Humanitarian Violence: Israel’s Abuse of Preventative Measures in its 2023-2024 Genocidal Military Campaign in the Occupied Gaza Strip

Report by Forensic Architecture

Accompanying an interactive report: gaza.forensic-architecture.org/displacement

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1. SCOPE OF ANALYSIS

1.1. Forensic Architecture has conducted an analysis of open-source data, press releases, social media posts, and statements by officials in the Israeli occupation forces (IOF/Israeli military) concerning warnings, ‘evacuation orders’, ‘known shelters’, and suggested ‘evacuation routes’, and examined the means by which this information was disseminated, by reference to testimonies both online and collected first-hand, media evidence, documentation of these events by Palestinians in the occupied Gaza Strip, and satellite imagery from 8 October 2023 to 16 February 2024.

1.2. The aim of the study was to:

1.2.1. establish and examine a timeline of warnings and ‘evacuation orders’, including the establishment of so-called ‘safe corridors’, ‘safe zones’, and ‘known shelters’, and the map of ‘evacuation zones’ or ‘blocks’ made available to the Palestinian civilian population in Gaza by the Israeli military;

1.2.2. plot the location, boundaries, and timeline of ‘safe zones’ and ‘evacuation grids’ declared by the Israeli military;

1.2.3. examine the effectiveness of the Israeli military’s means of disseminating information on the ‘evacuation orders’, ‘safe corridors’ and ‘safe zones’;

1.2.4. examine direct attacks by the Israeli military on its declared ‘safe corridors’ and ‘safe zones’; and

1.2.5. examine the relationship between the Israeli military ‘evacuation orders’ since 7 October 2023 to the mass displacement and unprecedented killing of the Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip.

2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

2.1. The evacuation of civilians from active combat zones is prohibited under international humanitarian law (IHL) unless exercised for the protection of civilian populations. Areas to which civilians are directed must be provided with ‘the essentials for survival, including food, water, shelter, hygiene, health assistance, and safety’. While Israel has claimed that its ‘evacuation orders’ were an attempt to protect Palestinian civilians, our study reveals that since 7 October 2023, the ‘humanitarian measures’ employed by the Israeli military have failed to provide protection for the Palestinian civilian population.

2.2. Our findings further reveal that the ‘humanitarian measures’ employed by Israel, including ‘warnings’, ‘evacuation orders’, ‘safe zones’, and ‘safe corridors’ were not used as a means of protecting life and livelihood—as has been suggested by the Israeli military and as was argued by its legal team at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 12 January 2024—but rather have:

2.2.1. amplified the forced transfer and mass displacement of Palestinians;

2.2.2. created confusion and panic by providing unclear, incorrect, inconsistent, elastic, unspecified, conflicting, and inaccessible instructions, formats, names, and communication protocols (referred to herein as ‘cartographic terror’);

2.2.3. resulted in cases of targeting and military bombardment of routes and zones designated as ‘safe’ by the Israeli military;

2.2.4. facilitated the movement and direction of displaced civilians to areas of active Israeli military presence and operations which, in numerous cases, led to significant civilian fatalities;

2.2.5. repeatedly ordered the evacuation of civilians to areas declared ‘safe’ that consistently lacked access

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1 Article 8 (2) (e) (viii) of the Rome Statute forbids ‘ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand.’ https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/RS-Eng.pdf

2 https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/about-inter-agency-standing-committee/statement-principals-inter-agency-standing-committee-humanitarian-chiefs-will-not-take-part
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to basic means of life, including adequate 'shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition' as required by international humanitarian law;  

2.2.6. attacked civilians in areas designated as ‘safe’;
2.2.7. continued even after the ruling of the ICJ on 26 January 2024 which found, by a large majority, that ‘at least some of the acts and omissions alleged by South Africa to have been committed by Israel in Gaza appear to be capable of falling within the provisions of the [Genocide] Convention’. Since this ruling, Israel has continued the expulsion and forced displacement of Palestinians from their homes and deprived them of access to adequate food and water, humanitarian assistance, fuel, shelter, clothes, hygiene, sanitation, and medical care, in contravention of the court’s order.

2.3. Together, these measures have become tools in a military campaign that has, at the time of writing, killed over 30,000 Palestinians, over 70% of them women and children, with thousands more missing, and tens of thousands more civilians wounded. This has been exacerbated by unparalleled and catastrophic levels of infrastructural destruction and agricultural damage, and the systematic targeting of vital civilian structures, including hospitals, schools, religious and cultural heritage sites, bakeries, and homes.

2.4. This study reveals the way in which the Israeli military’s above declared ‘humanitarian efforts’ served to facilitate what numerous international experts have called Israel’s genocidal actions. Rather than ‘humanitarian acts’ used as preventative measures for the safeguarding of civilian life, this report supports claims that Israel has exercised a form of ‘humanitarian violence’, in concert with and in support of its broader genocidal actions.

3. DEFINITIONS

3.1. **Evacuation orders**: Military instructions provided by the Israeli military, often through air-dropped leaflets and social media posts, ordering the residents of various areas in Gaza to leave their homes. The Israeli military also employs phone calls, text messages, and drones with loudspeakers to order people to evacuate.  

3.2. **Evacuation grid**: On 1 December 2023, the Israeli military published an annotated map with an evacuation grid made up of more than 600 zones. Each zone within this grid was marked with a number. The map can be accessed using a QR code from a mobile phone (subject to battery life or internet availability). As reported by Haaretz on 6 December 2023, this ‘evacuation grid’ was originally created by Israeli authorities ‘half a century ago, as part of a short-lived plan to rebuild the Gaza Strip under Israeli occupation in the early 1970s’. Parts of this map were also visible in evacuation order videos posted to Twitter on 8 October 2023. While the map was presented as a basic location tool to enable Palestinians to avoid the most dangerous areas, an interactive version has already been in use for the past eight weeks of the war, ‘as a decision-making tool for IDF commanders and planners before

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3 https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule131  
5 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/06/israel-gaza-civilians-protection/  
6 https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1710776997230620908?s=20  
7 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-12-06/ty-article/.premium/the-idfs-confusing-ironic-evacuation-map-for-palestinians-in-gaza/0000018c-3b63-de12-a3af-3bef79640000  
8 https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1710776997230620908?s=20
launched airstrikes and ground manoeuvres’. In effect, the ‘evacuation grid’ is a military tool actively used in Gaza since October 2023 that was repackaged by the Israeli military as a ‘humanitarian tool’.

3.3. **Safe corridors**: Routes and roads prescribed by the Israeli military for Palestinian civilians for safe relocation, mostly from northern Gaza to areas south of Wadi Gaza (a seasonal stream flowing into the Mediterranean Sea, south of Gaza City).

3.4. **Safe zones**: Areas designated by the Israeli military as safe for Palestinian civilians to shelter in. Within those areas civilians are supposedly protected from military attacks, and can receive food, medical aid, and other humanitarian supplies. One of the safe zones is titled a ‘humanitarian zone’ by the Israeli military.

3.5. **Known shelters**: Many ‘evacuation orders’ by the Israeli military instruct civilians to move to ‘well-known shelter points’ such as ‘schools’ in various regions. Shelters in this context refer to buildings in Gaza which the Israeli military agrees not to target and has designated safe for civilians.

4. **BACKGROUND**

**Evolution of ‘evacuation orders’**

4.1. On 8 October 2023, at 00:59 local time, Lt. Col. Avichay Adraee, the Israeli army’s Arabic-language spokesman, posted on X (formerly Twitter) a series of videos addressed to residents of several numbered blocks in the Gaza Strip, stating, ‘For your safety, you must leave your place of residence immediately’. The videos contained in this post include images of a map dividing the Gaza Strip, from Beit Hanoun in the north to Rafah in the south, into numbered zones. While in some instances, the zones loosely coincide with established Palestinian neighbourhoods, at others seem to follow a military rather than an urban civilian logic. This map, later explained as part of a formal evacuation strategy (see Phase 2 below), revealed the underlying logic of a ‘humanitarian policy’ that would, from that moment on, act as one of the main mechanisms in a campaign to facilitate unprecedented population transfer and displacement.

4.2. On 13 October 2023, the Israeli military airdropped tens of thousands of leaflets with ‘evacuation orders’. The orders acted as a form of collective punishment and served a clear binary logic. The entirety of ‘northern Gaza’, meaning the area north of Wadi Gaza, encompassing Gaza City and the areas to its north with a population of approximately 1.1 million Palestinians, was ordered to evacuate their homes within 24 hours and head south of Wadi Gaza. The leaflet stated that “It is forbidden to approach the security wall, and anyone who exposes himself to death.”

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9 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-12-06/ty-article/.premium/the-idfs-confusing-ironic-evacuation-map-for-palestinians-in-gaza-00000018c-3b63-de12-a3af-3bef79640000

10 Translation of the tweet with the Israeli military’s instructions on relocation as provided by the Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights:

“Residents of the Gaza Strip, pay attention! Hamas operations force the IDF to operate in your place of residence. For your safety, you must leave your place of residence immediately. Residents of the Al-Ma’qousi area must move to the center of Gaza City. Residents of Beit Hanoun must move to the center of Gaza City. Residents of the north and east of Al-Bureij camp [in the Middle Area District] must move to shelters in the center of the camp. Residents of the east and south of Al-Maghazi camp [in the Middle Area District] must move to shelters in the center of the camp. Residents of Abasan al-Kabira and Abasan al-Saghira areas must move to the center of Khan Younis city. Residents of Rafah must move to shelters in the center of Rafah city. Residents of east of Al-Sheja’yya neighborhood must move to the center of Gaza City.”

Posted 7 October 2023, X: https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1710776997230620908?s=20

11 The leaflet was also shared via X. One of the two roads identified by the Israeli army in this order as a “safe route” to the southern half of the strip was Salah-al-Din Road, a main transit route in the territory. Less than an hour before this announcement was made, a convoy of vehicles carrying fleeing civilians in Gaza on this road was reportedly hit by a deadly airstrike, as established by the Forensic Architecture Investigative Unit at Al-Haq Rights Center. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/14/gaza-civilians-afraid-to-leave-home-after-bombing-of-safe-routes
4.3. On 22 October, another airdropped leaflet warned residents in the north that ‘whoever chooses not to leave north Gaza to the south of Wadi Gaza might be identified as an accomplice in a terrorist organisation’. This warning, that remaining civilians may be identified as terrorists, was applied in all ‘evacuation orders’ communicated by the Israeli military during the period from 8 October 2023 to 6 March 2024 (the date of this report). This ‘humanitarian warning’ effectively proposed a blanket redefinition of all those that do not or cannot follow it. 12

4.4. The binary order dividing the Gaza Strip into north and south created large concentrations of displaced Palestinians in the municipalities of Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah in the middle and southern areas of the strip, and was in place until 24 November 2023, when a temporary ceasefire commenced to facilitate the partial release of Israeli captives held in Gaza in exchange for Palestinian captives held by Israel.

4.5. During this period, on 16 November, heads of over a dozen United Nations (UN) and humanitarian organisations publicly objected to ‘the establishment of any ‘safe zone’ in Gaza that is set up without the agreement of all the parties, and unless fundamental conditions are in place to ensure safety and other essential needs are met and a mechanism is in place to supervise its implementation’. In this statement, the signatories declared that three conditions must be in place in line with the demands of international humanitarian and human rights law, including the ‘provision of the essentials for survival, including food, water, shelter, hygiene, health assistance, and safety.13

4.6. Starting from 1 December, following the collapse of the temporary ceasefire, an evacuation grid with over 600 numbered blocks was posted on the Israeli military website with a feature that shows the user’s location on the map. In an announcement in Arabic directed at the residents of Gaza, the army claimed that this map is a ‘safe way to preserve your safety, your lives, and the lives of your families’. 14 Since the introduction of this interactive map, the Israeli military's evacuation policies have assumed a more granular form.

4.7. In this period, as ‘evacuation orders’ became more localised, attacks on Khan Younis, Rafah and al-Mawasi continued, as many thousands of Palestinians continued to be displaced to these purported ‘safe zones’ in southern Gaza. On 4 January 2024, responding to an Israeli military airstrike near the ‘safe zone’ of al-Mawasi that killed 14 people, most of them children under 10 years old, Save the Children's Country Director for the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), Jason Lee, said:

4.7.1. ‘I cannot stress this enough: there is nowhere safe in Gaza. But under International Humanitarian Law, there should be. […] These relocation orders offer nothing more than a smokescreen of safety. If people stay, they are killed. If they move, they are killed. People are facing the “choice” of one death sentence or another.’ 15

4.8. From 22 January 2024 to the present, further mass displacement of Palestinians from the Israeli military's designated ‘safe zones’ began. These were the results of several attacks on al-Mawasi, Rafah, and Deir al-Balah ‘safe zones’. Further movement out of the ‘safe zones’ occurred after the Israeli Prime Minister announced on 9 February 2024 that the army should prepare for ‘the evacuation of the civilian population’ from Rafah. 16 At the time of writing, the Israeli military has yet to provide formal ‘evacuation orders’ for these areas.

13 https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/about-inter-agency-standing-committee/statement-principals-inter-agency-standing-committee-humanitarian-chiefs-will-not-take-part
14 https://www.idf.il/152678/
Figure 1. Gaza governates and municipalities. The evacuation order on 13 October 2023 imposed a new spatial division for the Gaza Strip into north and south, separated by Wadi Gaza. The ‘north’ consists of Gaza City (light green) and Northern Gaza (green). The ‘south’ includes the municipalities of Deir Al-Balah (orange), Khan Younis (purple), and Rafah (red).
**Israel’s argument**

4.9. Israel has argued that these practices represent a genuine ‘humanitarian effort’ to protect civilian lives. In its defence in the ICJ on 12 January 2024, the Israeli legal team declared that:

4.9.1. ‘The IDF maintains a Civilian Harm Mitigation Unit to undertake this task. It works full-time to provide advance notice of areas in which the IDF intends to intensify its activities, co-ordinate travel routes for civilians and secure these routes. This unit has developed a detailed map so that specific areas can be temporarily evacuated, instead of evacuating entire areas. [...] The IDF also enacts localized pauses in its operations to allow civilians to move. It does this even though Hamas does not agree to do the same and has even attacked IDF forces securing humanitarian corridors. [...] The IDF employs a range of additional measures in accordance with the obligation to take precautionary measures under international humanitarian law. For example, it provides effective advance warnings of attacks where circumstances permit. To date, the IDF has dropped millions of leaflets over areas of expected attacks with instructions on how to do so, broadcast countless messages over radio and through social media warning civilians to distance themselves from Hamas operations, and made over 70,000 individual phone calls, including to occupants of the targets, warning them of impending attacks. This requires time. It requires resources and intelligence — and the IDF invests all of these to save civilian lives.’


**Summary**

4.10. At present, using the evacuation grid map (introduced in 4.1), the Israeli military has published at least 34 ‘evacuation orders’ online, and around a dozen flyers, with instructions on areas to be evacuated, evacuation routes and ‘safe zones’. These ‘evacuation orders’ have resulted in the transfer and displacement of nearly two million Palestinian civilians to the southern parts of Gaza and between different areas within the south. Further, since 8 October 2023, multiple reports, including Forensic Architecture’s own previous investigations, have documented Palestinian civilians being bombed, shot at, executed, arrested, tortured, treated in a degrading manner, and forcibly disappeared by the Israeli military along roads, corridors and zones declared ‘safe’.


5. METHODOLOGY

5.1. **Open-source investigation**

5.1.1. Open-source investigation (OSINT) is information collected from publicly available sources. Common OSINT sources include social media networks, online forums, governmental websites, blogs, witness videos, news reports, and publicly available satellite images.

5.2. **Evacuation orders**

5.2.1. To document ‘evacuation orders’ and announcements published by the Israeli military, we identified places where these orders were posted online, principally:

5.2.1.1. the Twitter account of Lt. Col. Avichay Adraee;

5.2.1.2. the Facebook account of the Israeli military’s unit for Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT).

5.2.2. We manually analysed posts from these accounts since 7 October 2023 to identify ‘evacuation orders’ and announcements. We downloaded all images pertaining to evacuation announcements and organised them in chronological order.

5.2.3. We then scraped the dataset of the ‘numbered block’ system from the Israeli military webpage.

5.2.4. We then created three GeoJSON datasets:

5.2.4.1. A dataset for ‘evacuation orders’ that did not principally use the numbered block system (i.e., which marked bounded regions on a map as per Figure 1 above). We georeferenced each of the maps in these evacuation announcements and traced the edges of the boundaries that they highlighted for evacuation. We then tagged each boundary with the date that it was posted.

5.2.4.2. A dataset for ‘evacuation orders’ that principally used the Israeli military’s numbered block system. We identified every ‘block’ that the evacuation announcements specified – irrespective of whether they were specified in a map or in text – and tagged each block with a date corresponding to the relevant evacuation announcement. We then tagged each dated block with three properties, concerning whether the block in fact falls within the jurisdiction of the given evacuation order:

5.2.4.2.1. True or false: the block in question was highlighted in a map but not specified in the text description of the map;

5.2.4.2.2. True or false: the block in question was specified in the text description of the map but not highlighted in the map itself;

5.2.4.2.3. True or false: the block in question was highlighted only partially in the map.

5.2.4.3. A dataset for names of places (e.g., ‘Deir al-Balah’) specified in ‘evacuation orders’ that did not have clearly marked boundaries or corresponding numbered blocks.

5.2.5. With the datasets in place, we continued to update them with new information as they emerged, and we visualised the temporal progression of the ‘evacuation orders’ on a custom-made web-based GIS (graphical information system) platform.

5.3. **Airstrikes and attacks on hospitals and schools**

5.3.1. We developed an interactive web-based platform that scraped reports from three media sources (Al-Jazeera, Shehab News, Al-Arabiya) posted on Telegram. We developed a list of terminology relevant to the invasion in Arabic (e.g., ‘airstrike’, ‘siege’, ‘invasion’) and visualised when those terms were mentioned in these media reports over time, as well as the names of hospitals and schools that they referred to. We then manually analysed these reports to identify which were corroborated by multiple media sources. This enabled us to analyse the overall progression of airstrikes, ground operations,
and local sieges across Gaza, particularly in locations that were being used as shelters by displaced people.

5.4. **Ground invasion**

5.4.1. Another source of data was published by the Institute for the Study of War\(^\text{20}\), which showed the geographic progression of the Israeli ground invasion from 27 October 2023 onwards. We scraped this data as it was posted, and manually traced maps of it where needed, to create a chronological map of the ground invasion.

5.5. **Satellite image analysis**

5.5.1. We analysed satellite imagery collected by Planet\(^\text{21}\) to identify evidence of tent camps formed by displaced people (and the subsequent clearing of those camps), craters from explosive munitions, and the presence of Israeli military checkpoints, ramparts, and armoured vehicles. We included any significant or relevant satellite imagery in our web-based GIS platform.

5.6. **Testimonies**

5.6.1. While the ground invasion of Gaza Strip is ongoing, interviewing and reproducing the testimony of civilian witnesses may put them at risk. As such, Forensic Architecture interviewed doctors and other medical staff working in medical facilities across the Gaza Strip in the period following 7 October 2023 and who have since left Gaza.

5.6.2. Medical testimonies are important for several reasons. Since the beginning of the ground invasion, Forensic Architecture has documented a pattern of attacks on hospitals across the region, defined by intimidation, attacks on surrounding areas, direct targeting, siege, and occupation.\(^\text{22}\) Testimonies from medical staff have proven particularly valuable because, in the context of the ongoing ground invasion, hospitals have served as nodes for information about events in their vicinity, with information arriving there from across the larger territories they serve. Furthermore, medical staff have direct access to the physical injuries and conditions, such as dehydration and malnourishment, that patients have sustained, and which evidence the violence being inflicted on civilians in the surrounding areas. In short, medical professionals are direct eyewitnesses to events within the hospital, recipients of information about events beyond the hospital, and professional witnesses to the specific nature of civilian harm caused. These testimonies are therefore critical evidence of the correlation between Israel’s purported application of ‘humanitarian measures’ and the harm inflicted on the civilian population in Gaza.

5.6.3. Using both publicly available testimonies and those collected first-hand by Forensic Architecture, testimony from medical staff was corroborated by reference to other sources.

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\(^\text{20}\) [https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/2e746f51991643a39e64780f0674f7dd](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/2e746f51991643a39e64780f0674f7dd)
\(^\text{21}\) [https://www.planet.com/](https://www.planet.com/)
6. FINDINGS OF STUDY

6.1. EVACUATION ORDERS: A ‘CARTOGRAPHIC TERROR’

6.1.1. Phases of ‘evacuation orders’

Our analysis shows that the ‘evacuation orders’ have broadly assumed three phases, each of which produced mass displacement and forced transfer, and contributed to the killings of civilians throughout Gaza.23

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23 Forensic Architecture’s research into the timeline and content of Israeli military ‘evacuation orders’ and leaflets is supported by data collected first-hand by fieldworkers at the Al Mezan Center for Human Rights in Gaza, as well as by the Forensic Architecture Investigative Unit at the Al-Haq Center for Rights in Ramallah.
6.1.1.1. **Phase 1: Evacuating all residents in ‘northern Gaza’ (13 October - 24 November 2023)**

The first instance of an Israeli military ‘evacuation order’ for ‘northern Gaza’ was disseminated via airdropped leaflets and took place on 13 October 2023. The order instructed all people residing north of Wadi Gaza, approximately 1.1 million Palestinians, to evacuate their homes within 24 hours and head south of Wadi Gaza (see Figure 3). The leaflet included a rudimentary map of the Gaza Strip with an unnamed boundary in the south-west corner, indicating to civilians in the north to move south. On this leaflet, the marked area is rectangular and unspecified, not appearing to conform to any precise landmarks or geographic...
6.1.1.2. Displaced Palestinians were not permitted by the Israeli military to return north, during the November ceasefire or subsequently, and are still barred from returning. Civilians have reportedly been shot at, some fatally, while trying to turn back north and reach their homes.25

6.1.1.3. During this phase of the evacuation orders, between 600,000 and 800,000 Palestinians remained in the areas north of Wadi Gaza despite the evacuation order, many of whom were unable to adhere to the ‘evacuation orders’ because of health and/or accessibility impediments aggravated by attacks by the Israeli military.26

6.1.1.4. Already on 12 October, the UN issued a statement about the forthcoming Israeli evacuation order for all north Gaza, which suggested that it was ‘impossible for such a movement to take place without devastating humanitarian consequences’, and demanded it be ‘rescinded avoiding what could transform what is already a tragedy into a calamitous situation’.27 Similarly, the European Union’s High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, called the order ‘unrealistic’ and said not enough shelter would be available for the more than one million Palestinians being ordered to relocate to the southern part of the Strip.28

6.1.1.5. Importantly, and speaking to the feasibility of the Israeli military ‘evacuation order’ on 13 October, the New York Times also reported that ‘the roads [in Gaza] were damaged by nearly a week of Israeli airstrikes, and difficult to navigate’ (see section ).29

6.1.1.6. As part of the 13 October evacuation order, the Israeli military identified Wadi Gaza as the functional border dividing the new ‘north’ and ‘south’ in Gaza. However, our analysis of satellite images released by Planet on 18 November identified another unofficial demarcation line approximately 3km north of Wadi Gaza, likely delineated by a military bulldozer sometime between 3 and 18 November (see Figure 4). This line stretches from the eastern perimeter of Gaza to the coast, and rather than Wadi Gaza, seems to in fact be functioning as the operative dividing line between ‘north’ and ‘south’ being enforced by the Israeli military. Confusingly, this line was not marked on any Israeli military map or evacuation announcement.

6.1.1.7. By 14 November, where this ‘border’ intersected with Gaza’s main traffic artery, Salah al-Din Street, a makeshift checkpoint was established, apparently to facilitate the Israeli military’s monitoring and control of the mass civilian transfer southwards. The checkpoint was visible in satellite images and in videos recorded at the intersection between this makeshift border and Salah Al-Din Street (see Figure 5).

6.1.1.8. According to testimonies collected by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the checkpoint structure was unstaffed and was being remotely controlled by armed soldiers in its vicinity.30 The checkpoint reportedly includes some kind of surveillance system: ‘IDPs are ordered to show their IDs and undergo what appears to be a facial

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24 The leaflet was also shared via X: https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712825819691716748. One of the two roads identified by the Israeli army in this order as a ‘safe route’ to the southern half of the strip was Salah-al-Din Road, a main transit route in the territory. Less than an hour before this announcement was made, a convoy of vehicles carrying fleeing civilians in Gaza on this road was reportedly hit by a deadly airstrike, as established by the Forensic Architecture Investigative Unit at Al-Haq Rights Center https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/14/gaza-civilians-afraid-to-leave-home-after-bombing-of-safe-routes
recognition scan'. Forcibly transferring the Palestinian population has in this way facilitated the involuntary harvesting of biometric data. The checkpoint was also reported by OCHA to be a site of arbitrary arrests, forceful separation of families, humiliation, and other forms of psychological and physical violence inflicted by the Israeli military.  

6.1.1.9. Videos reportedly captured just south of the checkpoint show how this makeshift border was enforced by gunfire. Palestinians who followed the instructions to go ‘south’ were not allowed to return ‘north’, and video evidence shows Israeli military snipers positioned south of the checkpoint, reportedly shooting at civilians who approached the area (see Figure 6).  

6.1.1.10. There is also evidence of another east-west road being cleared by the military, located north of Wadi Gaza and south of the delineated border (see Figure 7).  

6.1.1.11. The circumstances surrounding the ‘evacuation order’ put the Palestinian civilian population in danger. Areas to which Palestinian civilians were instructed to evacuate were already heavily damaged (see Section 6.1.4.6), with the existing medical infrastructure in the south ill-equipped to serve a large number of displaced people even before October 2023 due to the Israeli-imposed blockade on the movement of goods in the Gaza Strip that was tightened in 2007. As a result, these ‘safe zones’ were particularly vulnerable to a critical lack of access to basic means of survival.

32 https://twitter.com/anadoluagency/status/1728450660310409436
33 There are reports and images showing another makeshift checkpoint at the intersection of the delineated border and Rashid - source here: https://x.com/JakeGodin/status/1760141582823622628?source=twitter
34 https://twitter.com/JakeGodin/status/1759675635604082862/photo/2
Figure 4. Planet satellite imagery from 17 November shows the extent of the unofficial demarcation line extending from the western to eastern boundaries of Gaza, referenced in 7.1.1.6. Left: Wadi Gaza is marked by a blue line. Right: Maxar satellite imagery from 14 November shows that a new checkpoint was installed where this new demarcation line intersects with Salah al-Din Street, one of the two main thoroughfares connecting Gaza’s northern and southern regions and the sole evacuation route at this time (indicated by a solid orange line).

Figure 5. Left: Aerial view of the checkpoint on Salah al-Din Street. Right: The checkpoint as viewed from an Israeli military position (marked with a camera icon on the left image).35

35 The source of this video is https://twitter.com/darthintra/status/1724198163006038226. A second video from a nearby position was posted by the Israeli military on 10 November: https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/172290106601218218. The overhead satellite imagery (left) is provided by Maxar.
Figure 6. A video captured on Salah al-Din Street approximately 450 metres south of the checkpoint, from the vantage of a journalist camera (marked with a camera icon on the mini-map). The checkpoint is approximately 75 metres past the Israeli military tank.36

36 https://twitter.com/anadoluagency/status/1728450660310409436. The satellite imagery in the mini-map is provided by Planet and Maxar.
Figure 7. Traces of another east-west road being cleared by the military, located north of Wadi Gaza and south of the delineated border. Source: Jake Godin.
6.1.1.2.  Phase 2: The ‘Evacuation Grid’ (1 December 2023 - Ongoing)

On 1 December 2023, following a temporary ceasefire, the Israeli military posted a web-based interactive map that divided the Gaza Strip into over 600 numbered blocks (referred to in section 6.1.1.2). The Israeli military presented this map as a humanitarian tool intended to inform Palestinian civilians which areas were being ordered to evacuate and help them identify ‘safe zones’ to relocate to (see Figure 9).

37 https://www.idf.il/152678/
6.1.1.2.2. As noted above (see ‘Background’), the Israeli military initially employed this numbered block system as a decision-making tool for launching airstrikes and ground operations prior to repurposing it as a tool for ‘preventing’ civilian harm. As this study reveals, this numbered block system has served as a tool for facilitating displacement and furthered genocidal conditions on the ground, arguably in keeping with its original military function.

6.1.1.2.3. As early as 00:59 on 8 October 2023, within 24 hours of the start of the ground invasion, the map was employed by the Israeli military in videos posted to Twitter, directing the evacuation of four regions, which comprised blocks 10, 11, 12, 225, 325, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 253, 254, 824, 832, 833, 852, 853, 889, 892, and 2231 (see Figure 10 & Figure 11).

6.1.1.2.4. This phase departed from the previous north/south logic of division to a more sporadic, fragmented and localised one, leading to a labyrinthine set of instructions that sent Palestinians in various directions to unclear and unsafe destinations, often during ongoing airstrikes.

6.1.1.2.5. On 2 December 2023 using this ‘evacuation grid’, the Israeli military began instructing Palestinians in areas south of Wadi Gaza—including Khan Younis and refugee camps in the middle of the Gaza Strip—to evacuate (see Figure 8). Previously designated as ‘safe’, these areas had offered refuge to many thousands of displaced persons from the ‘north’ of Gaza, compelling them to undergo another phase of mass displacement. The ‘evacuation orders’ also extended to the heart of Khan Younis city, encompassing the Nasser Medical Complex, the primary hospital in the southern region. In sum, all the accumulated ‘evacuation orders’ increased the concentration of displaced persons in Rafah, al-Mawasi, and Deir al-Balah (see Figure 12 & Figure 13 & Figure 14).

6.1.1.2.6. In this phase—considering the ordered blocks and maps after 1 December 2023 alone, without counting ‘the entire area north of Wadi Gaza,’ the evacuation orders from 8 December 2023, nor the named regions—the total area to which Palestinians were being instructed to evacuate was 143 square kilometres. This is about 39% of the total area of the Gaza Strip.

6.1.1.2.7. Contrary to its presentation as a ‘humanitarian tool’ for evacuation guidance, our analysis suggests that the unclear, inconsistent, and sometimes contradictory instructions provided through the numbered block system has produced unclarity, confusion, and panic, resulting in many Palestinians failing to evacuate or relocate to the designated areas. Further, it is a known fact that periods of telecommunication and internet blackout imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip have left civilians unable to access the available information at all. In effect, the ‘evacuation grid’ has been implemented so as to serve as a tool of ‘cartographic terror’.

6.1.1.2.8. This ‘cartographic terror’ spread to medical and humanitarian staff in Gaza’s health sector. On 2 December 2023, Melanie Ward, the Chief Executive Officer of the organisation Medical Aid for Palestinians posted on X: ‘I cannot overstate the fear, panic & confusion that these Israeli maps are causing civilians in #Gaza, including my own staff. People cannot run from place to place to try to escape Israel’s bombs, nor does international law expect them to.’

38 We conducted this analysis using the ISW map, which counts a block as evacuated even if it is only partially covered in the map.
41 https://x.com/melanie_ward/status/1731244329706877377?s=20
Figure 9. A screenshot of the ‘evacuation grid’: an ‘interactive’ map with numbered blocks published by the Israeli military on 1 December 2023 to mark areas in Gaza instructed to evacuate.

Figure 10. Screenshots of maps published by the Israeli army on 8 October 2023 instructing multiple areas in Gaza to evacuate using the ‘evacuation grid’ that was released in an ‘interactive’ format on 1 December 2023.
Figure 11. Areas ordered to evacuate on 8 October 2023, 0:59 am local time.
Figure 12. The tent camp in western Rafah on 14 January 2024.

Figure 13: Planet imagery shows camps in Deir al-Balah on 31 January 2024. Tents are dispersed throughout the entirety of the area, but areas with high concentrations are highlighted.
Figure 14. Satellite imagery from Planet on 14 January 2024 showing tents within the Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’, announced on 6 December 2023 (highlighted orange; high-density areas in white). Camps are also visible on the al-Aqsa University campus (outlined green), and they were subsequently cleared by 29 January 2024.
6.1.1.3. **Phase 3: Forceful Evacuation of the ‘Safe Zones’ (22 January 2024 - Ongoing)**

Figure 15. A map showing the cumulative coverage of all evacuation orders (yellow) and safe zones (blue). The distinction between ‘Declared Safe Zones’ and ‘Declared Safe Regions’ is that the latter do not have explicitly defined boundaries; rather, they mark entire municipalities declared safe by Israeli announcements (here, Rafah and Deir al-Balah).
6.1.1.3.1. There are three areas in the Gaza Strip designated by the Israeli military as ‘safe zones’ or as containing ‘known shelters’: Rafah, Deir Al-Balah, and Al-Mawasi (see Figure 15 and section 6.2.1). While the boundaries of the al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’ have been marked on Israeli military maps in various formats and with variable parameters, safe places in Rafah and Deir al-Balah are not explicitly marked in Israeli military announcements; rather, they are referred to by name.

6.1.1.3.2. At the time of writing, the air and ground invasion of the northern part of Al-Mawasi (see Figure 16) led to the evacuation of thousands of displaced persons taking refuge in the area. The campus of Al-Aqsa university was forcefully evacuated during January 2024, although the area did not receive any official ‘evacuation order’. Satellite image analysis from before and after the attack on Al-Aqsa University shows that the tent camp set up by displaced civilians on the university campus had been dismantled by 29 January 2024 (see Figure 17).

6.1.1.3.3. The northern part of Al-Mawasi was first invaded by the Israeli military on 22 January 2024. We geolocated two videos identifying Israeli tanks within this ‘safe zone’ (see Figure 46). The attacks on this area included educational facilities acting as shelters, such as Al-Aqsa University.

6.1.1.3.4. Furthermore, the attacks and continuous presence of Israeli military tanks within the northern part of Al-Mawasi led to further mass displacement towards its southern parts, and in the direction of Rafah (see section 6.2.2).

6.1.1.3.5. Moreover, satellite images show displaced Palestinians stopped at a makeshift Israeli military checkpoint in Al-Mawasi which, if employed by the Israeli military in a similar manner as the checkpoint on Salah al-Din Street (see 6.1.1.1), would mobilize this ‘safe zone’ as a selective border for administrating the movement and concentration of the displaced Palestinian population (see Figure 18).

6.1.1.3.6. The above patterns of concentrating populations in a single area, followed closely by the issuing of an ‘evacuation order’ for said area, speaks to the situation in Rafah unfolding at the time of writing. Israeli military attacks on Rafah and emerging reports about a possible ground invasion in the area have led to further displacements, with many panicked civilians fleeing to Deir al-Balah and the Nuseirat refugee camp in the centre of Gaza strip (Wusta).42

6.1.1.3.7. As Rafah remains severely overcrowded—with civilians being compelled to set up tents on major roads (see Figure 12)—a ground invasion in these overpopulated areas would, according to World Health Organisation representative Rik Peeperkorn, be an ‘unfathomable catastrophe [...] and would even further expand the humanitarian disaster beyond imagination.43

43 Clip of interview on Middle East Eye: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7WXAMUloC0
Figure 16. ISW data shows that Israeli military clearing operations are reported within the Al-Mawasi humanitarian zone by 22 January 2024.
Figure 17. Satellite imagery from 19 October 2023, 14 January 2024, and 29 January 2024 showing Al-Aqsa university dismantled, surrounded by new ramparts, and with signs of structural damage to buildings on the campus.
6.1.2. **Dissemination during telecommunication blackouts**

6.1.2.1. The first internet disruptions throughout the Gaza Strip were reported by NetBlocks on 8 October 2023, the same day as the first announcements of evacuations orders were made by Israeli military spokespersons (see Background). Later, on 10 October, further telecommunication disruption was reported due to destruction of main network elements by the Israeli army along with further declines in internet connectivity in Gaza. Interruption and slowdown were reported due to destruction of main network elements by the Israeli military along with further declines in internet connectivity in Gaza.

6.1.2.2. Our analysis shows that on numerous occasions ‘evacuation orders’ by the Israeli military were posted online during communication blackouts or network disruptions. To date, telecommunications blackouts have occurred on 27, 28, 29, 30 October 2023; 1, 5, 6, 12, 16, 17, 25 November; 4, 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 26, 27 December; 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24 January 2024, and with services now functioning ‘significantly below pre-war levels’.

6.1.2.3. The Israeli military’s intentional disruption of communications in Gaza renders its online ‘evacuation orders’ released in those moments ineffective and inaccessible (see Figure 19).

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44 https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1710955569631072446
45 https://twitter.com/Paltelco/status/1711701294270865465
46 https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1711761635025572099
47 https://twitter.com/netblocks/status/1750274332884914547
6.1.2.4. Additionally, power outages have left many Palestinians in Gaza unable to charge their devices, not only hindering their ability to access online 'evacuation orders', but also rendering ineffective any individual phone calls or text messages sent by the Israeli military as part of a ‘protective measure’ for civilians against impending attacks.

6.1.2.5. Further, in several instances, ‘evacuation orders’ were communicated in English, apparently targeting an international audience, rather than directly addressing the mostly Arabic-speaking Palestinians in Gaza. This may suggest that the Israeli military is using these ‘evacuation orders’ as a PR exercise, rather than for the purpose of civilian harm reduction.

6.1.2.6. Since, as above, ‘evacuation orders’ are not necessarily accessed or received by the civilian population, the claim made by the Israeli military that anyone not adhering to those orders is willingly risking their lives by failing to leave ‘for [their own] safety’ is unreasonable and pernicious, and endangers the lives of any civilians remaining in the areas ordered for evacuation. In this manner, coupled with regular telecommunication blackouts, the ‘evacuation orders’ not only failed to provide protection for the Palestinian civilian population in Gaza, but also caused confusion and panic and placed civilian lives at direct risk from impending military attacks.

Figure 19. A timeline showing telecommunication blackouts (white) alongside ‘evacuation orders’ published online (red) and evacuation flyers (yellow). The horizontal timeline has been divided in half to fit on the page.

48 https://x.com/IDF/status/1713453410534543518?s=20
https://x.com/SkyNews/status/1718250062009008251?s=20
6.1.3. **Unclear and inconsistent instructions**

6.1.3.1. **Multiple and conflicting formats**

6.1.3.1.1. The interactive ‘evacuation grid’ introduced by the Israeli military on 1 December 2023 (see Section 6.1.1.2) was presented as a humanitarian tool intended to help guide Palestinians to ‘safe zones’.

6.1.3.1.2. However, Forensic Architecture’s examination of this tool suggests that even for users in the United Kingdom with access to a stable network connection, this map does not update to reflect new ‘evacuation orders’ nor whether the user should evacuate based on their current location.

6.1.3.1.3. In addition to this supposedly interactive ‘evacuation grid’, the Israeli military also issued a second map on 2 December 2023 that departed from the grid system, instead adopting a neighbourhood-based logic which overlays and cuts through the original numbered block system (see Figure 20).

6.1.3.1.4. On occasion, both the grid-based and neighbourhood-based systems have been combined and deployed simultaneously. The ‘evacuation order’ of 3 December 2023 (see Figure 21) contained a map with a boundary highlighted, in addition to a ‘headline’ descriptive text which listed blocks numbers and neighbourhood names to be evacuated, and. The content of the descriptive text and the content of the map do not match: the text refers to areas which are not in fact highlighted in the map, and the map highlights some areas which are also not referred to in the text.

6.1.3.1.5. Further, as reported in Haaretz on 7 December 2023, the maps have also shifted orientation, with some of them presented with the north on top as per convention, and at other times with the north positioned to the right (see Figure 22 & Figure 23), or cropped.49

6.1.3.1.6. The introduction of a different communication and map system, as well as sporadic switching between the two, and their occasional combination with changing orientations, introduces an additional layer of confusion and distress affecting the welfare of civilians in an active war zone, and renders safe and efficient evacuation of the area almost impossible.

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49 The article goes on to report that even in instances when clarifications to confusing and incorrect instructions were made by the Israeli military, ‘the map itself...remained unchanged, with the north on the right and the west at the top.’
Figure 20. Neighbourhood-based map published on 2 December 2023.

Figure 21. An evacuation order from 3 December, employing three modes of instructions: written names of regions to be evacuated (not highlighted on the map), a list of numbered blocks to be evacuated, and a map highlighting an area to be evacuated.
Figure 22. Example of a map of Gaza provided by the Israeli military, with north at the top of the image.

Figure 23. Example of a rotated map of Gaza provided by the Israeli military, with the north to the right.
6.1.3.2. Inconsistencies and 'errors' in marking and naming areas

6.1.3.2.1. Our study reveals numerous patterns of inconsistencies and 'errors' by the Israeli military in labelling, marking, and naming the evacuation areas. In some of these cases, more than one of these 'errors' occurs simultaneously:

6.1.3.2.1.1. In the neighbourhood-based map announced on 2 December 2023, we have identified at least 3 errors in the alignment between the names and locations of neighbourhoods on the provided map. Consequently, residents in these neighbourhoods face significant uncertainty when their neighbourhood is mentioned, as it is unclear whether civilians residing there should evacuate, or if the map incorrectly refers to a different location by the same name (see Figure 24).

6.1.3.2.1.2. In 14 instances of 'evacuation orders', the shaded areas on the map posted by the Israeli military online, indicating the blocks instructed to evacuate, did not align with the block numbers listed in the order (see Figure 25).

6.1.3.2.1.3. In 9 different Israeli military 'evacuation orders', the shaded areas designating 'evacuation zones' did not correspond with the blocks in the evacuation grid. Instead, the borders of the 'evacuation zones' crossed over them, resulting in some blocks being partially included and partially excluded. This has produced further uncertainty among Palestinian residents in those areas about whether they are being instructed to evacuate. One person responded to a similar map published by the IOF on Facebook on 2 December 2023 asking for clarification regarding the areas designated for evacuation: ‘Is Block 53 in Ma’an instructed to evacuate? Please respond.’ (see Figure 26 & Figure 27) No response to their question was posted online.

6.1.3.2.1.4. In some 'evacuation orders', the named locations on the map are mislabelled. For example, in the order pictured in Figure 27 residents are instructed to go to Daraj and Tuffah—both areas that are located within the areas highlighted for evacuation, while the bottom arrow in the map points to Shujaiyeh instead, which is not labelled (see Figure 27).

6.1.3.2.1.5. Evacuation orders referring to the same area may come from multiple sources and images, along with inconsistencies and contradictions. For example, in the announcement published on Facebook on 2 December 2023, two overlapping but significantly different regions are highlighted in separate images and published side-by-side (see Figure 28).
Figure 24. Above: Israeli military map published on 2 December 2023. Below: an edited version of the same map, created by Forensic Architecture with English translations and incorrect labels annotated in red. Al-Maghazi is actually located in the blue region which is labelled Al-Naser. The locations of Al-Naser and Al-Jala’a are reversed.
Figure 25. In this order from 25 December 2023, the blocks highlighted on the map, such as block 2348, are not listed in the text. Also, the highlighted area does not overlap with the underlying blocks, making it unclear whether the residents of block 2326 are also ordered to evacuate or not.

Figure 26. The area marked for evacuation does not overlap with the underlying ‘evacuation-grid’, making it uncertain whether Palestinians who live in the intersected blocks, such as Block 53, are being instructed to evacuate or not. One person responded to this map on Facebook asking ‘Is Block 53 in Ma’an instructed to evacuate? Please respond’
Figure 27. The borders of the area highlighted for evacuation are not aligned with those of the underlying ‘evacuation grid’. Furthermore, the bottom label on the map instructs Palestinians to go to Tuffah and Daraj neighbourhoods, which are in fact within the shaded area, while the arrow points out to Shujaiyeh.
Figure 28. An evacuation order from 2 December, including two images side-by-side, covering overlapping yet significantly different zones for evacuation in Khan Younis.
6.1.4. ‘Evacuation orders’ as facilitating displacement, fatalities, and genocidal acts

Beyond their ambiguities and inconsistencies, our study of the Israeli military ‘evacuation orders’ reveals their function as a tool for displacement, whereby civilians are knowingly relocated to areas characterised by unliveable conditions.

6.1.4.1. ‘Evacuation orders’ to areas that received previous ‘evacuation orders’

6.1.4.1.1. In some instances, Palestinians in Gaza were directed to evacuate to areas that had received ‘evacuation orders’ less than 24 hours prior.

6.1.4.1.2. For instance, on 2 December 2023, multiple regions were ordered to evacuate and relocate, including Al-Fukhari (see Figure 29). Subsequently, on 3 December, zones in central Khan Younis were instructed by the Israeli military to evacuate and relocate to Al-Shaboura, Tel Al-Sultan, and Al-Fukhari (see Figure 30)—the latter of which had already been ordered to evacuate (see Figure 31).
Figure 29. An evacuation order posted on 2 December instructing evacuees to go to ‘Rafah’.

Figure 30. An evacuation order posted on 3 December, instructing evacuees to go to ‘Al-Shaboura’, ‘Tel Al-Sultan’, and ‘Al-Fukhari’.
Figure 31. A map showing an evacuation order posted on 3 December 2023 (dark yellow, red arrows), compared to an evacuation order posted the previous day on 2 December 2023 (light yellow). One of the arrows explicitly instructs moving to Al-Fukhari (labelled red), which had already been instructed to evacuate on 2 December 2023.
6.1.4.2. **Invasion of areas followed by ‘evacuation orders’**

6.1.4.2.1. Forensic Architecture’s analysis of the ground invasion of Al-Mawasèi\(^{50}\) demonstrates that the invasion of Al-Mawasèi and the central part of Khan Younis city had already commenced on 22 January 2024, even though neither of these areas had received any ‘evacuation orders’ by that time.

6.1.4.2.2. While Al-Mawasèi is still designated as a ‘safe zone’, an ‘evacuation order’ for the centre of Khan Younis was issued on 23 January 2024, following the army invasion (see Figure 32). This order came after the reported attack on Khalidiya school in Khan Younis that acted as a shelter point for displaced civilians and the siege imposed on Nasser and Al-Amal hospitals (see Figure 33).

6.1.4.2.3. Forensic Architecture geolocated a video circulated on the morning of 22 January 2024, showing the movement of Israeli military tanks within the designated ‘humanitarian zone’ of Al-Mawasèi and passing through Khan Younis, which, up to that point, had not yet received an ‘evacuation order’ (see section 6.2.2). Furthermore, ISW data reveals that the Israeli army’s ground invasion before 22 January had also encroached both beyond the designated evacuation area in Khan Younis that was announced later, and into the Al-Mawasèi ‘safe zone’.

6.1.4.2.4. Analysis of publicly available visual evidence demonstrates that airstrikes (evidenced by the United Nations Satellite Centre, UNOSAT) and ground invasion (evidenced by ISW) both occurred in areas that did not receive prior ‘evacuation orders’.

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\(^{50}\) See our study of the Israeli military invasion of Al-Mawasèi here: [https://twitter.com/ForensicArchi/status/175087658166741003](https://twitter.com/ForensicArchi/status/175087658166741003)
Figure 33. A map created by Forensic Architecture of evacuation orders by the Israeli military up until 22 January (yellow), the Mawasi safe zone announced by the Israeli military on 13 December (blue), and ISW data showing the Israeli ground invasion until 22 January (red). The ground invasion encroached both beyond the announced evacuation area and into the Al-Mawasi humanitarian zone.
6.1.4.3. **Unspecified durations for ‘evacuation orders’**

6.1.4.3.1. Our study revealed numerous cases where the timeline of the ‘evacuation orders’ was unclear, with certain areas receiving the same directive multiple times but for different periods. As a result, it was not clear to individuals residing or sheltering in these areas whether the expiration of the time periods in given orders for specific areas implied that it was safe for residents to return.

6.1.4.3.2. For example, al-Nusairat camp area received ‘evacuation orders’ during the period of 22 December 2023 to 8 January 2024, triggering a significant displacement towards the designated ‘safe zones’ in Deir Al-Balah and Rafah. As a result of subsequent attacks in these ‘safe zones’, and the absence of additional ‘evacuation orders’ for al-Nusairat, displaced families began to return in February 2024.

6.1.4.3.3. This was followed by Israeli military airstrikes in the area, resulting in civilian casualties among those who had returned. Forensic Architecture verified the killing of two Palestinian women on 10 February 2024, a few days after they had returned to al-Nusairat from Rafah, and received witness testimony and footage confirming the same.

6.1.4.3.4. Further, a first-hand account in a Los Angeles Times opinion piece by an American physician, Dr. Irfan Galaria, who entered Gaza on 29 January 2024 to work for 10 days at the European Gaza Hospital in Khan Younis, reported that civilians, including children, were shot to death after returning to their homes after the apparent withdrawal of the Israeli military from their neighbourhoods:

6.1.4.3.4.1. ‘I stopped keeping track of how many new orphans I had operated on. After surgery they would be filed somewhere in the hospital, I’m unsure of who will take care of them or how they will survive. On one occasion, a handful of children, all about ages 5 to 8, were carried to the emergency room by their parents. All had single sniper shots to the head. These families were returning to their homes in Khan Younis, about 2.5 miles away from the hospital, after Israeli tanks had withdrawn. But the snipers apparently stayed behind. None of these children survived.’

6.1.4.4. Creating patterns of multiple displacements

6.1.4.4.1. As reported by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), as of 17 February 2024, up to 1.7 million people have been displaced across the Gaza Strip, many of them multiple times.52 On 19 February, a UNRWA report linked Israeli military attacks, ‘evacuation orders’, and mass civilian displacement more directly by stating that ‘ongoing hostilities, ‘evacuation orders’ issued by Israeli forces, and the constant need for safer locations have resulted in people being displaced multiple times’.53 Relatedly, on 20 February, OCHA reported that ‘since 7 October 2023, about 67 percent of the Gaza Strip have been placed under evacuation orders’—thereby maintaining the present conditions of mass displacement, as civilians are unable to return to their homes.54

6.1.4.4.2. In our analysis, we observed that ‘evacuation orders’ facilitate multiple displacements. During the different phases of the ‘evacuation orders’ (see section 6.1.1), Palestinians in Gaza were instructed to evacuate to areas that later received another ‘evacuation order’.

6.1.4.4.3. Already in Phase 1, outlined above, Palestinian residents in the ‘northern’ areas of Gaza were instructed to go to the areas south of Wadi Gaza, including the refugee camps in the middle of Gaza Strip (Wusta) and Khan Younis. Those same areas later received ‘evacuation orders’ from the Israeli military.

6.1.4.4.4. During Phase 2 of the evacuation orders, on 8 December 2023, residents of Jabaliya, Shujaiyeh, Zaytoun, and the Old City of Gaza were instructed to evacuate towards the southwestern part of Gaza City (see Figure 34). Later, on 29 January 2024, the very same areas received an ‘evacuation order’ instructing already displaced civilians to relocate further towards Deir Al-Balah (see Figure 35).

53 Ibid.
54 https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-122
Figure 34. An ‘evacuation order’ published on 8 December 2023 instructing the residents of Jabaliya, Shujaiyeh, Zaytoun, and the Old City of Gaza to evacuate towards the south-western part of Gaza City.

Figure 35. An ‘evacuation order’ published on 29 January 2024 instructing the residents of the south-western part of Gaza City to evacuate further south.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{55} https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1751870951396888377?s=20
6.1.4.5. ‘Evacuation orders’ to areas later facing Israeli military attack

6.1.4.5.1. On the morning of 20 February 2024 at 09:29 am local time, the Israeli military published an ‘evacuation order’ to the neighbourhoods of al-Zaitoun and al-Turkman (see Figure 36). The order instructed Palestinians in these neighbourhoods to evacuate to the ‘humanitarian area’ in al-Mawasi through Salah Al-Din Street.

6.1.4.5.2. Approximately 11 hours later, online reports emerged about attacks in Al-Mawasi overnight and further advancement of the Israeli ground operation in the area. As reported by Al-Jazeera on 21 February, despite being designated as a ‘safe zone’ by the military, the area came under heavy bombardment, with bulldozers on the ground and aerial strikes using attack drones causing civilian fatalities and injuries. Doctors Without Borders (MSF) has reported that during the attack on 20 February 2024, an Israeli tank fired on a house sheltering MSF members and killed two members of their families.

6.1.4.5.3. The Israeli military repeated the same order on 21 February, instructing the residents of al-Zaitoun and al-Turkman to go to al-Mawasi, although the ‘safe zone’ there had been attacked, and the Israeli tanks were still in the area.

Figure 36. An ‘evacuation order’ published on 20 February 2024 instructing residents of Al-Zaitoun and Al-Turkman in Gaza City to evacuate towards the ‘humanitarian area’ in Al-Mawasi through Salah Al-Din Street.

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56 https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1759825957697774049?s=20
57 https://twitter.com/diaamahmoud/status/1760023761225691520?s=46&t=JH7WTzO0dcUtxAqglAAxw;
https://twitter.com/yirawi/status/1760027145169184247?s=46&t=JH7WTzO0dcUtxAqglAAxw
58 https://twitter.com/SaulStaniforth/status/1760204852624322648
6.1.4.6. ‘Evacuation’ orders to destroyed areas

6.1.4.6.1. Within the first week of the Israeli military incursion into Gaza, ‘evacuation orders’ directed Palestinian civilians to areas that were either destroyed, severely damaged or moderately damaged. This meant that the areas declared ‘safe’ for evacuation by the Israeli military lacked access to basic provisions for survival, as required by international humanitarian law.

6.1.4.6.2. Already on 13 October 2023, when leaflets were first dropped instructing a population of approximately 1.1 million Palestinians to evacuate their homes within 24 hours and head south of Wadi Gaza, the same southern areas were being targeted with Israeli military airstrikes and bombardment. The lack of means for survival in the ‘safe’ areas to which people were directed at the start of the current war by the Israeli military is also reflected in the distribution of casualties across Gaza. As reported by OCHA, by 28 October 2023, around 37% of the total recorded 7,703 civilian fatalities were in Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah—all areas south of Wadi Gaza (see section 6.1.1.1).

6.1.4.6.3. Until the temporary ceasefire on 24 November 2023, as people were being instructed by the Israeli military to travel south, and while those who had been displaced in the south were being prevented by the army from returning north to reach their homes during the ceasefire, the same ‘southern’ areas to which civilians were already displaced, and were repeatedly instructed to relocate to, continued to be targeted (see Figure 38 & Figure 39).

6.1.4.6.4. With the introduction of the mentioned ‘evacuation grid’ in Phase 2 of the Israeli military orders (see section 6.1.1.2), a more fragmented and granular division of space was implemented, sending civilians in various directions across ‘southern’ Gaza to unclear and unsafe destinations, often during ongoing airstrikes, thereby producing increased concentrations of displaced persons in ‘safe zones’ that were also attacked (see Figure 40).

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60 https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-reported-impact-day-22
Our analysis shows that in this period, by 7 January 2024, many of the areas to which people were being instructed to relocate using the Israeli military’s ‘evacuation grid’ were destroyed or severely damaged. For instance, on 8 December, when an Israeli military ‘evacuation order’ (see Figure 34 above) instructed residents of Jabaliya, Shujaiyeh, Zaytoun, and the Old City of Gaza to evacuate towards the western part of Gaza City, this area was largely destroyed or damaged (see Figure 37). On 29 January 2024, the very same areas received an ‘evacuation order’ instructing already displaced civilians to go towards Deir al-Balah (see Figure 35). That area was already
damaged and would have required civilians to travel through destroyed or severely damaged areas to arrive at designated ‘safe zones’.

6.1.4.6.7. Moreover, and as alluded to above, the roads and routes declared by the Israeli military as ‘safe’ for civilians to travel en masse to the designated ‘safe zones’ were also heavily damaged and difficult to navigate—further contributing to the severe difficulties and sometimes impossibility of the demands made in Israeli ‘evacuation orders’.

6.1.4.6.8. During Phase 2 of the ‘evacuation orders’, Palestinians were instructed to seek shelter in the ‘safe zones’ in Rafah, Deir al-Balah, and Al-Mawasi (see Section 6.2). Nonetheless, these ‘safe zones’ were also attacked and damaged (see section 6.2.2).

6.1.4.6.9. Several testimonies obtained by Forensic Architecture confirm the patterns presented in this chapter. Dr. Ahmad Ebeid, an anaesthesiologist who worked at the Gaza European Hospital from 29 January until 7 February 2024, stated:

6.1.4.6.9.1. ‘My work is in the operating room. We received people with targeted gunshots either by drones or snipers. We saw a family that had their home targeted with a missile, they went, and they were hit by gunfire by drones. We had recurrent cases where patients were displaced multiple times. They told us that each place to which they were displaced, was hit. The army issues ‘evacuation orders’ but does not care if people have the means to leave or not. This is part of what resulted in the waves of patients we received: I came across numerous stories of people who were injured while evacuating. Even the people who work in the hospitals were themselves displaced doctors; I would say 70% were displaced medical workers. Throughout our stay, our movement was extremely coordinated, where a system of ‘green’ and ‘red’ lights from the Israeli authorities via the WHO determined each of our steps: from Rafah to the European Hospital, to the clinic, to the guest house. I witnessed first-hand that even in a massive war zone such as this it is possible to save civilian lives if there is a will to do so. What struck me when I started talking to people was the systematic dehumanisation of the Palestinians. These are not individual actions but a systematic destruction. It was clear from the doctors and patients I spoke to. I did not witness a military operation. It is a complete destruction. A mass destruction.’

6.1.4.6.10. Description of the ‘unliveable’ conditions in the Israeli military’s declared ‘safe zones’ for Palestinians in Gaza are further supported with testimony provided to Forensic Architecture by primary care and public health and preventive medicine resident physician, Dr. Yipeng Ge:

6.1.4.6.10.1. ‘I worked as a medical volunteer providing primary care services to patients at two primary care centres in Rafah between 12-19 February 2024: Dar Al-Fazeela (medical point at a school that has now been used to shelter many internally displaced people) and Tel Al-Sultan. Many people who came to the Dar Al-Fazeela clinic live in make-shift tents surrounding the school, and many of these tents are made by materials insufficient to ward off the elements—as I came to realise some of my patients had very damp clothing because of the rain that we saw some of the days in Gaza. During my stay, I saw numerous cases of malnourishment, acute infections, and injuries and burns from airstrikes. The reason for these conditions presenting both in such high patient loads and severity, is the overlapping crises of food, clean water, and housing insecurity—none of which were available in the zones declared ‘safe’ by the Israeli army that we visited. There are no ‘safe’ places left in Gaza—this has been true for many weeks now. One of the acutely malnourished children I saw was the sickest child that I have ever seen in my entire medical career and training. They were 9-10 years old, being carried in by his mother, unable to walk. We were instructed by the WHO to take upper arm circumference measurements to screen for severe malnutrition, but we did not even have
this tape measurement in the clinic. And yet I did not need this tape for this child. I could wrap my entire index finger and thumb around the upper arm and lower leg of this child. There were paediatric patients that could walk before, and now cannot walk due to severe malnutrition and suspected Rickets disease. There were young paediatric patients that should have been walking due to their developmental milestones but were not walking due to severe malnutrition. These children are being forcibly starved. There is no reliable access to nutritious food, clean water, and decent shelter and housing. Without these conditions I have no other conclusion than this being a genocide of the people in Gaza. On top of these crises, there continue to be daily bombings, airstrikes, and shelling that occur around the clinics and hospitals even in the ‘safe’ or ‘green’ zones that we worked at and visited—which continue to kill and result in many more injuries every day we were in Gaza. What I saw was unimaginable beyond belief and beyond words: suffering and disease that is entirely preventable with proper nutrition and food, clean water, and decent shelter. These necessary conditions for life, especially for young children, appear to be withheld intentionally by Israel to make the conditions in Gaza entirely unimaginably unliveable and unsurvivable for everyone.’

6.1.4.6.11. These descriptions of the ‘unliveable’ conditions of the Israeli-designated ‘safe zones’, and the ways in which they are reinforced by Israeli military ‘evacuation orders’, are also supported by testimony from a primary care physician, Dr. Fozia Alvi:

6.1.4.6.11.1. ‘I worked as a medical volunteer providing primary care services to patients at two care centres in Rafah between 12-19 February 2024: Dar Ul Fazeela (a medical point set up at a school that has now been used to shelter thousands of internally displaced people) and Tel Al-Sultan. Many people who came to the Dar Ul Fazeela clinic live in the school classrooms and make-shift tents surrounding the school. These tents were made of bed sheets and blankets and were not enough to protect young children from rain and cold. In one classroom, almost 50 people were staying in close proximity, resulting in the rise of communicable diseases. Almost everyone I met was looking at a shadow of themselves, when they showed me pictures of themselves on their phones before the war—we could barely recognize if they were the same persons in the photo from the level of malnourishment. We saw malnourishment in almost every person: doctors, staff, children, elderly, and pregnant women. I personally saw numerous pregnant women looked pale and weak. These are not liveable conditions: there was no food, no electricity, no clean water, no medications, no safe place to stay in these humanitarian zones. The ‘evacuation orders’ from the Israeli army are also contributing to this humanitarian disaster. It pains me to think about a young 25-year-old female, Yasmeen: she was a newlywed forcibly evacuated from her home. She moved to a so-called safe area in her sister’s home when that building was hit by an airstrike and shrapnel injured her spinal cord. Yasmeen was paraplegic as a result. She followed the evacuation order announced by the army. Now her life will never be the same.’
Figure 38. A map showing the cumulative coverage of evacuation orders until 15 October 2023 (yellow), compared to destroyed and damaged buildings according to UNOSAT (black). The total area ordered to evacuate by this date was 149km² (41% of the total area of the Gaza Strip).
Figure 39. A map showing the cumulative coverage of evacuation orders until 26 November 2023 (yellow), compared to destroyed and damaged buildings according to UNOSAT (black). The total area ordered to evacuate by this date was still 149km² (41% of the total area of the Gaza Strip).
Figure 40. A map showing the cumulative coverage of evacuation orders until 7 January 2024 (yellow), compared to destroyed and damaged buildings according to UNOSAT (black). The total area ordered to evacuate by this date was 146 km² (67% of the total area of the Gaza Strip).
6.2. ‘SAFE ZONES’ AND ‘SAFE CORRIDORS’

6.2.1. Boundaries of ‘safe zones’: Elastic, unclear and inconsistent

6.2.1.1. The boundaries of various ‘safe zones’ have not been clearly defined nor effectively communicated, neither to Palestinian civilians seeking safety in Gaza nor to the general public, including human rights investigators monitoring attacks on these ‘safe zones’ (see Figure 41).

6.2.1.2. An illustrative instance of the ambiguous and elastic boundaries designating the ‘safe zones’ is evident in the case of the Al-Mawasi area west of Khan Younis.

6.2.1.3. Within the 13 October ‘evacuation order’, referenced in Figure 42, an unnamed boundary is marked in the south-west corner of the Gaza Strip, indicating to civilians in the north to move south. On this leaflet, the marked area is large and unspecified, appearing to include the Al-Mawasi zone.

Figure 41. A map showing all of the ‘safe zones’ and areas specified in Israeli military evacuation announcements. Whereas the Al-Mawasi humanitarian zone (orange) and a specific region in Deir al-Balah (yellow) have boundaries that are marked on Israeli military maps, other regions specified for shelter are only referred to by name and do not have clearly defined boundaries: al-Sultan, al-Zohour, al-Shaborsa in Rafah, as well as Deir al-Balah in all orders except for the one that marked specific blocks on 8 January 2024.
Figure 42. An unnamed boundary is marked in the south-west corner of the Gaza Strip, indicating to civilians in the north to move south. On this leaflet, the marked area is large and unspecified, appearing to include the al-Mawasi zone.

6.2.1.4. Since then, the Israeli military has released at least four distinct versions of the boundaries of the Al-Mawasi ‘safe zone’, on 18 and 22 October, and 2 and 6 December 2023. Overlaying these different boundaries on a single map demonstrates the inconsistent and changing boundaries of the ‘safe zone’ in Al-Mawasi (see Figure 41).

6.2.1.5. The size and borders of this zone fluctuate significantly depending on the purpose of the map. When Palestinians are instructed to evacuate to Al-Mawasi, the ‘safe zone’ boundary encompasses only about half of the area depicted in maps used to assert that Palestinian fighters have fired rockets from within the same ‘safe zone’. In other words, the designated ‘safe’ area is significantly smaller in Israeli military orders when it serves the purpose of protecting civilians, and conversely, significantly larger in publications wherein the Israeli military makes claims regarding the alleged use of these ‘safe zones’ as part of Palestinian armed resistance (see Figure 43).
6.2.1.6. To date, Forensic Architecture has been unable to locate any official boundary lines released by the Israeli military for the ‘safe zone’ in Al-Mawasi. In our analysis, we rely on the boundary lines published by the ISW, which aligns with the boundary lines issued by the Israeli military on 6 December, asserting that Palestinian fighters launched rockets from the ‘safe zone’.  

6.2.1.7. Moreover, multiple ‘evacuation orders’ instructed civilians to relocate to Rafah without providing explicit boundaries for ‘safe areas’ within the city. Some orders explicitly refer to neighbourhoods in Rafah – “Al-Shaboura”, “Al-Sultan”, and “Al-Zohour” – as ‘known shelters’, as if their status and bounds as ‘shelters’ are already known, waiving the need for clarification. (see Figure 41).

6.2.1.8. Multiple ‘evacuation orders’ also instructed civilians to relocate to Deir al-Balah. None of these orders provide explicit boundaries for the specific ‘safe areas’ in the city—except for one which we identified that uses the numbered block system of the aforementioned ‘evacuation grid’ to mark certain blocks within Deir al-Balah as ‘safe’ (see Figure 44).

6.2.1.9. Numerous orders released by the Israeli military, including on 2 December 2023, instruct civilians to evacuate to unspecified ‘known shelters’, and ‘schools’ in various regions. However, the locations of these ‘safe zones’, whether shelter points or schools, are not clearly specified and assumes that all civilians are aware of the locations implied in the orders (see Figure 45). According to data published by the UN, 318 schools were used as shelters, and 287, or 90%, of those schools acting as shelters were damaged (see section 6.2.3.2).

61 On maps intended for Palestinian in Gaza, the delineated boundary of Al-Mawasi is accompanied by text at the bottom stating "رسم توضيحي" which translates to “illustrative drawing” or “explanatory diagram” in English. See source.
Figure 44. An ‘evacuation order’ dropped as a leaflet uses the ‘evacuation grid’ to mark numbered blocks in Deir Al-Balah as ‘safe’.

Figure 45. Evacuation orders posted on 2 December 2023. The post instructs Palestinians in the highlighted areas to go to ‘known shelters and schools’ in Daraj, Tuffah, and west Gaza City.
6.2.2. Direct attacks on designated ‘safe zones’ and ‘safe corridors’

6.2.2.1. Within the first week of the ground invasion, ‘evacuation orders’ directed Palestinian civilians to areas that were either destroyed or damaged to various degrees (see section ).

6.2.2.2. Since 14 October 2023, reports were made of attacks against ‘safe routes’62 (see Figure 51).

6.2.2.3. In our analysis we confirmed numerous instances of Israeli military attacks on ‘safe zones’ in Al-Mawasi, Deir Al-Balah and Rafah—at least since Phase 2 of the ‘evacuation orders’, from 1 December 2023 to the present.

6.2.2.4. Forensic Architecture has verified a case in which a Palestinian civilian holding a white flag was shot at, close to al-Aqsa university inside the al-Mawasi ‘safe zone’ on 23 January 2024 (see Figure 46).63 This case was further analysed by the investigative agency Earshot, who verified the location of the Israeli tanks from which this civilian was targeted.

6.2.2.5. Moreover, a comparison of satellite imagery of the al-Mawasi ‘humanitarian zone’ from 19 October 2023 and from 29 January 2024 reveals numerous craters from airstrikes in this ‘safe area’; these airstrikes therefore were conducted during a period in which the Israeli military had made multiple announcements about Al-Mawasi being a ‘humanitarian zone’ and a safe refuge for Palestinians (see Figure 47).

6.2.2.6. We continued to identify new craters within this declared ‘safe zone’ until at least 4 February 2024 (see Figure 48).

6.2.2.7. Furthermore, destruction analysis published by UNOSAT indicates that the ‘safe zones’ in Rafah and Deir al-Balah were also attacked and damaged (see Figure 49 & Figure 50).

63 Link to FA tweet https://twitter.com/ForensicArchi/status/1750876558166741003 Original ITV News report: https://twitter.com/itvnews/status/17499251983548442
Figure 46. The location of Israeli tanks on 22 January 2024, and the location of a civilian shot at while holding a white flag on 23 January 2024, with respect to Al-Aqsa University within the Al-Mawasi Humanitarian Zone.
Figure 47. Craters in the Al-Mawasi 'humanitarian zone'. Damage identified by UNOSAT is visible in Planet satellite imagery on 19 October 2023. By 29 January 2024, after multiple announcements about the Al-Mawasi 'humanitarian zone', new craters are visible within it.
Figure 48. Planet satellite imagery shows new craters in the southern region of the Al-Mawasi humanitarian zone between 30 November 2023 and 4 February 2024.
Figure 49. Damage to structures (black) in the Deir al-Balah municipality (blue) as of 7 January 2024 based on data published by UNOSAT. The darker blue region indicates numbered blocks that the Israeli military explicitly announced safe in a flyer from 8 January 2024 (see Figure 44).
Figure 50. Damage to structures (black) in the Rafah municipality (light blue) as of 7 January 2024 based on data published by UNOSAT.
6.2.2.8. Forensic Architecture spoke to multiple doctors and medical staff who witnessed waves of civilian injuries and casualties resulting from direct attacks by the Israeli military on designated ‘safe zones’ and ‘safe routes’.

6.2.2.9. A testimony provided to Forensic Architecture by a medical doctor reads:

6.2.2.9.1. ‘I am a surgeon who worked in Shuhada Al-Aqsa hospital in Deir el-Balah between 26 December 2023 and 7 January 2024. In this period the area of the hospital was a “green” or “safe zone”. Despite this “safe zone”, I treated dozens of patients injured from attacks in the area. On 5 January, the head nurse in the operating rooms went to deliver food to his family at about 1:00pm. He reported seeing two people shot by snipers on Salah El Din Street, approximately 500m from the hospital. The two injured patients could not be reached by us as the snipers were stopping people approaching to help.’

6.2.2.10. Another testimony provided by a surgeon who worked in Khan Younis reads:

6.2.2.10.1. ‘I am an orthopaedic surgeon resident who worked at the Gaza European Hospital in Khan Younis. I was there also before 7 October 2023. When the war started, I witnessed the consistent targeting of civilians, mainly elderly, women and children, and the destruction of the health care services in the south. I worked most of the time in the ER and witnessed waves and waves of civilian patients who were injured in the vicinity of the hospital which was in the ‘green’ or safe zone. I received limbs not knowing to whom they belong: a foot, a leg and a hand. Already by the end of October, as Al-Nasser Hospital filled up, patients came to the European hospital. In these first few weeks of war patients were left on the floor. I had to make the choice of who lives and who dies. After that we had waves of patients without capacities to deal with them. Limited supplies, space and not enough medical staff. In this period injured people, patients torn apart, sometimes no injuries but instead with 100% body surface area burned, or loss of all limbs— these patients came to us from nearby areas of al-Fukhari, Miraj, Rafah, Bani Suhaila, Abbassan and Khan Younis to our hospital. In this period people in the north were still being told to travel to the south of Gaza. In November, the European hospital was directly targeted. The army bombed an empty area next to the pediatric ward of the hospital in early November. No one was injured. Later they targeted an area in front of the hospital near the ICU, the impact of the blast was so intense that windows shattered and things fell on patients inside the hospital. When a family house near the building where we slept as medical residents was targeted, I decided to leave fearing for my life. I am a resident, at the start of my medical career. I never expected to see this in my lifetime.’

6.2.2.11. Further, in a statement to NBC News broadcast on 24 January 2024, Dr. Muhammad Harara said:

6.2.2.11.1. ‘The Nasser Medical Complex [in Khan Younis] where [I work] received orders from the Israeli military to evacuate—along with nearby residential areas and a school where people had taken refuge. But despite leaving many people returned to the hospital having come under fire.’

6.2.2.12. Testimony provided to Forensic Architecture by Dr. Thaer Ahmad also confirms the targeting of medical centres in declared ‘safe zones’ and the targeting of sites where humanitarian aid is being provided (or is supposed to be accessible):

6.2.2.12.1. ‘I am an emergency room doctor. I was part of a group of volunteers who joined the WHO delegation in Gaza and worked at Al-Nasser hospital from 8-24th January 2024. Over the course of my time at Al-Nasser hospital, there were victims of innumerable airstrikes, tank

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64 NBC News YouTube channel (27 Jan 2024): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6DsJzyPt8d4
shelling, drone strikes, and gunshots. The overwhelming majority of these patients would arrive as mass casualty events to the emergency department at Al-Nasser, and they were usually multiple members of the same family unit. The wounded and killed were mostly of shrapnel injuries, blunt trauma, or large calibre bullets. During the course of my visit, our hospital was in what the Israeli army called a safe zone. And yet, when I was there I remember an incident that occurred in early-mid January, where an aid truck was struck by a missile as it passed the civil defence building. This was less than 100 metres from the entrance to the hospital complex where I worked, and the blast injured and killed scores of people. We saw at least 6 patients arrive in the emergency department who died as a direct result of this airstrike. Dozens of others suffered injuries. Another incident also occurred very close to the hospital complex on 11 January, where a residential home was struck with a missile at around 1:25 pm. After first responders and bystanders began rushing to the area of the attack to help rescue any survivors, a second airstrike hit the same area at around 1:30pm causing dozens of casualties and injured.'

6.2.2.13. Another testimony provided to us by an emergency room nurse who worked in Rafah in February 2024 similarly recounts the targeting of civilians travelling through Israeli military ‘safe routes’, pointing also to the ways in which ‘safe routes’ are mobilised by the Israeli military as sites of interrogation, detention, humiliation, and torture:

6.2.2.13.1. ‘I was repeatedly told stories from medical colleagues and patients of people being targeted on roads and in areas declared to be safe by the Israeli army. One patient I treated in the emergency room was himself a medical worker, a nurse, who fled the north of Gaza on Salah El-Din Street, which was declared a safe route, and was detained by the army while evacuating on this very road. This patient suffered major injuries while in detention, including a broken right foot and multiple bed sores and open wounds—likely from being placed in a single position for too long and on pressure points—as well as bruising on his torso. He told us that the Israeli army held him for 3 weeks and from seeing the severity of his fracture and the different discoloration of bruises, I can confirm that this timeline makes sense. I would also say, based on his wounds, that he was tortured: this patient, a nurse, was detained while traveling on a declared safe road, held for 3 weeks by the army, and arrived suffering from wounds sustained during his detention that I believe resulted from sustained torture’.
6.2.2.14. Professor Nick Maynard, a surgeon who worked in Al-Mawasi humanitarian zone also testified to Israeli airstrikes on this ‘safe zone’ during his stay:

6.2.2.14.1. ‘I am a Consultant Upper Gastrointestinal Surgeon and was the clinical lead for the first emergency medical team that went into Gaza with Medical Aid for Palestinians on 26 December 2023. We spent 2 weeks working in Al-Aqsa Hospital in Deir al Balah and exited Gaza on January 8th, 2024. During our stay at Al-Aqsa Hospital, we witnessed multiple casualties being admitted to the emergency department having been victims of bombings on the 3 camps in Deir al Balah which were supporting displaced Gazans from the North of Gaza: Nuseirat, Maghazi and Bureij camps. We spoke to many victims of the bombings who described being told to evacuate from Northern Gaza to middle Gaza and were seeking refuge in the camps and then were being ordered to evacuate further from middle Gaza to the south. It was during that forced evacuation that these civilians were bombed and injured. During our stay in Gaza, we were living in a building in Al-Mawasi, west of Khan Younis. This building was chosen for our accommodation as it was isolated, with no other surrounding buildings for a few hundred metres. At 6:00 am on 17 January 2024, there was an aerial bomb attack from an Israeli F-16 jet on that building in Al-Mawasi. Four UK doctors who were members of the second MAP UK EMT, together with one member of the International Rescue Committee, and two local MAP Gazan staff with their two children were all asleep in the house at the time. Luckily the inhabitants of the house suffered relatively minor shrapnel injuries and remarkably no-one was killed or sustained serious injuries. This house was unequivocally in the green zone and indeed the Israelis had been informed that MAP UK staff would be living there.’
Figure 51. On the same day of the evacuation order instructing the civilian population north Wadi Gaza to evacuate, the Israeli-sanctioned ‘safe route’ along Salah Al-Din Street was bombed by the Israeli military. A civilian convoy was hit, and seventy civilians were reportedly killed.
6.2.3. Attacking hospitals and schools as shelters: Double impact of denying medical aid and producing forced displacement

6.2.3.1. Attacks on Hospitals as Shelters

6.2.3.1.1. In addition to serving as medical infrastructure, hospitals in Gaza have also offered refuge to displaced persons during the ground invasion. The destruction of this infrastructure has created life-threatening conditions that effectively forced population transfer, leading to the displacement of thousands of individuals seeking shelter. Al-Shifa Hospital, Gaza’s largest, was reported to have sheltered at least 50,000 displaced persons before it was invaded and depopulated on 15 November 2023. Similarly, the invasion of Al-Quds Hospital between 13-14 November 2023 caused the additional displacement of 12,000 people who had been taking shelter there.

6.2.3.1.2. The destruction of medical infrastructure in Gaza unfolded in tandem with the expansion and spatial distribution of the ‘evacuation orders’ and the Israeli ground invasion, progressing from north to south and repeating the same pattern of attacks on hospitals that Forensic Architecture has previously documented (see Figure 56).

6.2.3.1.3. In Phase 1 of the ‘evacuation orders’, which covered the territory north Wadi Gaza and where Al-Shifa hospital is located, we mapped the locations of 20 hospitals in this region:

- Beit Hanoun Hospital
- The Indonesian Hospital
- Al-Naser Hospital
- Al-Rantisi Hospital
- Ophthalmic Hospital
- Mental Health Hospital
- Al-Shifa Medical Compound
- Al-Durrah Hospital
- Al-Amal Hospital
- Khidma Aamma
- Al-Quds Hospital
- St John Hospital
- Al-Sahaba Medical Complex
- Asdiqaa Al-Marid
- Al-Awda Hospital
- Al-Karama Hospital
- Kamal Adwan
- Hamad Hospital
- The Turkish Hospital
- Al-Wafa Hospital

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65 https://shifa.forensic-architecture.org/
66 https://gaza-hospitals.forensic-architecture.org
6.2.3.1.4. By the time the temporary ceasefire started and the end of Phase 1 of the ‘evacuation orders’ came to an end, 16 of these hospitals were reported to have been forced out of service in the region north of Wadi Gaza (see Figure 52).

6.2.3.1.5. As the ground invasion continued after the temporary ceasefire, 3 more hospitals were reportedly forced out of service in December 2023, leaving just Al-Sahaba Medical Complex, which only has maternal and dental departments, in the region north of Wadi Gaza. This hospital was also reportedly attacked on 16 December 2023 (see Figure 53).

6.2.3.1.6. Dr. Ghassan Abu Sitta has described to Forensic Architecture events leading up to the 17 October 2023 blast in the Al-Ahli Baptist Hospital in eastern Gaza City:

6.2.3.1.6.1. ‘I was there when the Israeli army ordered the evacuation of Al-Ahli Baptist Hospital. What had happened was that the Israelis called Dr Maher Aayad, the Medical Director of Al-Ahli, and gave him the evacuation order. When he didn’t evacuate the hospital the following day the army fired two missiles at the outer fence of the hospital. And then the same officer called him again and said, “we told you to evacuate, you failed to evacuate, anything that happens is on you”. And then the missile attack happened.’

6.2.3.1.7. During Phase 2 of the evacuation orders, the areas instructed to evacuate south Wadi Gaza covered the location of five hospitals, including Nasser Hospital, the second largest hospital in Gaza after Al-Shifa:

- Nasser Hospital
- Al-Amal Hospital
- Dar Al-Salam Hospital (already reported to be out of service on 1 November 2023)
- The Algerian Hospital
- The European Hospital

6.2.3.1.8. Nasser and Al-Amal hospitals were reported to be forced out of service during Phase 2 of the ‘evacuation orders’ (see Figure 53 & Figure 55)

6.2.3.1.9. At least 24 hospitals were reportedly forced out of service across the whole Gaza Strip. These hospitals are primarily located within areas that have received ‘evacuation orders’ (see Figure 53).

6.2.3.1.10. Furthermore, all hospitals in areas reached by the advance of the ground invasion were reportedly forced out of service (see Figure 56), including Al-Khair hospital in Al-Mawasi, which did not receive any ‘evacuation orders’. On 22 January, the Israeli army stormed Al-Khair Hospital, the only hospital located in the ‘safe zone’ in Al-Mawasi, and arrested members of staff, according to the Gaza health ministry (see Figure 55).^{67}

6.2.3.1.11. The attacks, siege, and invasion of Nasser Hospital, the main medical facility serving ‘southern’ Gaza, led to the repeat displacement of thousands of already displaced persons who had reportedly taken shelter at the hospital, and ultimately forced the hospital out of service on 18 February 2024.^{68}

6.2.3.1.12. Also during Phase 2, Al-Shifa hospital witnessed another wave of mass displacement. On 29 January 2024, an area that included the hospital received an ‘evacuation order’, and the surrounding area was once again bombed. At the time of the ‘evacuation order’, Al-Shifa had started to regain functionality, and had become a site of refuge for around 20,000 displaced

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Palestinians. As of 8 February 2024, the World Health Organization office in the occupied Palestinian Territory (WHOoPT) have stated that the hostilities around Al-Shifa have undone any humanitarian progress, with the hospital regressing to minimal functionality (see Figure 54).\(^{69}\)

6.2.3.13. Shuhada Al-Aqsa, the main hospital in Deir Al-Balah, was reportedly attacked on 10 January 2024.\(^{70}\) While the hospital is still functioning, it does not have the capacity to service the increasing numbers of displaced persons in the area.\(^{71}\) Moreover, Rafah lacks large medical facilities, and the existing operational hospitals, such as Al-Kuwaiti Hospital, are also unable to offer adequate medical assistance to the influx of displaced individuals being directed to Rafah. This situation necessitates the establishment of field clinics to supplement the existing healthcare infrastructure.\(^{72}\)

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\(^{69}\) https://twitter.com/WHOoPt/status/175565939807838920

\(^{70}\) https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2024/1/10/photos-al-aqsa-martyrs-hospital

\(^{71}\) https://www.msf.org/last-medics-providing-healthcare-amidst-death-and-destruction-gaza

During Phase 1 of the ‘evacuation orders’ (between 13 October and 24 November 2023) at least 16 out of 20 hospitals in northern Gaza went out of service. Three of the remaining hospitals were forced out of service after the end of the temporary ceasefire in December 2023. The one hospital in ‘northern’ Gaza that remained functional after December 2024 was a smaller maternity facility.
Figure 53. During Phase 2 of the evacuation orders (1 December 2023 – ongoing), more hospitals were forced out of service, including Nasser Hospital, the largest in ‘south’ Gaza.
Figure 54. An ‘evacuation order’ was published on 29 January 2024 (darker yellow region) for the area where Al-Shifa is located, weeks after the hospital was already invaded and went out-of-service in November 2023, and after it started regaining parts of its functionality following the temporary ceasefire.
Figure 55. The ground invasion in Khan Younis has pushed Nasser and Al-Amal hospitals out of service, in addition to Al-Khair, the only hospital inside the ‘safe zone’ in the area.
Figure 56. Correlation between the expansion of the Israeli ground invasion and the locations of hospitals forced out of service.
6.2.3.2. **Attacks on UN Schools and facilities as Shelters**

6.2.3.2.1. According to data published by the UN on 2 March 2024 on damaged and destroyed schools in Gaza, at least 318 of these schools served as shelters.\(^{73}\) Based on satellite imagery analysis and initial field reports, at least 287 of these schools were damaged or destroyed, with 39 of them located in Rafah municipality which is supposed to be a ‘safe zone’ (see sections 6.2.1 & 6.2.2). The attacks on and destruction of these facilities leads to further displacement of the civilian population taking refuge in them (see Figure 57).

6.2.3.2.2. Attacks on educational facilities acting as shelters also included training centers like the UNRWA Khan Younis Training Centre (KYTC), directly adjacent to the ‘humanitarian area’ in Al-Mawasi. The facility became an overcrowded shelter for 43,000 displaced persons.\(^{74}\) Satellite images taken by Planet on 30 November 2023 shows tents dispersed throughout the UNRWA facility. On 24 January, the UN reported that 13 people were killed and many more injured when a building within the facility was hit by direct fire.\(^{75}\) Two days later, on 26 January, the Israeli army ordered the displaced civilians taking refuge in the UN-run shelter to leave by the afternoon of the same day. Satellite imagery from 4 February shows the evacuation of the tent camp, which was then cleared and destroyed (see Figure 58.)

\(^{73}\) [https://gis.unicef.org/portal/apps/dashboards/c6e0bdf744164b2f84276071b1a83e78](https://gis.unicef.org/portal/apps/dashboards/c6e0bdf744164b2f84276071b1a83e78)


Figure 57. Data published by the UN shows locations of damaged and destroyed schools in Gaza Strip. Schools documented to have received internally displaced people (IDPs) are marked by larger icons (red and yellow). Schools that received IDPs and were also damaged are marked red. The map only shows schools that have been damaged.
Figure 58. Planet satellite images showing the UNRWA Khan Younis Training Centre (KYTC), used as a shelter for displaced people throughout December 2023 and January 2024, and subsequently cleared and destroyed by 4 February 2024.
7. ABOUT FORENSIC ARCHITECTURE

Forensic Architecture is a research agency, based at Goldsmiths, University of London, investigating human rights violations including environmental destruction and violence committed by states, police forces, militaries, and corporations. FA has undertaken more than ninety investigations worldwide including in Pakistan, Indonesia, Myanmar, Guatemala, Mexico, Chile, Brazil, the US, UK, Germany, Turkey, Ukraine and Greece. FA is directed by Professor Eyal Weizman and works to develop new evidentiary methods and apply them in complex multimedia spatial analyses. The agency also works regularly with local and international NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Doctors without Borders, the ICRC, and the UN.

Our investigations employ pioneering techniques in spatial and architectural analysis, open-source investigation, digital modelling, and immersive technologies, as well as documentary research, situated interviews, and academic collaboration. Findings from our investigations have been presented in national and international courtrooms, parliamentary inquiries, and exhibitions at some of the world’s leading cultural institutions and in international media, as well as in citizen’s tribunals and community assemblies.

FA’s case files have been submitted as evidence in national legal processes across the world, including in Israeli courts. The agency’s findings have also been submitted or presented in international jurisdictions including the European Court of Human Rights and the UN General Assembly, and in national courtrooms, parliamentary inquiries, and truth commissions around the world.

Forensic Architecture has been recognised for its work in the field of journalism with a Peabody Award for Digital and Interactive Storytelling (2021), the European Cultural Foundation (ECF) Princess Margriet Award for Culture (2018), the Designboom Design Prize for Social Impact (2019), and a Peabody–Facebook Futures of Media Award for Interactive Storytelling (2017). FA director Eyal Weizman is a life fellow of the British Academy and recipient of an MBE for ‘services to architecture’. He is a member of the Technology Advisory Board of the International Criminal Court in The Hague and is on the board of the Centre for Investigative Journalism.
8. FORENSIC ARCHITECTURE'S HISTORY IN LEGAL/POLITICAL PROCESSES

Forensic Architecture has produced evidence for the then-UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism Ben Emmerson QC, in whose company we presented our findings on drone warfare at the UN General Assembly in New York in October 2013 and the Human Rights Council in Geneva in 2014. We have also presented evidence that accompanied a complaint to the International Criminal Court (ICC) into the killing of Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh in 2022.

We presented evidence in the Israeli High Court in the case of The Committee of the Village of Battir vs. the Ministry of Defence (HCJ 7612/12) through Michael Sfard, who won this case on 4 January 2015.

Our report on the Use of White Phosphorus in Urban Environments was presented at the UN Human Rights Council Geneva in November 2012, and in March 2011 in the Israeli High Court through Michael Sfard.

Our Forensic Oceanography team presented the case of the Left to Die Boat before the French Tribunal de Grande Instance in April 2012, the Brussels Tribunal de première instance in November 2013, and in the courts of Spain and Italy in June 2013. Forensic Oceanography also had findings presented before the European Court of Human Rights in 2018.

The Gaza Platform and our Rafah: Black Friday report about the 2014 Gaza War, developed with Amnesty International, were submitted to the UN Independent Commission of Inquiry in March 2015, and to the International Criminal Court in March and September 2015.

Our 2019 investigation into the killing of Tahir Elci, a renowned Kurdish human rights lawyer, was cited by UN rapporteurs as instrumental in the re-opening of the Turkish state’s investigation into the killing, and was subsequently cited in the prosecutors’ indictment, and discussed at length in court.

Our investigation of the murder of Pavlos Fyssas was played before the Court of Appeal of Athens in 2018, as part of the trial of 69 members of the Golden Dawn political organisation, and was reportedly significant in the judge’s decision in the case.

Our investigation into the presence of Russian military units in eastern Ukraine in 2014 was submitted to the European Court of Human Rights in 2019 as part of an ongoing case.

Our investigation into intentional fire-setting in Papuan rainforests is currently before a court in Hamburg, where submissions were made in February 2021.

Our investigation into the systematic destruction of Palestinian medical infrastructure in the occupied Gaza Strip by the Israeli occupation forces since 7 October 2023 was cited in the submissions by the government of South Africa to the International Court of Justice in January 2024.