Inhumane Zones: An assessment of Israel’s actions with respect to the provision of aid, shelter, safe passage, and assistance to evacuees in Gaza; response to questions raised in the ICJ on 17 May 2024

Report by Forensic Architecture
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Contents

1. Background ................................................................................................................................................................... 3
2. Scope .............................................................................................................................................................................. 3
3. Questions examined ................................................................................................................................................... 3
4. Summary of findings ................................................................................................................................................... 4
5. Have the 'humanitarian zones' (areas into which the Israeli military ordered Palestinians go for their safety), including the 6 May al-Mawasi 'humanitarian zone', been defined and communicated in a clear and consistent manner? ................................................................................... 5
6. Does essential infrastructure for the provision of shelter, food, water, and medical care in the newly designated ‘humanitarian zone’ in al-Mawasi exist? Are other places into which Israel instructs civilians to evacuate capable of supporting evacuees? ....................................... 11
7. Are the routes to the designated ‘humanitarian zone’ in al-Mawasi communicated on 6 May safe? .................................................................................................................................................................... 23
8. Have the designated ‘humanitarian corridors to safe areas’ or ‘evacuation routes’, that Israel urged civilian evacuees to use for travel along, been protected and exempt from military attacks by Israel? ........................................................................................................................................... 24
9. Have areas across Gaza which were designated ‘safe’ for evacuees by the Israeli military in its evacuation orders to the civilian population been protected and exempt from military attacks by the Israeli military since October 2023? ........................................................................................................... 28
10. Has Israel ensured the provision of essential shelter and sustenance within Gaza and ensured the safe distribution, access, and facilitation of aid been within Gaza since the beginning of their attack? ...................................................................................................................................... 32
11. About Forensic Architecture ..................................................................................................................................... 34
12. Appendix ..................................................................................................................................................................... 35
1. **Background**

1.1. In the 17 May ICJ hearing, Judge Georg Nolte asked the following question to the Israeli legal team:

1.1.1. ‘Can Israel provide information about the existing humanitarian conditions in the designated evacuation zones, in particular Al-Mawasi, and how it would ensure safe passage to these zones, as well as the provision of shelter, food, water and other humanitarian aid and assistance to all evacuees that are, and can be expected to arrive, in these zones?’

1.1.2. NB: In his question, the judge incorrectly referred to the area of al-Mawasi as an ‘evacuation zone’. Rather, it has been designated by the Israeli military as a ‘humanitarian zone’, where civilians who obeyed their orders to evacuate from other parts of Gaza were assured safety. In this report we refer to ‘evacuation zones’ as areas where Palestinians were instructed to vacate or evacuate from, rather than to.

2. **Scope**

2.1. Forensic Architecture (FA) investigated and assessed Israel's actions in relation to its humanitarian responsibilities — the creation of ‘humanitarian zones’ with adequate provisions for shelter, sustenance, and medical aid, and the facilitation of safe passage to them — since 6 May, when its long-threatened invasion of the city of Rafah and the surrounding areas began. We have assessed these actions in view of the patterns of Israeli military conduct since 7 October 2023.

3. **Questions examined**

3.1. Have the ‘humanitarian zones’ (areas to which the Israeli military ordered Palestinians relocate for their safety), including the expanded al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’ designated by Israel on 6 May, been defined and communicated in a clear and consistent manner?

3.2. Does essential infrastructure for the provision of shelter, food, water, and medical care in the newly designated al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’ exist? Are other places to which Israel instructs civilians to evacuate capable of supporting evacuees?

3.3. Are the routes to the expanded al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’ that were communicated on 6 May safe?

3.4. Have the designated ‘humanitarian corridors to safe areas’ or ‘evacuation routes’, which Israel urged civilian evacuees to use for travel, been protected and exempt from military attacks by Israel?

3.5. Have areas across Gaza which were designated ‘safe’ for evacuees by the Israeli military in its evacuation orders to the civilian population been protected and exempt from military attacks by the Israeli military since October 2023?

3.6. Has Israel ensured the provision of essential shelter and sustenance to civilians and has it ensured the safe access to and distribution of aid within Gaza during its military campaign?
4. Summary of findings

4.1. On 6 May, the expanded al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’ was unequipped to accommodate evacuees from Rafah. The area was unable to support the hundreds of thousands that were arriving there from Rafah already, and certainly could not support the further 1.5 million Palestinians that were estimated to have been in Rafah in the weeks prior to the Israeli military’s assault on the city. The reasons for this assessment are as follows:

4.1.1. At the time the Israeli designation of the expanded ‘humanitarian zone’ was announced on 6 May, all but two hospitals in the newly defined ‘humanitarian zone’ were out of service due to the Israeli assault¹. The two functioning hospitals in this area, Shuhada al-Aqsa and al-Amal are importantly overcapacity and with drastically reduced function, respectively.

4.1.2. 67 out of 92 schools have been damaged or destroyed.

4.1.3. 3 out of 19 drinking water facilities, including stations and wells, have been visibly damaged or destroyed. A lack of fuel and electricity also makes the water stations that remain unreliable.

4.1.4. 12 out of 24 community centres are damaged or destroyed, reducing the sheltering capacity of the ‘humanitarian zone’ significantly.

4.2. Israel has not provided clear or consistent information about designated ‘humanitarian zones’.

4.2.1. Israel has published at least five contradictory boundaries of the al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’ since October 2023.

4.2.2. Israel has repeatedly attacked evacuation routes which it explicitly designated ‘humanitarian corridors’ for safe passage since 13 October 2023, on which date the Israeli military issued an order for the entire population of the Gaza Strip north of Wadi Gaza (around 1.1 million Palestinians) to evacuate into southern Gaza within 24 hours.

4.3. Since 6 May, Israel has not provided a specific and clear safe route for evacuees from Rafah to travel to its designated ‘humanitarian zone’ around al-Mawasi.

4.4. Israel has repeatedly bombed, shelled, and invaded areas that it had previously designated as safe ‘humanitarian zones’. Israel has also repeatedly displaced Palestinians from sites where it previously directed them to seek refuge and shelter.

4.5. Israel has restricted necessary levels of aid from entering Gaza and has systematically targeted aid and aid infrastructure within Gaza.

¹Our analysis of hospitals’ status is limited to existing hospital buildings and does not include field hospitals established since October 2023.
Findings

5. Have the ‘humanitarian zones’, including the al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’ expanded on 6 May, been defined and communicated in a clear and consistent manner?

5.1. On 6 May 2024, the Israeli military issued an evacuation order instructing ‘residents and displaced people in eastern Rafah’ to move to what it referred to as an ‘expanded humanitarian zone’ in al-Mawasi (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Evacuation order on 6 May 2024 instructing Palestinians in the eastern part of the Rafah municipality to evacuate to an ‘expanded humanitarian area’. The arrow on the map points to the city centre of Khan Younis, included within this expanded zone, which suffered extensive destruction following the Israeli ground invasion in January. The map does not provide a ‘safe route’.
Figure 2. An illustration of a map published in Arabic on 6 May by the Israeli military showing the expansion of the al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’. The red area represents what the Israeli military purportedly designated to be the previous boundary of the ‘humanitarian zone’; however, the boundary marked on this map was never previously declared, nor is it consistent with any previously declared boundaries for the area. The blue area represents the ‘expanded humanitarian area’ around al-Mawasi as of 6 May. It includes large parts of central Khan Younis.
5.2. The map attached to the order (see Figure 1) described significantly different boundaries for the al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’ to all those previously published (see Figure 3). This discrepancy is very likely to lead to confusion among Palestinian civilians as to the correct, current boundaries of the ‘humanitarian zone’.²

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5.3. The new ‘humanitarian zone’ declared on 6 May excludes areas that had previously been declared part of the al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone.’ Satellite imagery from April shows that the area excluded from the 6 May borders of the ‘humanitarian zone’ contains many displaced people (see Figure 4).3

5.4. Satellite image analysis reveals that Palestinian civilians, apparently unaware that the boundary had been changed, evacuated to this now-excluded area between 30 April and 15 May, after the Israeli ground invasion of Rafah commenced (see Figure 5).

5.4.1. The establishment of new tent camps within the now-excluded area suggests that displaced Palestinians were still relying on maps referring to the previous boundaries, evidencing the confusing nature of the orders. What Israel refers to as the ‘expanded humanitarian area’ has, in at least one critical location, contracted rather than expanded (‘excluded area’ in Figure 4).

Figure 4. The ‘expanded humanitarian area’ as published on 6 May excludes an area that was declared safe according to a map published on 6 December 2023. Satellite imagery from 15 May suggests evacuees continued to seek safety in that area after 6 May, indicating that the recent exclusion of this area may not have been widely understood. Furthermore, satellite imagery suggests the total number of civilians in this area seems to have grown (see Figure 5).

3 See our satellite imagery analysis of the excluded area’s existing camps here: https://x.com/ForensicArchi/status/1790439607667986532.
Figure 5. Satellite images from 30 April and 15 May 2024 show an increase in Palestinians taking shelter in an area that was included in the previous borders of the al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’, but was excluded, without explanation, from the new ‘expanded humanitarian area’ in a map published by the Israeli military on 6 May.
5.5. The size and borders of this ‘area’ or ‘zone’ have been rendered larger in publications in which Israel’s military makes claims regarding the alleged use of this ‘humanitarian zone’ by Palestinian armed groups. In contrast, when Palestinians have been instructed to take refuge in the ‘humanitarian zone’ of al-Mawasi, its boundaries are more restricted. The boundary thus appears to fluctuate to support Israeli narratives about its humanitarian and military measures, rather than to establish a consistent refuge area for civilians (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Our analysis suggests that the size and boundaries of the ‘humanitarian zone’ in al-Mawasi have fluctuated according to the context in which it is being represented by the Israeli military. The boundary published on 22 October 2023 marks the border of the zone as it was conveyed as part of an evacuation order instructing Palestinians to head to that area. The boundary published on 6 December marked a significantly larger boundary for the same zone (see Appendix for chronology of the al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’ boundary).
6. Does essential infrastructure for the provision of shelter, food, water, and medical care in the newly designated ‘humanitarian zone’ in al-Mawasi exist? Are other places into which Israel instructs civilians to evacuate capable of supporting evacuees?

6.1. Hospitals

6.1.1. The Israeli military is forcibly displacing approximately 1.5 million people from Rafah, an area with some of the last functioning medical facilities in Gaza, to a supposed ‘humanitarian zone’ in which repeated Israeli attacks have rendered nearly all medical infrastructure non-functional.

6.1.2. While the expanded ‘humanitarian zone’ includes the location of major hospitals in southern Gaza like Nasser and al-Amal in Khan Younis, both hospitals were damaged and forced out of service following violent Israeli military raids in February and March 2024.

6.1.3. Moreover, the Israeli military reportedly forced al-Khair Hospital, the only hospital within the previously declared boundaries of the ‘humanitarian zone’ in al-Mawasi, out of service in January 2024 (see Figure 7).

6.1.4. The two hospitals with any functionality within the expanded 6 May ‘humanitarian zone’, Shuhada al-Aqsa and al-Amal hospitals, are overcapacity and working at partial function, respectively.

6.1.4.1. Shuhada al-Aqsa, the main hospital in Deir al-Balah, was reportedly attacked on 10 January 2024. While the hospital is still functioning, it does not have the capacity to service the increasing numbers of displaced persons in the area. On 22 April, the UN reported that the hospital “is so overwhelmed with trauma patients that it no longer provides maternity care.”

6.1.4.2. On 4 May 2024, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) announced that al-Amal Hospital restored part of functionality after it was pushed out of service following the extensive destruction it sustained following the Israeli invasion. While additional functionality was restored on 12 May, the hospital was operating in a limited capacity on 6 May when the Israeli military announced the expansion of the ‘humanitarian zone’.

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4 Our analysis of hospitals’ status is limited to existing hospital buildings and does not include field hospitals established since October 2023.

March: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q-J-bvHAHgD4

7 https://www.msf.org/last-medics-providing-healthcare-amidst-death-and-destruction-gaza
8 https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-156
9 https://x.com/palestinercs/status/178677537390461027?sfw=46&xpoTpRvOr1g_JypMkN4hXw
10 https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-165
Figure 7. Map marking the location of the hospitals within the expanded ‘humanitarian zone’ and their status as of 6 May. Three out of five hospitals, including Nasser, the largest in southern Gaza, were out of service within this area when the 6 May ‘humanitarian zone’ was published.

6.1.5. On the following page is satellite image analysis of three hospitals within the newly designated ‘expanded humanitarian area’, al-Amal Hospital (partial function), Nasser Hospital (out of service), and Dar al-Salam Hospital (out of service).
Figure 8. A) al-Amal Hospital: Tents are largely removed by February 2024 and its grounds remain empty as of 8 May; B) Dar Al-Salam Hospital: Shut down on 1 November 2023 because of airstrikes and lack of fuel. The hospital was bombed on 16 December; C) Nasser Hospital: People are seen fleeing the hospital grounds and tents were removed by April 2024.
6.2. **Schools**

6.2.1. 67 out of 92 of schools within the ‘humanitarian zone’ as defined on 6 May are damaged or destroyed. Schools have in the past been used for shelter and the distribution of aid. As large buildings with multiple separate spaces and an open yard, they are essential for serving a large community of evacuees and their destruction significantly reduces this area’s capacity to host evacuees.

*Figure 9. Map showing the location of schools within the expanded 6 May ‘humanitarian zone’, as well as their status. Most schools within this area have been damaged as a result of Israeli attacks. (Data from UNICEF, 25 April)*
6.3. **Essential services**

6.3.1. Essential infrastructure and civic buildings within the ‘humanitarian zone’ as defined on 6 May, including drinking water stations and community centres, have been destroyed or damaged. The damage to so many of these facilities makes it clear that the area is unsuitable for evacuees.

6.3.2. To assess the status of the essential services within the 6 May ‘humanitarian zone’ boundary, we analysed historical satellite imagery of the area within that boundary, recording instances of visible damage. Figure 11 demonstrates the methodology behind that analysis.

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**Figure 10.** Map marking the locations of essential services and which of those are damaged within the expanded ‘humanitarian zone’.
Figure 11. Method for assessing damage using a series of satellite images. Please note the date format (YYYYDDMM) above each thumbnail image. A. Odeh and Abu Younis Petroleum Station. Damage is first detected on 17 February 2024 and further major damage on 5 May; B. Al-Rahma Mosque water desalination plant. Damage is first detected on 17 February and further major damage on 5 May; C. Al Baraem Development Association. Damage is first detected on 17 February and further major damage on 5 May.
6.4. **Expanding the ‘humanitarian zone’ in al-Mawasi to an area that is heavily destroyed**

6.4.1. The expanded ‘humanitarian area’ around al-Mawasi, which was declared on 6 May, includes parts of western and central Khan Younis. Our analysis shows that this part of the supposedly safe area has been heavily targeted by bombing and shelling, and many buildings within it are damaged or destroyed. An urban landscape populated by significantly damaged buildings is dangerous and cannot provide safe or adequate shelter to civilians.

Figure 12. Satellite image of the ‘expanded humanitarian area’ around al-Mawasi includes parts of Khan Younis that were heavily destroyed in January 2024, according to data published by UNOSAT.
Figure 13. A map indicating the damage inflicted in February alone. Much of this damage falls within the Israeli designated ‘humanitarian zone’ of 6 May. (Based on data published by UNOSAT.)
Figure 14. Damage in March 2024 indicates continued Israeli attacks on buildings and urban infrastructure within what is now the expanded ‘humanitarian zone’. (Based on data published by UNOSAT.)
Figure 15. This annotated satellite image shows the extent of destroyed and damaged structures between October 2023 and March 2024 within the area designated as the expanded ‘humanitarian zone’. (Based on data published by UNOSAT.)
Figure 16. Satellite imagery analysis of the 6 May expanded ‘humanitarian zone’ shows extensive damage resulting from Israeli attacks, rendering these areas uninhabitable even by tent structures due to the ruins and uneven ground there.
6.5. Evacuation Orders to areas that are already destroyed (the case of Jabalia)

6.5.1. The Israeli military has repeatedly ordered Palestinians to evacuate to areas that are already largely destroyed.\(^\text{11}\) For instance, on 11 May 2024, Palestinian neighbourhoods of Jabalia in northern Gaza were instructed to evacuate to the western part of Gaza City.\(^\text{12}\)

6.5.2. UN data shows that there was a significant level of destruction in western Gaza City at the time of this order (see Figure 17 and Figure 18), including the area of al-Shifa hospital which was heavily damaged by Israeli military activity between 18 March 2024 and 1 April 2024.

6.5.3. In addition to this evacuation order, three more orders were issued, on 14 May,\(^\text{13}\) 15 May,\(^\text{14}\) and 18 May 2024\(^\text{15}\), instructing Palestinians in additional neighbourhoods in northern Gaza to head towards the same destroyed area of western Gaza City where the main hospital was heavily damaged and forced out of service (see Figure 18).

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\(^\text{12}\) https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/178917670105636971/photo/1

\(^\text{13}\) https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1790391505045033042

\(^\text{14}\) https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1790794941049590

\(^\text{15}\) https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1791870827484328420

Figure 17. An evacuation order published on 11 May instructing Palestinians in Jabalia and surrounding areas to evacuate to a heavily destroyed part of western Gaza City.
Figure 18. On 11 May, inhabitants of the Jabalia area (highlighted in yellow) were ordered by Israel to evacuate to unspecified ‘shelters’ in the western part of Gaza City. As this image illustrates, the entire western part of Gaza City is largely destroyed or damaged, making the area unsafe and shelters for evacuees nearly impossible to find. Furthermore, the main hospital in this area, al-Shifa, was heavily damaged and pushed out of service following the second Israeli invasion of the hospital between 18 March and 1 April.

7. Are the routes to the designated ‘humanitarian zone’ around al-Mawasi communicated on 6 May safe?

7.1. Exacerbating the problem noted above, in their 6 May evacuation order, the Israeli military did not provide any indication of safe routes that could be used to reach the ‘expanded humanitarian area’ (see Figure 1). Rather, the map associated with this evacuation order includes only a broad arrow directing Palestinians from Rafah to the heavily demolished city centre of Khan Younis.
8. Have the designated ‘humanitarian corridors to safe areas’ or ‘evacuation routes’ that Israel urged civilian evacuees to use for travel been protected and exempt from military attacks by Israel?

8.1. Since October 2023, the Israeli military has imposed evacuation orders on civilians in Gaza in the form of airdropped leaflets, or digitally, through Arabic-language social media channels.

8.2. Following the Israeli military’s 13 October evacuation order instructing the entire population of northern Gaza to move south of Wadi Gaza, the Israeli military’s Arabic-language spokesperson posted a diagram on Facebook\(^{16}\) displaying an evacuation route along Salah-al-Din Street, located centrally along the spine of the Gaza Strip. On 14 October, another Facebook post\(^ {17}\) showed an additional evacuation route along Al-Rashid Street, located on the coast of Gaza.

8.3. Salah-al-Din and Al-Rashid Streets are essential for the movement and evacuation of civilians within Gaza, able to accommodate a high transit volume. Along these widely communicated evacuation routes, which were repeatedly referred to by Israeli officials as ‘humanitarian corridors’ (see Figure 19), the Israeli military has repeatedly targeted civilians evacuating and seeking refuge via these routes (see Figure 20).

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\(^{16}\) https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=655000310074000&set=pb.100066921098856.-2207520000

\(^{17}\) https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=655329013374463&set=pb.100066921098856.-2207520000

*Figure 19. Israeli military diagrams showing evacuation routes along Salah-al-Din Street and Al-Rashid Street.*
Figure 20. Documented Israeli attacks along evacuation routes. Each attack (marked A to D) was on a road explicitly designated by the Israeli military as an evacuation route. These cases are non-exhaustive and only represent a sample of attacks on civilians using Israeli-designated evacuation routes.
Case Studies

8.4. Incident A, 13 October, Salah-al-Din

8.4.1. On 13 October 2023, 70 people were killed as a convoy of vehicles was targeted by the Israeli military while evacuating northern Gaza, following an evacuation order. Reports state the vehicles were travelling along Salah-al-Din Street.18

8.4.2. An Israeli military diagram, published the same day, showed a designated evacuation route from the intersection of Salah-al-Din and Al Quds, near Jabalia in northern Gaza, to the Salah-al-Din and Al-Matahen intersection, north of Khan Younis (see Figure 21).19

8.4.3. The convoy was targeted while travelling south along Salah-al-Din Street, following the Israeli instructions to use the evacuation route they designated safe for passage.

8.5. Incident D, 4 December, Salah-al-Din

8.5.1. On 4 December the Israeli military declared parts of Salah-al-Din Street blocked for ‘safe passage’ and instructed Palestinians to travel by way of an east-west road near Deir al-Balah called al-Shuhada towards a ‘safe route’ on al-Rashid Street (see Figure 21).

8.5.2. On the same day, Palestinian photographer Motaz Azaiza recorded a video of a Palestinian woman and child running from Israeli tank fire close to the intersection of al-Shuhada Street (declared safe) and Salah-al-Din Street.20

8.5.3. Cross-referencing this location with an evacuation diagram published on 4 December shows that the civilians targeted in the video were only 770 m away from the intersection of Salah-al-Din and the declared ‘safe route’ on al-Shuhada Street, and 2.6 km away from the part of Salah-al-Din Street declared ‘unsafe’.21

8.5.4. The evacuation routes intermittently change, especially along Salah-al-Din and al-Rashid streets generally referred to as ‘safe routes’, causing confusion for those evacuating. Nonetheless, at the time of this incident the civilians were located 770m from a sanctioned evacuation route at an intersection along Salah-al-Din.

18 https://x.com/ragipsoylu/status/1712944592021045668
19 https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=655000310074000&set=pb.100066921098856.-2207520000
20 https://www.instagram.com/p/C0bYiS3sl09/
Further Incidents

8.5.5. Incident B

On 3 November 2023, a car driving south along al-Rashid Street was targeted by the Israeli military near the Wadi Gaza Bridge. A social media video shows several dead bodies along the established evacuation route.22

8.5.6. Incident C

On 10 November, people evacuating south along Salah-al-Din Street were reportedly targeted by the Israeli military, leaving at least 17 dead and dozens injured.23

8.6. This pattern of repeated attacks on routes designated safe by the Israeli military, and widely understood as such by the civilian population in Gaza, demonstrates that these routes are unreliable and that anyone evacuating to a designated ‘humanitarian zone’ along such a corridor is not safe.

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22 https://www.instagram.com/p/CzMXiHpNtLs/?hl=en
23 https://x.com/PalastineEye/status/1722982508038349050
9. Have areas across Gaza which were designated ‘safe’ for evacuees by the Israeli military in its evacuation orders to the civilian population been protected and exempt from military attacks by the Israeli military since October 2023?

9.1. Attacks and invasion inside the al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’, January 2024

9.1.1. The Israeli military fatally shot a Palestinian civilian walking with a man holding a white flag inside the al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’ on 22 January 2024. This killing, which was captured on video by a cameraman for British television, was further analysed by the investigative agency Earshot, which verified the location of the Israeli tanks from which this civilian was targeted.  

9.1.2. This killing took place as civilians who had followed Israeli orders to evacuate from their homes to makeshift camps in the al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’ were forced to flee from invading Israeli troops. This incursion subsequently forced the evacuation of displaced Palestinians taking shelter at al-Aqsa University, located inside the ‘humanitarian zone’.  

24 ITV news footage of the incident: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PGdyXRHS2lg&t=50s
Earshot investigation on the 22 January killing of a Palestinian civilian in al-Mawasi: https://earshot.ngo/investigations/targeting-of-civilians-in-khan-yunis

Figure 22. A) The location of a civilian who was shot and killed on camera while walking with a man holding a white flag within the al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’ on 22 January 2024. B) The position of Israeli tanks on 22 January inside the ‘humanitarian zone’ in al-Mawasi.
9.2. **Bombing of Deir al-Balah while designated a ‘humanitarian zone’**

9.2.1. Our analysis indicates the supposedly ‘safe area’ in Deir al-Balah\(^{26}\) that Israel directed evacuees to shelter in was repeatedly targeted after that announcement, with tens of thousands of evacuees in it. The amount of destruction within this area does not appear to be less than in the area around it, indicating there is no restriction on the application of military force within such designated safe areas.

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\(^{26}\) On multiple occasions, the Israeli military referred to Deir al-Balah in general as a ‘safe’ area. On 8 January 2024, Palestinian photographer Motaz Azaiza, who was based in Deir al-Balah at the time, published a photo of an Israeli air-dropped leaflet instructing Palestinians to evacuate towards the blocks in Deir al-Balah shown in Figure 24 and Figure 25: https://x.com/azaizamotaz9/status/1744373263222894632
Figure 24. Damage between January and the end of March 2024 within the Israeli designated ‘humanitarian zone’ of Deir al-Balah. This image indicates that Israel repeatedly targeted this ‘humanitarian zone’ since it was declared as such on 8 January 2024.
10. Has Israel ensured the provision of essential shelter and sustenance within Gaza and ensured the safe distribution of and access to aid within Gaza since the beginning of their invasion?

10.1. Our analysis of reported data identifies at least 80 separate attacks by Israel on aid in Gaza since January. The frequency and widespread nature of these attacks suggests that Israel is systematically targeting aid. The reported attacks we mapped include attacks on civilians seeking aid, attacks on aid convoys, attacks on aid personnel, and attacks on aid infrastructure (including aid warehouses).

Figure 25. An image from Forensic Architecture’s ‘Attacks on Aid in Gaza’ interactive map platform showing documented attacks on aid in Gaza by Israel.

27 This work was published on 15 May 2024 on the social media website X. https://x.com/ForensicArchi/status/1790796901123559572

The interactive map platform can be accessed through a desktop using this link: https://t.co/wfwdHp6y62

The full data set, containing coordinates, details of the incidents, and sources for the incidents is based on open-source information and is available in full upon request.
Figure 26. Reports indicate there have been at least 37 attacks on civilians seeking aid, all near the Israeli-controlled checkpoints on Salah-al-Din Street and al-Rashid Street, which are repeatedly referred to by Israeli officials as ‘humanitarian corridors’ (see 8.3).
11. About Forensic Architecture

Forensic Architecture is a research agency, based at Goldsmiths, University of London, investigating human rights violations including environmental destruction and violence committed by states, police forces, militaries, and corporations. FA has published over 100 investigations into cases of human rights violations worldwide including in Pakistan, Indonesia, Myanmar, Guatemala, Mexico, Chile, Brazil, the US, UK, Germany, Turkey, Ukraine and Greece. FA is directed by Professor Eyal Weizman, and has worked with international NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Doctors without Borders, the ICRC, and the UN.

Our investigations employ pioneering techniques in spatial and architectural analysis, open-source investigation, digital modelling, and immersive technologies, as well as documentary research, situated interviews, and academic collaboration. Findings from our investigations have been presented in national and international courtrooms, parliamentary inquiries, and exhibitions at some of the world’s leading cultural institutions and in international media, as well as in citizen’s tribunals and community assemblies.

FA’s case files have been submitted as evidence in national legal processes across the world, including in Israeli courts. The agency’s findings have also been submitted or presented in international jurisdictions including the European Court of Human Rights and the UN General Assembly, and in national courtrooms, parliamentary inquiries, and truth commissions around the world.

FA has been recognised for its work in the field of journalism with a Peabody Award for Digital and Interactive Storytelling (2021), the European Cultural Foundation (ECF) Princess Margriet Award for Culture (2018), and a Peabody-Facebook Futures of Media Award for Interactive Storytelling (2017). FA director Eyal Weizman is a life fellow of the British Academy and recipient of an MBE for ‘services to architecture’. He was a member of the Technology Advisory Board of the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
Figure 27. The boundary of the ‘humanitarian zone’ in al-Mawasi as declared by the Israeli military on 18 October 2023.
Figure 28. The boundary of the ‘humanitarian zone’ in al-Mawasi as shown in an Israeli military evacuation order published on 22 October 2023. The same boundary was published in multiple evacuation orders.

28 On maps intended for Palestinians in Gaza, the delineated boundary of Al-Mawasi is accompanied by text at the bottom stating "رسوم توضيحية" which translates to ‘illustrative drawing’ or ‘explanatory diagram’ in English.
Figure 29. The boundary of the al-Mawasi area as shown on a neighbourhood-based map published by the Israeli military on 2 December 2023.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{29} https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=896287658529509&set=a.306770754147872
https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=900127288145546&set=a.306770754147872
https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=901282458030029&set=a.306770754147872

\textsuperscript{30} https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/article/2023/12/02/israel-military-gaza-blocks-maps
Figure 30. The boundary of the ‘humanitarian zone’ in al-Mawasi as defined in a map published[^31] by the Israeli military and dated 6 December 2023. Here the Israeli military published a version of the al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’ boundary that was notably larger than any previously published in order to support their claim that Palestinian armed resistance had fired rockets from this zone.

[^31]: https://idfanc.activetrail.biz/ANC07122023045086
Figure 31. A map showing the overlap of the different versions of the ‘humanitarian zone’ in al-Mawasi as published by the Israeli military between October and December 2023. The ambiguity surrounding the boundaries of areas declared ‘safe’ in Gaza is also evident in the cases of the ‘safe zones’ in Rafah and Deir Al-Balah\textsuperscript{32}.