members of the Abu Shabab group taking control of aid trucks entering from the Karm Abu Salem crossing as they travelled along Salah al-Din Road, in the area south of the Morag corridor, which is under Israeli military control (see Figure 16, within bounds A). Videos published by members of the group show them distributing aid bags labelled as belonging to the World Food Programme (WFP) (see Figure 18 above, see also p.53 and p.114. for other verified incidents involving the group).
- 217 The Abu Shabab group, which also refers to itself as the ‘Popular Forces’ and sometimes as the ‘Counter Terrorism Service’, operates largely in Israeli-controlled Rafah. Other prominent figures in the group, like Issam Nabahin and Ghassan al-Dheini, are reported to have ties with ISIS.¹⁶⁵
- 218 At Nasser Hospital, Dr Maynard recalls a member of the Abu Shabab family attacking Nasser hospital while he was there:

‘Towards the end of the first week, tension levels in the hospital rose, and there was a lot of fighting between locals. There was a big gunfight that started in the hospital. I was told by colleagues and friends there that a notorious gang family called the Al Shabab family, whose leader had been in prison prior to October 7th but was released at the

¹⁶² <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2025-06-05/ty-article/.premium/armed-gaza-militia-rivaling-hamas-hands-out-aid-in-israeli-controlled-zone/00000197-3f9a-dc9f-afbf-bffbc7d30000>

¹⁶³ <https://apnews.com/article/netanyahu-palestinian-clans-activated-armed-8f2461f5253550d0a4ce4ea661c580ef>

¹⁶⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/29/aid-officials-recount-violent-looting-in-gaza-as-criminal-gangs-thrive-amid-israeli-bombardment>

¹⁶⁵ <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/s1skwx7xgx>

beginning of this military assault, as all other criminals were. The family was reportedly responsible for looting a lot of the food and selling it all off at extortionate prices. I was also told he and his family were being funded and enabled by the Israelis.

Towards the end of the first week, one of his family members had been looting and had been shot by hospital security, who I believe are almost a self-appointed security force. I'm told they're not Hamas. They may have been policemen previously, though I'm uncertain about that, but they were almost like a self-appointed, altruistic security force to protect the hospital against the likes of the Al Shabab family and other criminals.

*In summary, the hospital security had guns, and they'd shot a member of the Al Shabab family and therefore the Al Shabab family came to the hospital and started a gunfight in the emergency room. The fight escalated, it went outside, it went upstairs. They came within five meters of our accommodation block. We could hear all this gunfire going on. [...] There were gunshot holes in the walls of our accommodation block.'*¹⁶⁶

- 219 Outside Rafah, Israeli media reported that two Fatah-linked militias are being armed by Israel in an effort to exploit factional rifts in Gaza. Fighters from the Khalas and Khanidak clans are said to coordinate with the Israeli military within areas under their control. One militia is active in Shujaiya, Gaza City (eastern sector), led by Rami Khalas and his extended clan. They operate in Israeli-evacuated neighbourhoods to provide local security and coordinate with Israeli forces. The other group operates in Khan Yunis, led by Yasser Khanidak, similarly backed by the Palestinian Authority, and supported with arms and humanitarian aid.¹⁶⁷

3.3 Attacks on the Police and People Protecting Aid

- 220 In the early hours of 18 March, Israel broke the January to March 2025 ceasefire by attacking members of the police and civilian components of Gaza's governing institutions, who play a key role in maintaining order, and protecting and facilitating the distribution of aid. Those killed included the Director General of the Internal Security Agency, the Deputy Minister of Interior, the Deputy Minister of Justice, and the Head of Government Work Oversight.¹⁶⁸ This attack appears part of a larger pattern of Israel threatening and targeting Palestinian police, including members of the Sahm Unit (see [Figure 81](#)) — failing to distinguish between armed combatants and the civilian administrative apparatus in Gaza. Israel has produced no evidence that any of these attacks were on genuine Hamas militants. We verified five attacks on the Sahm Unit and people tasked with protecting aid (see [Figure 82](#)).¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ Dr Maynard's statement, p.4.

¹⁶⁷ <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hj00b11cxrex>

¹⁶⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2025/mar/18/israel-gaza-live-blog-updates-air-strikes-strip-netanyahu-hamas>

¹⁶⁹ IDs: 50502-81113; 50522-48007; 50529-61232; 50626-13810; 50717-50618.

- 1) On 26 June 2025, members of the Sahm Unit were reported to be operating in Deir al-Balah market, distributing bags of flour confiscated from gangs diverting aid convoys, and corrupt merchants. An Israeli strike targeted the area, killing eighteen people, including members of the Sahm Unit and civilians gathered around them to get flour.¹⁷⁰ [ID: 50626-13810]
- 2) On 2 May, members of the unit were reportedly killed while attempting to protect a warehouse from thieves in north Gaza City. [ID: 50502-81113]
- 3) On 22 May, reports indicate that a group of security forces and volunteers protecting two aid trucks carrying medical supplies were targeted in Deir al-Balah. [ID: 50522-48007]
- 4) On 29 May, the Israeli military conducted an airstrike on a crowded makeshift market in the al-Rimal neighbourhood of western Gaza City, killing eleven Palestinians, including members of the Sahm Unit who were reportedly pursuing thieves diverting aid in the area.¹⁷¹ [ID: 50529-61232]
- 5) On 17 July, an Israeli military drone strike killed people tasked with protecting aid in the al-Tawam area in northern Gaza. [ID: 50717-50618]

¹⁷⁰ <https://www.nbcnews.com/world/middle-east/israeli-strike-kills-18-palestinians-central-gaza-turmoil-mounts-food-rcna215479>

¹⁷¹ https://x.com/Reem_Mazen/status/1928096932880162958; <https://x.com/ARabumuaaz/status/1928066481582940219>; <https://x.com/ALHIJASHI/status/1928224916060446807>



Figure 81. [Top] A screenshot of text message reportedly sent to people in Gaza, threatening members of the Sahm Unit. The image, published by a social media account on 29 May, reads: 'To the Sahm Unit, we will wipe you out, we will kill every last one of you. Captain Abu Salem. +97[redacted]75'.¹⁷² Israeli military officers who speak Arabic often use Arabic names in their communications with Palestinians in Gaza. The name 'Captain Abu Salem' and his full phone number also appear as the signature on one of the Israeli leaflets airdropped over Gaza.¹⁷³ [Bottom] An image of airdropped leaflet, reportedly released by a quadcopter over Nuseirat on 6 July, addressed to Gaza residents. It urges them to report the locations of Sahm Unit members or anyone planning to join the group by calling the number provided.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷² https://x.com/_hk_27/status/1928094990955167915?s=46&t=xpoTpRvOr1g_JYpMkN4hXw

¹⁷³ <https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=2583045128751241&set=a.193750081014103>

¹⁷⁴ <https://t.me/Nuseirat1/120628>; <https://t.me/Nuseirat1/120625>



Figure 82. Map of attacks on police and people protecting aid between 18 March and 1 August 2025.

3.4 Attacks on Aid Workers

221 From January 2023 to July 2025, 924 aid workers have been killed worldwide while on duty.¹⁷⁵ Of these, 517 (56%) are in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

222 Since 18 March 2025, we documented at least six attacks on aid workers (see [Figure 83](#) and [Figure 84](#)).



Figure 83. Map of attacks on aid workers between 18 March and 1 August 2025. See [Figure 84](#) for details of specific incident.

¹⁷⁵ aidworkersecurity.org



Figure 84. Verified image from 26 May 2025, showing the aftermath of an Israeli military airstrike on aid workers in Gaza City. See location in Figure 83. [ID: 50526-70982]

3.5 Preventing Civilian Efforts to Protect Aid Convoys

223 Israel has not only undermined existing social order, but has actively suppressed efforts to maintain it by preventing community efforts to protect aid convoys.

224 On 24 June 2025, Palestinian clans stepped in to protect aid convoys, successfully ensuring the delivery of aid to the WFP and Anera warehouses (see Figure 87).¹⁷⁶ This followed a series of incidents in which civilians were killed and aid was diverted along the truck routes from the Zikim crossing in northern Gaza (see p.64). In response, several clans in the area publicly declared that civilians should refrain from gathering along the route and warned that any gangs attempting to attack the trucks would be met with force (see Figure 85). Visual evidence and reports confirm that on 25 June the trucks reached their destinations safely, and the following day, civilians were seen queueing in front of warehouses to receive aid in an orderly manner (see Figure 88 and Figure 89).

¹⁷⁶ A statement issued by the National Assembly of Palestinian Tribes, Clans, and Families on 24 June announced that the clans will begin protecting aid convoys to ensure their safe delivery to humanitarian agency warehouses and the fair distribution of aid among civilians. <https://t.me/ShehabTelegram/604880>



Figure 85. Verified video published on 25 June 2025, showing the elders of multiple Palestinian clans in northern Gaza announcing the clans will be protecting aid convoys.¹⁷⁷ [ID: 50625-29382]

¹⁷⁷ Video source: <https://x.com/PalinfoAr/status/1937881914704073041>



Figure 86. Verified videos from 24 June 2025, showing Palestinian clans protecting aid trucks entering from Zikim crossing until their delivery at Anera warehouse in Gaza city as seen in still frames from a video published by Getty images. [ID: 50625-09604]




Figure 87. Map of aid trucks along route to successful aid deliveries in Gaza City between 24 and 26 June 2025. See Figure 88 and Figure 89 for details of specific incidents.



Figure 88. Verified video from 26 June 2025, showing aid successfully distributed in UNWFP warehouse in Gaza City. See location in [Figure 87](#). [ID: 50626-42362]



Figure 89. Verified video from 26 June 2025, showing an orderly aid distribution process at UNWFP warehouse in Gaza City following the efforts by Palestinian clans to protect aid trucks. See location in [Figure 87](#). [ID: 50626-52526]

- 225 A day after this successful attempt, on 26 June, Israel closed the Zikim crossing, which was the main route for aid to Palestinians in northern Gaza and Gaza City, and the route used by the clans.¹⁷⁸ Naftali Bennett, a former Israeli Prime Minister, published a video on X showing the clans' protection of the aid trucks and described it as showing ' Hamas gunmen' taking control of food trucks.¹⁷⁹
- 226 We have documented a similar pattern of Israel obstructing community and civil-institution efforts in Gaza to organise aid delivery and distribution safely and effectively, in order to prevent civilian casualties and aid diversion. On 17 March 2024, Palestinian clans, in collaboration with the police, successfully delivered aid to warehouses in Jabalia, northern Gaza — the first such delivery in two months. Prior to this, aid was routinely diverted after passing the Netzarim corridor, and many civilians were killed, including in what is known as the 'flour massacre'. We verified the movement of this community-coordinated aid delivery and the subsequent distribution from a warehouse in Jabalia. The next day, on 18 March 2024, Israeli forces invaded al-Shifa Hospital for the second time and killed, among others, Faiq al-Mabhouh, a senior police official reportedly responsible for aid logistics, according to the Gaza government media office.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/26/israel-closes-the-most-direct-route-for-aid-to-palestinians-in-gaza>

¹⁷⁹ <https://x.com/naftalibennett/status/1937967384515551505>

¹⁸⁰ https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FA_A-Spatial-Analysis-of-the-Israeli-militarys-conduct-in-Gaza-since-October-2023.pdf, p.752

J CONCLUSION

227 This report finds that, since 18 March, the Israeli military has dismantled the ‘civilian model’ of aid distribution in Gaza and sought to replace it with a ‘military model’ which uses aid to further Israel’s military and political objectives, and starve the population of Gaza.

228 Starvation is happening on two levels: the biological starvation of the individual, and the destruction of the group as a whole, through collective dehumanisation, destroying its social fabric, and separating Palestinians from their land.

229 Despite core humanitarian principles that require that humanitarian aid not be misused for military or political ends, Israel has sought to instrumentalise aid:

- 1) **To enforce displacement and re-concentration:** Israel has imposed a militarised aid distribution model, which only provides rations in places to which it wants Palestinians to be displaced to (south of Wadi Gaza, and close to Rafah, near the border with Egypt), and has limited the availability of aid in places it wants to clear of Palestinians (north Wadi Gaza, including Gaza City).
- 2) **To make reaching aid deadly and dangerous:** The Israeli military has repeatedly killed and injured Palestinian civilians both when they sought the little aid still available through the civilian model, as well as at and around the GHF sites.
- 3) **To undermine civil order and dismantle the social fabric of Palestinian society:** Israel has used aid to break down existing social and civil structures in Gaza grounded in relations between family networks, political groups, and international aid organisations, to generate dependency and, as a result, establish political control over the Palestinian population.
- 4) **To permit and enable the diversion of aid:** Israel has failed to prevent the diversion of aid within areas controlled by its military, while accusing Hamas of systemic diversion of aid without evidence.

230 The ‘military model’, relying on the GHF ration stations and airdropped aid, has carried out (and at the time of publication continues to carry out) starvation rationing:

- 1) The rations provided are too limited to avert an ongoing nutritional disaster.
- 2) The continuing failure to rehabilitate or establish essential infrastructure portends ongoing, escalating humanitarian catastrophe.
- 3) The physical and psychological stresses inflicted on people needing aid will deepen their trauma and undermine their already much-reduced resilience.

4) The further dismantling and undermining of the social fabric of Palestinian society in Gaza will exacerbate the humanitarian catastrophe and its dehumanisation of Palestinians.

231 The militarised model cannot be considered 'humanitarian', even in the most limited sense, in that it is not humane. It is more accurately seen as a tool for population control, depriving the Palestinian population in Gaza of the conditions necessary for life, within the logic of a continued genocidal assault by Israel against the population.

K INCIDENT IDS

ID	Date	Latitude	Longitude	Source
50323-43706	2025-03-23	31.34705	34.29305	https://www.instagram.com/p/DHJgcbQMYOI , https://x.com/AbuLocation/status/1903906512638214392 , https://x.com/hassaneslayeh/status/1903892258153247188 , https://x.com/AnasAlSharif0/status/1903888256212566395 , https://x.com/AbuLocation/status/1903899088720142788
50403-17784	2025-04-03	31.2901	34.3136	https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-277-gaza-strip , https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1366734834753314
50405-36676	2025-04-05	31.3555636	34.28214194	https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-278-gaza-strip , https://pchgaza.org/israel-perpetuates-its-starvation-policy-targeting-field-kitchens-and-gatherings-of-civilians-desperately-lining-up-for-simple-meals-in-gaza/ , https://x.com/QudsNen/status/1908402976319811623
50407-35898	2025-04-07	31.42136	34.34333	https://www.instagram.com/p/DIJef4_NUK3 , https://x.com/EyeonPalestine/status/1909248698657255738 , https://x.com/NemoAnno/status/1909368280323650008 , https://x.com/NemoAnno/status/1909368280323650008 , https://x.com/NemoAnno/status/1909366792947917192
50408-90638	2025-04-08	31.40284	34.32882	https://www.instagram.com/reel/DILDg5Lt2M3 , https://x.com/TwistyCB/status/1909603349818650880 , https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/children-sit-outside-the-sabah-family-building-that-was-hit-news-photo/2208546599 , https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/people-walk-by-an-overturned-destroyed-vehicle-to-inspect-news-photo/2208543558 , https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/children-stand-outside-the-sabah-family-building-that-was-news-photo/2208546499 , https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1910037019423633790
50408-60205	2025-04-08	31.42348	34.35258	https://x.com/AnasAlSharif0/status/1909683454989447272 , https://t.me/hamza20300/338312 , https://x.com/AbuLocation/status/1909787454724616340 , https://t.me/mahmoudallouh90/303045 , https://x.com/AbuLocation/status/1909787454724616340 , https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1910037443199311923
50413-79590	2025-04-13	31.41695	34.35035	https://x.com/qudsn/status/1911345009258807376 , https://x.com/qudsn/status/1911340917627175088 , https://x.com/qudsn/status/1911426816939618810 , https://x.com/NemoAnno/status/1911548218732687630
50413-41064	2025-04-13	31.3474	34.3172	https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-myanmar-occupied-palestinian-territory-syria-democratic-republic-congo-sudan , https://x.com/QudsNen/status/1907364503534150012 , https://x.com/trtworld/status/1911524802806104077 , https://t.me/QudsN/554085 ,

				https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-167-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem
50423-31709	2025-04-23	31.444322	34.398761	https://x.com/qudsn/status/1916544818626318346 , https://t.me/mohnadQ/55083 , https://t.me/mahmoudallouh90/308072 , https://x.com/Snd_pal/status/1916538224857538757 , https://x.com/AbuLocation/status/1916617139794096266
50426-67886	2025-04-26	31.506427	34.450648	https://x.com/EyeonPalestine/status/1916062742739341683 , https://www.gettyimages.ae/detail/news-photo/search-and-rescue-work-in-the-rubble-of-the-targeted-school-news-photo/2211407238?adppopup=true , https://x.com/EyeonPalestine/status/1915945179410010316
50502-20935	2025-05-02	31.52599579	34.46432829	https://x.com/QudsNen/status/1918268900795666593 , https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/156980
50502-81113	2025-05-02	31.521887	34.448875	https://x.com/HamlaKaddour/status/1918431915670986907 , https://x.com/madfajy/status/1918608568258826731 , https://x.com/AJABreaking/status/1918441492793966700 , https://x.com/Hakeam_ps/status/1918407340103000116 , https://x.com/HAMMAM_PAL/status/1918395485750014099 , https://x.com/HichemBachir48/status/1918427902963491214
50504-85112	2025-05-04	31.446366	34.389157	https://www.instagram.com/reel/DJOYp44PFGP/
50507-25172	2025-05-06	31.521331	34.447294	https://t.me/hamza20300/344040 , https://x.com/Bisan_Shrafi/status/1920091804315041956 , https://x.com/aa_arabic/status/1920104417728041178 (0:18-1:12), https://t.me/Nuseirat1/106312
50509-37069	2025-05-09	31.532594	34.494889	https://x.com/qudsn/status/1920902181999321270 , https://x.com/AbuLocation/status/1920920618410668077
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50522-48007	2025-05-22	31.409961	34.359747	https://t.me/DaerElbalah7/7122 , https://t.me/DaerElbalah7/7129 , https://x.com/KhaledSafi/status/1925676082952339595 , https://x.com/Sa7atPI/status/1925808973971607646
50526-70982	2025-05-26	31.519494	34.464117	https://x.com/Global_NewsWire/status/1927991039081456123 , https://x.com/IHHen/status/1927830458894582137 , https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/5-aid-workers-from-intl-humanitarian-organization-killed-in-israeli-attacks-on-gaza/3582678 , https://x.com/HaksozHaber/status/1927846753669140509
50526-07894	2025-05-26	31.2735	34.2974	https://www.tiktok.com/@iil_.6.7/video/7508828370721983751
50527-33860	2025-05-27	31.3234	34.228	https://x.com/NaksBilal/status/1927379241684889755
50528-47634	2025-05-28	31.4214	34.3719	https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-05-29/four-killed-after-gaza-aid-hub-stormed/105350662 , https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/58/547126/War-on-Gaza/-Four-Palestinians-die-in-storming-of-UN-food-ware.aspx , https://apnews.com/article/gaza-israel-palestinians-aid-gunfire-88e825b923fe9d8420fba03739c7a5ac , https://x.com/nikolaosderes/status/1928126592351400435/video/1

50529-59817	2025-05-29	31.2697	34.2881	https://www.tiktok.com/@mh.nf2/video/7509973082560335122
50529-61232	2025-05-29	31.514	34.4508	https://t.me/hamza20300/349992 , https://x.com/ALHIJASHI/status/1928224916060446807 , https://x.com/HamlaKaddour/status/1928236755213262938 , https://t.me/hamza20300/349994 , https://t.me/hamza20300/349998 , https://x.com/AlabedYusuf/status/1928238636157349905 , https://t.me/hamza20300/350005 , https://t.me/hamza20300/350009
50529-14055	2025-05-29	31.533152	34.473806	https://x.com/i/status/1928024305075356155
50530-59420	2025-05-30	31.4443	34.3994	https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/ , https://x.com/RamAbdu/status/1928530638216310786/video/1 , https://x.com/Timesofgaza/status/1928408715331289268/video/1
50531-15369	2025-05-31	31.332006	34.311675	https://www.facebook.com/reel/1714178222817895
50601-16998	2025-06-03	31.328965	34.231959	https://x.com/hosein_kazeruni/status/1929876957174341882
50601-86860	2025-06-01	31.331795	34.229943	https://x.com/AnasAlSharif0/status/1929260410173342176/video/2
50531-55893	2025-05-31	31.337644	34.309161	https://t.me/hamza20300/350419
50601-18477	2025-06-01	31.331707	34.230026	https://x.com/MosabAbuToha/status/1930118175984611406
50601-04742	2025-06-01	31.321858	34.314101	https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1929220410471538728 , https://www.facebook.com/Hamad.Housing.compound/videos/1234714121595896/
50601-75795	2025-06-01	31.45082572	34.40939678	https://www.unocha.org/news/todays-top-news-occupied-palestinian-territory-nigeria-sudan-ukraine , https://x.com/QudsNen/status/1929050921020826051 , https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/158007 , https://x.com/MaramGaza/status/1929064284547391837/video/1
50602-11483	2025-06-01	31.323667	34.22883	https://x.com/ltayBlumental/status/1929195844026470520/video/1
50603-81250	2025-06-03	31.268273	34.291979	https://x.com/tamerqdh/status/1930000476055187954 , https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=745721134549648 , https://x.com/SinjoroMoseo/status/1930188912984510680
50603-57383	2025-06-03	31.328271	34.232513	https://x.com/ajmubasher/status/1929812831857246278
50608-70094	2025-06-08	31.328531	34.232228	https://x.com/muhammadshahad2/status/1931688695997886768 , https://x.com/fdov21/status/1931705129012465776
50610-23501	2025-06-10	31.321469	34.242589	https://x.com/SanaSaeed/status/1932548653454962974/video/2 , https://x.com/JerusalemDiary/status/1932448399560986929 , https://x.com/fdov21/status/1933261957034844478
50610-90774	2025-06-10	31.2834	34.3113	https://www.tiktok.com/@iil_6.7/video/7514365398549155090
50611-53424	2025-06-11	31.324647	34.228328	https://x.com/SuppressedNws/status/1932750388874100784
50612-50079	2025-06-12	31.455979	34.415563	https://x.com/WarDesigner0/status/1933241467285172597
50612-21943	2025-06-12	31.45685	34.418003	https://x.com/translatingpal/status/1933210102976368794

50614-98323	2025-06-14	31.5642	34.4786	https://x.com/AnasAlSharif0/status/1935399714222129332
50615-38883	2025-06-15	31.3337	34.2359	https://www.instagram.com/gaza.your.eyes/reel/DK7P8zmN43A/
50617-26125	2025-06-17	31.337643	34.309785	https://x.com/AJA_Palestine/status/1934879955407548793 , https://www.instagram.com/reel/DK_juh8s2XN/ , https://t.me/hamza20300/354244 , https://x.com/EyeonPalestine/status/1934896499114267096 , https://t.me/madinat_khanyuns/13171
50622-77401	2025-06-22	31.549965	34.458362	https://x.com/gazanotice/status/1936852582326051114
50623-39130	2025-06-23	31.4552	34.4148	https://x.com/DropSiteNews/status/1937160117553627259
50625-25069	2025-06-25	31.5394	34.465	https://x.com/palinfoar/status/1937892417685852418?s=46&t=xpoTpRvOr1g_JYpMkN4hXw , https://x.com/naftalibennett/status/1937967384515551505
50625-86552	2025-06-25	31.543	34.4517	https://x.com/QudsNen/status/1937976262296993953
50625-09604	2025-06-25	31.5383	34.4638	https://www.gettyimages.nl/detail/video/united-nations-aid-trucks-crossed-into-gaza-through-the-nieuwsfootage/2222158310?adppopup=true
50625-29382	2025-06-25	31.5468	34.4555	https://x.com/PalinfoAr/status/1937881914704073041
50625-13656	2025-06-25	31.5524	34.4609	https://x.com/sahatenglish/status/1937871669315432688
50626-13810	2025-06-26	31.4188	34.3499	https://t.me/hamza20300/356285 , https://t.me/hamza20300/356279 , https://t.me/Nuseirat1/118104 , https://t.me/DaerElbalah7/7794 , https://t.me/DaerElbalah7/7813
50626-42362	2025-06-26	31.524	34.4594	https://x.com/alqudsnewspaper/status/1938174887706956091 , https://www.gettyimages.nl/detail/nieuwsfoto%27s/palestinians-carry-away-bags-of-flour-as-others-wait-in-nieuwsfotos/2221409791?adppopup=true
50626-52526	2025-06-26	31.5242	34.4599	https://x.com/qudsn/status/1938142131303932046?s=46
50630-96357	2025-06-30	31.528455	34.436633	https://x.com/EyeonPalestine/status/1939662976937582965 , https://x.com/EyeonPalestine/status/1939668846765605050 , https://x.com/AnasAlSharif0/status/1939669473801408609
50710-23628	2025-07-10	31.4174	34.3547	https://x.com/gazanotice/status/1943189326830997996 , https://t.me/DaerElbalah7/8191 , https://t.me/DaerElbalah7/8193 , https://t.me/DaerElbalah7/8195 , https://t.me/DaerElbalah7/8196
50712-58900	2025-07-12	31.321181	34.242164	https://t.me/mediagovps/3743
50714-52104	2025-07-14	31.328756	34.244719	https://x.com/EyeonPalestine/status/1944705225060974713 , https://x.com/translatingpal/status/1944828718578389139 , https://x.com/NemoAnno/status/1944860056803271012
50717-50618	2025-07-17	31.5477	34.4751	https://x.com/AnasAlSharif0/status/1945713683381788886 , https://t.me/hamza20300/361225 , https://t.me/hamza20300/361230
50718-33132	2025-07-18	31.3293	34.2462	https://www.instagram.com/mohammad_salama.2/reel/DMQ1MTpCbIQ/
50719-90830	2025-07-19	31.3214	34.2425	https://x.com/EyeonPalestine/status/1946646405625311462

50726-26796	2025-07-26	31.3099065	34.2816559	Satellite imagery, see Figure 24. [©2025 Planet Labs PBC]
50727-49624	2025-07-27	31.3108	34.2825	https://www.instagram.com/ibrahim.st7/reel/DMm-pWSo4n-/
50728-05165	2025-07-28	31.4533	34.4129	https://x.com/mosababutoha/status/1949831491673850238?s=46
50729-12796	2025-07-29	31.3109	34.2822	https://t.me/hamza20300/364144
50729-03946	2025-07-29	31.5557	34.4656	https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1950093782394753405
50801-61057	2025-08-01	31.5668	34.4728	https://x.com/abu_salah9/status/1951261694946087103

L APPENDIX A: WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT THE HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE IN GAZA

The humanitarian consequences of Israel's policies on the population of Gaza have been catastrophic. There has also been much controversy about figures and their interpretation. What can be concluded, in confidence, about the humanitarian situation in Gaza?

First: the humanitarian situation has been catastrophic since it was first assessed in late November 2023.

The assessments made by the authoritative mechanisms for measuring acute food insecurity and famine, namely the UN's Integrated food security Phase Classification system (IPC) and the US Famine Early Warning System (FEWS NET) between December 2023 and May 2024 were damning. They indicated that the entire population of Gaza was suffering 'crisis', i.e. in need of urgent assistance, with almost all either in 'emergency' or 'catastrophe.' There was controversy over whether the conditions amounted to 'famine' or were just short of the arcane metrics needed for that threshold to be crossed. The specialists who made the assessments insisted that, even if 'famine' conditions could not definitively be identified, conditions of life endured by Palestinians in Gaza were entirely unacceptable.

Part of the reason for this controversy is that Israel has not permitted the UN and other agencies to collect the data necessary for a comprehensive assessment. (A secondary but less important factor is that humanitarian staff and agencies have not prioritized the collection of such data, as they are preoccupied with immediate life-saving activities.)

It is notable that both the IPC Famine Review Committee and FEWS NET issued reports over the last nine months, indicating that the lack of reliable new data should not preclude them from warning of further deterioration into famine conditions.¹⁸¹

Second: controversies over food availability metrics have been resolved. In mid-2024, critics of the IPC, FEWS NET and humanitarian agencies that had warned of famine argued that Israel was permitting sufficient food into the Gaza Strip to feed the entire population. This claim was used to try to discredit famine warnings. However, the argument was selective and limited and even its advocates have withdrawn its stronger claims. Food availability has been comprehensively and minutely analysed, and it shows several periods of major shortage during

¹⁸¹ IPC Famine Review Committee Alert: Gaza Strip, <https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/userupload/ipcinfo/docs/IPCFRCAAlertGazaNov2024.pdf>; FEWS NET, Gaza Strip Food Security Alert, 23 December 2024. (On Wayback Machine: <https://web.archive.org/web/20241224061303/https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-strip-food-security-alert-famine-ipc-phase-5-scenario-continues-unfold-north-gaza-governorate-december-23-2024>); IPC, 'Gaza Strip: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Special Snapshot, April - September 2025,' 12 May 2025. <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-strip-ipc-acute-food-insecurity-and-acute-malnutrition-special-snapshot-april-september-2025-published-12-may-2025>

the first ten months of the war.¹⁸² Moreover, the IPC and FEWS NET analyses are primarily concerned not with overall availability but with the most vulnerable. An analysis by Israeli nutritionists in June 2024 claimed that

'The quantity and quality of food aid delivered to Gaza have steadily improved since January 2024 and supply sufficient energy, protein, and fat for the population's needs.'

When their paper was published six months later after peer review, this claim was scaled back:

*'We found that, except in February, food crossing the borders into Gaza exceeded per capita minimal requirements for humanitarian aid. While reliable data do not exist for critical dimensions of food access and consumption across Gaza, these estimates suggest that adequate amounts of nutritious food were being transported into the Gaza Strip during most of the 1st half of 2024.'*¹⁸³

Their data ends in July 2024. After July, delivered amounts were reduced.

From 2 March-26 May 2025 there were no deliveries. An assessment by the FAO in May indicated a catastrophic collapse of food availability within weeks.¹⁸⁴ The IPC 'snapshot' released in May indicated the same. Further analysis by the food security specialists at Crisis Group indicated that the assistance provided by the GHF would slow, but not halt, that collapse.¹⁸⁵

During 2024, the people of Gaza were more resilient in the face of catastrophic acute food insecurity than many had expected. The relationship between overall food deprivation and child malnutrition was less direct than in other humanitarian emergencies, likely due to collective efforts to ensure that children were preferentially fed. Nonetheless, malnutrition rates were escalating.¹⁸⁶ That resilience appears to be collapsing. Notably, food diversity has collapsed. According to the WFP market monitor, the population faces dangerously unbalanced diets, deficient in essential nutrients.¹⁸⁷

Third: the Gaza Ministry of Health count of trauma deaths is an underestimate. The Gaza MoH publishes regular counts of the numbers killed through violence. As of 15 June 2025, the

¹⁸² Francesco Checchi, Mija-Tesse Ververs, Zeina Jamaluddine, 'Wartime food availability in the Gaza Strip, October 2023 to August 2024: a retrospective analysis,' medRxiv 2024.10.21.24315753; doi: <https://doi.org/10.1101/2024.10.21.24315753>
<https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2024.10.21.24315753v1.full.pdf>

¹⁸³ Fliss-Isakov, Naomi, Dorit Nitzan, Moran Blaychfeld Magnazi, Joseph Mendlovic, Sharon Alroy Preis, Gilad Twig, Aron M. Troen, and Ronit Endevelt. 'Food supplied to Gaza during seven months of the Hamas-Israel war.' Israel Journal of Health Policy Research 14 (2025): 8.

¹⁸⁴ FAO, 'Briefing note on the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Food pipeline disruption and declining food availability in the Gaza Strip: Implications under international humanitarian and human rights law,' Rome, FAO, 15 May 2025.
<https://reliefweb.int/node/4153067>

¹⁸⁵ Crisis Group, (Robert Blecher and Chris Newton) 'The Gaza Starvation Experiment,' Commentary, 6 June 2025,
<https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine/gaza-starvation-experiment>

¹⁸⁶ Checchi, Francesco, and Zeina Jamaluddine. 'Evolution of child acute malnutrition during war in the Gaza Strip, 2023-2024: retrospective estimates and scenario-based projections.' medRxiv (2024): 2024-12.

¹⁸⁷ <https://wssd.mosd.gov.ps/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/WFP-0000166964.pdf>, p.3.

cumulative count was 57,012.¹⁸⁸ These are individuals whose bodies have been identified and confirmed by the MoH. Additionally, the MoH has reported an estimate of 10,000 bodies unidentified under the rubble. These numbers are often reported in the press as unconfirmed with a question mark next to them on the grounds that the MoH is under the Hamas administration. Sceptics sought to cast further doubt on the figures when the MoH, following a rigorous screening of the records, removed about 3,000 names from the ‘confirmed’ list.¹⁸⁹ Two separate studies indicate that the trauma death toll is likely to be about 40% higher, i.e. about 75,000. These studies use additional methods, such as household surveys and online obituaries.¹⁹⁰

Fourth, there are no good figures for non-trauma deaths (hunger and disease) During 2024, numerous and diverse methods for estimating or projecting ‘indirect’ deaths and excess deaths attributable to hunger and disease were utilized. They produced widely divergent estimates, ranging from physician-diagnosed starvation deaths (32) to inference from other comparable conflicts using a ratio of 1:4 direct-to-indirect deaths (149,584), so that the only conclusion that could be reached with confidence was ‘we don’t know.’¹⁹¹ The fact that, in a situation with such good population data and public health infrastructure, vastly superior to (for example) Somalia or South Sudan, the numbers are unknown, is a testament to the destruction of essential infrastructure and, indirectly, the determination of the occupying power to not collect incriminating data.

Fifth, there is powerful evidence that non-trauma deaths are significant and rising. The most recent, and likely most reliable, study is by Michael Spagat et al., which indicates 8,540 (95% CI: 4,540–12,500) excess (i.e., above expectation) nonviolent deaths between October 2023 and January 2025.¹⁹² Based on all the above considerations, we can confidently assume that conditions have massively deteriorated since March.

¹⁸⁸ UNOCHA, Reported impact snapshot | Gaza Strip (2 July 2025), <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported-impact-snapshot-gaza-strip-2-july-2025>

¹⁸⁹ Ghobrial Cockerill, Matthew, ‘The vanishing children: Gaza MoH’s redaction of thousands of deaths fuelled doubt, but the data suggests something darker than deception.’ Action on Armed Violence, 17 June 2025

¹⁹⁰ Spagat, Michael, Jon Pedersen, Khalil Shikaki, Michael Robbins, Eran Bendavid, Håvard Hegre, and Debarati Guha-Sapir. ‘Violent and Nonviolent Death Tolls for the Gaza War: New Primary Evidence.’ medRxiv (2025): 2025-06.; Jamaluddine, Zeina, Hanan Abukmail, Sarah Aly, Oona MR Campbell, and Francesco Checchi. ‘Traumatic injury mortality in the Gaza Strip from Oct 7, 2023, to June 30, 2024: a capture–recapture analysis.’ The Lancet 405, no. 10477 (2025): 469-477.

¹⁹¹ De Waal, Alex, ‘How Many People Have Died of Starvation in Gaza?’ Reinventing Peace, 17 December 2024.

¹⁹² Spagat, Michael, Jon Pedersen, Khalil Shikaki, Michael Robbins, Eran Bendavid, Håvard Hegre, and Debarati Guha-Sapir. ‘Violent and Nonviolent Death Tolls for the Gaza War: New Primary Evidence.’ medRxiv (2025): 2025-06.

M APPENDIX B: THE UN'S RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS OF DIVERSION OF AID BY HAMAS

In May, seeking to comply with strict requirements imposed by Israel, the UN proposed the following (summarised) five-stage model for the resumption of aid deliveries to Gaza.¹⁹³ The full system is extremely elaborate and entirely transparent to the Israeli authorities, with comprehensive tracking and monitoring of all aid commodities.

Stage 1 | Delivery of aid to Gaza. Cargo proposed for entry is submitted through an online platform, managed by the UN 2720 Mechanism. The Israeli Authorities review these submissions prior to entry into Gaza. Each consignment is assigned a unique QR code to enable tracking. UN 2720 monitors would be deployed at key inspection points along the aid corridors.

Stage 2 | Inspection/scanning of aid at the crossing points. UN 2720 monitors verify manifests and validate the consignments' unique QR code. Second, trucks are scanned to ensure only the cleared humanitarian materials are loaded (manifest verification).

Stage 3 | Transporting aid from crossing points to humanitarian facilities for onward distribution (first mile delivery). As the 'first mile' of the delivery chain is the most vulnerable to looting and robbery, additional measures have been identified to mitigate risks. Vehicles and trucks departing a crossing carry a GPS tracker for tracking and security. Closed trucks would also be used to reduce the ability of cargo to be taken directly off the trucks before reaching its intended destination.

Stage 4 | Preparing aid from humanitarian facilities for onward distribution (Humanitarian Facilities). Logistics facilities are designed to meet the needs of 2.1 million people and are placed where people can be reached. The UN and humanitarian partners control the management of the facilities and security arrangements.

Stage 5 | Transporting aid to people in need (middle - last mile delivery). From logistics facilities, supplies are transported to distribution points using the established delivery network, leveraging proven methods such as community engagement, distribution lists and minimizing intermediary staging areas. The distribution sites are determined by humanitarian needs and international standards. A higher number of sites, closer to affected populations, enhances safety, improves crowd control, and reduces risks of aid diversion and looting.

¹⁹³ UNOCHA, Briefing Note, 'Briefing note: UN-Coordinated Plan to Resume Humanitarian Aid Deliveries to Gaza,' 16 May 2025. <https://www.unocha.org/news/briefing-note-un-coordinated-plan-resume-humanitarian-aid-deliveries-gaza>